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This project examines the foreign policy rhetoric of Bill Clinton in the post-Cold
War world.  My reading of Clinton’s rhetoric reveals that a change/order binary
underwrote his oratory.   Clinton defined change as being the underlying guidepost of the
post-Cold War international setting.  Order was defined through how he could guide,
shape, direct, and manage American foreign policy in a sea of change, represented
through his use of what I call America’s foreign policy vocabulary.  This lexicon is based
on three rhetorical components—the definitions of America’s role in the world,
identification of the enemies we face, and the grand strategy we use to achieve American
interest—have been a resource for presidential foreign policy discourse since America’s
founding.  Clinton’s use of this vocabulary maintained continuity in its use with his
predecessors, but he also modified it in key ways to deal with the changes of the global
environment.  These modifications positioned Clinton to direct and manage the change to
serve American interests which offered a semblance of order for American foreign policy
in a sea of international disorder.
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1CHAPTER ONE:
PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY
VOCABULARY
For over 40 years, the Cold War structured America’s foreign policy universe as a
contest between the United States and the former Soviet Union, characterized as much by
a war of words, as by physical confrontation (Cameron, 2002; Hinds & Windt, 1991;
Medhurst et. al., 1997).  During that era, American presidents presented a clear image of
the United States as the leader of the free world and defender of civilization.  They
presented the Soviet Union as our central enemy and articulated a specific strategy—the
grand strategy of containment—to combat that threat (Judis, 2004; McCrisken, 2003).
However, when the Cold War ended American foreign affairs lost much of its
former coherence.  Phillippe Le Prestre (1997) posited the defeat of America’s central
enemy “destroyed familiar guideposts, undermined the traditional means of mobilizing
support for foreign policy, and overthrew whatever bureaucratic consensus may have
existed” (p. 65).  The implosion of the Soviet Union created discord and debate among
America’s foreign policy intelligentsia concerning a variety of issues including
America’s role in the world, when and how the United States would use force, and what
grand strategy would replace containment. These pundits, policymakers, and political
leaders struggled to communicate a direction for international relations and create
consensus on how to conduct foreign policy in a different epoch.
To complicate matters further, the United States confronted a post-Cold War
environment full of new challenges, including an apparent rise in ethnic conflict, greater
2focus on transnational dilemmas such as global warming and AIDS, the homogenization
and redefinition of culture, emergence of rogue states, and exacerbation of wealth
disparities between developed and developing nations (Bacevich, 2003; Leiber, 1997;
Schelinger, 1992).  Meanwhile, the importance of international organizations and
corporations as international actors increased, accompanied by an expansion of
technology and global communication, acceleration of free trade, and
interdependence/integration of the global system (see Friedman, 2000; Huntington, 1996;
Rose, 1991).  The resulting international environment produced both opportunities and
challenges for American foreign policy and warranted a different direction in U.S.
foreign policy rhetoric from the Manichean logic of the Cold War (Kane, 1991).
President George H. W. Bush attempted to provide this course for American
foreign policy by proclaiming a “new world order” based on the promotion of
democracy, human rights, and free trade.  Yet, much like his Cold War predecessors, a
good deal of Bush’s discourse revolved around the metaphor of war (Cole, 1996).  Bush’s
declaration of a “new world order,” while simultaneously employing discourse
reminiscent of the Cold War, yielded discursive incoherence.  As Timothy Cole (1996)
explained, Bush enjoyed considerable foreign policy success with his triumphant
missions in Panama and Kuwait, but he was “clearly not articulating a vision of politics
that might transcend Cold War prescriptions” (p. 107).  Roy Joseph (2006) further argued
that Bush’s New World Order was supposed to be shorthand for a new form of moral
leadership for the post-Cold War world, similar to the prescriptions enshrined in the
charter of the United Nations.  But Bush was unable to fully define what he meant by the
3phrase.  Consequently, his defeat in the 1992 presidential election gave the Clinton
administration its own chance to shape U.S. foreign policy rhetoric.
The task of this project is to explore how Bill Clinton crafted American foreign
policy rhetoric for the post-Cold War world.  The end of the Cold War proved to be an
important transition period in the history of foreign affairs, similar to the aftermaths of
each World War where there were questions about the make-up of the international
environment, America’s role in that setting, who our enemies were and what specific
instruments should the United States emphasize to best achieve its interests (Hutchings,
1998; Judis, 2003; MacGregor Burns, 1999; Schonberg, 2003).  The president, in his role
as chief of foreign policy, can leave an indelible mark on the direction of this transition
period and the future of U.S. foreign relations through his discourse.  Through his
rhetoric, he president can both shape how a particular subject is viewed and educate
audiences on that subject (Beasley, 2004; Bostdorff, 1994; Edelman, 1988; Zarefsky,
2004).  Considering that Bill Clinton was the first true post-Cold War president, his time
in office gave him the opportunity to offer a direction in American international affairs
different than his predecessors.
Moreover, rhetorical scholarship on Clinton’s foreign policy has been lacking.
Although, there has been a good deal of scholarship exploring his rhetoric on his
domestic agenda and the Lewinsky scandal (Blaney & Benoit, 2001; Brovero, 2001;
Carcasson & Rice, 1999; Denton & Holloway, 2003; Murphy, 2002, 1999, 1997; Parry-
Giles & Parry-Giles, 2002; Smith, 1994), only a few essays on his foreign policy
discourse have been produced (see Butler, 2002; Cole, 1999; Conti, 1998; Ivie, 2000;
4Kuypers, 1997; Olson, 2004; Stuckey, 1995) and no large-scale analysis of his overall
foreign policy speech has been conducted.  When you  consider there was a good deal of
foreign policy activity during Clinton’s presidency where rhetoric played a role in the
success or failure of the passage of over 300 bilateral and multilateral trade agreements
like NAFTA and GATT; the creation of the WTO; the Mexican and Asian Financial
Crises; the peace negotiations in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Ethiopia and Eritrea,
and East Timor; the Kyoto Accords; the expansion of NATO; the terrorist attacks on
American targets in New York City, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen (the
USS Cole); the Rwandan Genocide; and the interventions into Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia,
Kosovo, along with the bombing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The fact that more
focus has not been paid to the discourse surrounding these specific subjects, as well as his
overall rhetorical course in foreign policy is a severe omission.  Clinton’s foreign policy
“set in motion a pattern of U.S. policy initiatives. . . that will affect U.S. foreign policy
for years to come” and provides a rich legacy within foreign affairs (Rubinstein et. al,
2000, p. xi; McCormick, 2002).  This legacy of activity, along with the fact that Clinton
presided over a key transition period in American foreign policy justifies an examination
of how this president crafted American foreign policy.  By examining his discourse, we
obtain a better understanding of how Clinton navigated the post-Cold War world and the
symbolic legacy he left for foreign policy and on the presidency.
My reading of the president’s discourse reveals that a theme of a change/order
binary pervades and unites the chapters of this text and underwrites the president’s
foreign policy discourse. For presidents to speak of change is certainly not unusual; the
5idea of change is a common theme in inaugural addresses (Benoit, 2005).  In terms of
foreign policy, Clinton understood change to be the defining feature of the post-Cold War
world.  Unlike the Cold War context where the international environment was a
structured, static, and relatively stable bipolar order, the post-Cold War world was,
according to Clinton’s logic, underwritten by an era of accelerated globalization, which
brought about rapid change both positive and negative, creating a good deal of
opportunity for the United States, but also presented American foreign policy with a
series of challenges.
 The president defined order through how he could guide, shape, direct, and
manage our international affairs within this sea of change through his use of what I call
America’s foreign policy vocabulary.  This vocabulary contains three rhetorical
components that have provided a framework for presidential discourse on U.S.
international relations since the nation was founded.  Presidents visions for foreign affairs
are structured by these three characteristics, which are the definitions of America’s role in
the world, the identification of the enemies we face, and the grand strategy by which we
advance America’s and our allies interests.1  Taken as a whole, this framework shapes the
national understanding of foreign affairs; serves as a guide through complex international
terrain; offers parameters under which specific action may be taken; educates the
American public in the “realities” of a dangerous world; supplies rhetorical support for
1 I do not claim that the features I have offered are an exhaustive list of America’s foreign policy
vocabulary, but merely these elements have been the most salient throughout American history.  John Judis
(2004) has persuasively argued that American leaders have always articulated America’s role, identified its
enemies, and set forth the means utilized to advance American interests.  In addition, these attributes were
at the core of post-Cold War foreign policy formation, in which foreign policy elites debated a new
direction for U.S. foreign relations.
6policy decisions; and outlines the opportunities and obstacles facing U.S. interests.
Analyzing how Clinton constructed each aspect of this vocabulary reveals the unique
contributions he made to foreign policy rhetoric, while at the same time demonstrates
how he maintained, but modified this vocabulary to deal with the changes in the global
environment. America’s transition from Cold War to post-Cold War international meant
Clinton could not necessarily rely on the way presidents had used America’s foreign
policy vocabulary in previous epochs.  The post-Cold War world did not necessarily
require new ideas in foreign policy discourse, but it certainly required a recasting of some
of the lexicon’s basic qualities.  These modifications allowed Clinton to provide direction
for American foreign policy, position the United States to shape and manage the change
for the benefit of American interests, and offer a semblance of order for American
foreign policy in a sea of international disorder.
 Over the next few pages I discuss the importance of presidential rhetoric in
foreign policy and America’s foreign policy vocabulary.  First, I explain the central role
the president plays in foreign policy and how presidential rhetoric enhances that role.
Second, I outline the essentials of American foreign policy discourse, which make up the
body of presidential discourse on foreign policy.  Finally, I delineate the methodological
procedures for this dissertation, paying specific attention to a defense of the textual
choices I have made and how I authorize my criticism within this project, before
previewing the upcoming chapters.
7The Presidency and Foreign Policy
 The president is the most important political actor within American politics.
Robert Denton, Jr. and Gary Woodward (1990) describe the presidency as “an office, a
role, a persona, constructing a position of power, myth, legend, and persuasion.
Everything a president does or says has implications and communicates ‘something.’
Every act, word, or phrase becomes a calculated and measured for a response” (pp. 199-
200).  No political topic is left untouched by a modern president.  He is the proverbial sun
of America’s political universe.2
 This importance is magnified in the foreign policy arena because of a president’s
constitutional obligations.  Article II of the Constitution makes the president the
“commander-in-chief” of the armed forces and gives him the power to appoint
ambassadors and “make treaties” with other nation-states.  That's why the president leads
the government in foreign relations, a constitutional mandate which creates a number of
foreign policy roles for the president—commander-in-chief, chief diplomat, and
especially in the last century, world leader (Rosati, 1993; Rossiter, 1956; Snow & Brown,
1997).  Concomitantly, as American involvement in international affairs grew, so did the
president’s dominance in foreign policy making (Ikenberry, 2001; Schonberg, 2003).
In the republic’s first century, presidents concentrated most of their energy on
domestic matters (McDougall, 1997; Mead, 2001; Merk, 1963; Stephanson, 1995).
2 See A. Brinkley & D. Dyer (2004). American presidency.  New York: Houghton Mifflin; M. A.
Genovese (2000). The power of the American presidency: 1789-2000. New York: Oxford University
Press; R. Neustadt (1960). Presidential power: The politics of leadership.  New York: Wiley; R. Y.
Shapiro, L. R. Jacobs, & M. J. Kumar (2000). Presidential power: Forging the president for the twenty-
first century.  New York: Columbia University Press
8However, at the turn of the twentieth century around the time of the Spanish-American
War, American responsibility and leadership in international relations accelerated as the
United States became more involved in international affairs and leading the world on a
variety of issues. The power of the president in foreign affairs also increased (Peterson,
1994).3  During the early stages of the Cold War, foreign policy became even more
centralized for it was the president and his aides who devised strategies for opposing the
Soviet Union.   This presidential dominance inspired Aaron Wildavsky (1969) to
hypothesize the existence of two presidencies: one foreign and one domestic.
 Wildavsky (1969) studied congressional roll call votes on domestic and foreign
policy, surmising from them that the two presidencies were “fraternal—but hardly
identical—twins” (Peterson, 1994, p. 225).  The agenda of the domestic presidency was
subject to the debate and the vagaries of partisan politics found within American
democracy, especially in Congress.  In contrast, the foreign policy presidency enjoyed
relative independence in managing America’s foreign relations.  Wildavsky argued that
as foreign policy issues require fast action, they are more appropriate for executive
decision making.  Presidents also have a good deal of constitutional power to commit
3 Presidential power in foreign affairs has increased in the modern presidency.  For other discussions of this
issue look to S. E. Ambrose (1991/1992).  The presidency and foreign policy. Foreign Affairs, 70, 120-
138; R. Dahl (1964). Congress and American foreign policy.  New York: Norton; C.W. Kegley, Jr. & E.
Wittkopf (1979). American foreign policy: Pattern and process.  New York: St. Martin’s Press; B.
Kellerman & R. Barilleaux (1991). The president as world leader.  New York: St. Martin’s Press; T.
McCrisken (2003). American exceptionalism and the legacy of Vietnam: U.S. foreign policy since 1974; P.
E. Peterson (1994). The president’s dominance in foreign policy making. Political Science Quarterly, 109,
215-234; R. Rose (1991). The postmodern president: George Bush meets the world, 2nd ed.  Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; K. K. Schonberg (2003). Pursuing the national interest: Moments of transition in
twentieth century American foreign policy.  Westport, CT: Praeger.; D. M. Snow and E. Brown (1997).
Beyond the water?s edge: An introduction to United States foreign policy.  New York: St. Martin’s.
9resources for foreign policy, thus allowing them the ability to acquire greater information
on international topics.  Furthermore, Wildavsky argued the general public knew little to
nothing about foreign policy; instead they leave it to the president to lead in foreign
affairs.  Thus, as both Congress and the public tend to defer to the president on matters of
international relations, the president dominates in constructing and managing foreign
affairs.
Congress attempted to counter this presidential dominance with the passage of the
War Powers Act of 1973, which sought to limit the president’s ability to initiate the use
of military force.  This supposedly reinserted Congress back into the calculus for
decisions on military intervention.  Another result of the act was that it renewed interest
in the utility of Wildavsky’s hypothesis, in which in seeking to validate his findings, a
number of published studies replicated his method—analysis of congressional roll call
votes—to conduct inquiries into various presidential administrations. These scholars
examined the Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan administrations, but the mixed
results of their investigations neither confirmed nor refuted the thesis (Parsons, 1994;
Renka & Jones, 1991; Schraufnagel & Shellman, 2001; Sigelman, 1979).  George
Edwards III (1989) summed up Wildavsky’s critics when he stated, “there is less to the
two presidencies than meets the eye” (p. 69).  Simply put, Wildavsky’s vision of
presidential power in foreign policy may not be accurate, which calls into question belief
in the president’s dominance in international relations.
 In defending Wildavsky’s hypothesis, some scholars maintain we should move
beyond the examination of congressional roll call votes and embrace other indicators that
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may confirm the president’s dominance in crafting American international affairs
(Lindsay & Steger, 1993).  One such study examined executive orders to determine
presidential power in foreign policy, as these orders are an important aspect of
presidential power.  Bryan Marshall and Richard Parcelle, Jr. (2005; see also Mayer,
2002) found executive orders offered evidence in favor of the two presidencies thesis, as
presidents use executive orders to take direct action in international affairs. Accordingly,
the president’s foreign policy dominance is not fully captured by studying congressional
votes, as other existing indicators support Wildavsky’s supposition about presidential
dominance in the formation of international relations.
A further indicator of the chief executive’s authority is presidential rhetoric, for it
is by his rhetorical pronouncements that the president both defines and leads in foreign
policy.4 It is through America’s foreign policy vocabulary that the president orders
America’s foreign policy universe, defines its reality, and educates the public on U.S.
foreign affairs.
Presidential Rhetoric and Foreign Policy
Presidents communicate their ideas about America’s foreign relations through
public discourse.  This discourse serves at least two important functions: to shape the
political reality of American foreign affairs and helps to teach that reality to various
audiences.  First, presidential foreign policy rhetoric can shape political reality.  Murray
4 For notable studies on a president’s rhetorical leadership in foreign policy look to: D. M. Bostdorff
(1994). The presidency and the rhetoric of foreign crisis.  Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina
Press.  K.K. Campbell & K.H. Jamieson (1990). Deeds done in words: Presidential rhetoric and the
genres of governance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  R. Denton, Jr. & R. Woodward (1990).
Presidential communication.  Westport, CT: Praeger; J.M. Hogan (1994). The nuclear freeze campaign:
Rhetoric and foreign policy in the telepolitical age.  East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press.
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Edelman (1988) noted that language is a “key creator of the worlds people experience”
(p. 103).  People do not experience specific events, but experience the language of events.
This is not to say that specific situations and contexts do not influence a speaker, but it is
the language used to discuss various ideas and situations that create and connect people to
various “worlds.”  In international affairs, American presidents are the most prominent
speakers and they use language to shape the public’s understanding of the world around
us.
The ability to create and shape political reality comes through the president’s
power of definition (Zarefsky, 1986, 2004).  David Zarefsky (2004) noted that political
realities are not “given,” but rather are constructed from a variety of possibilities (p. 611).
In foreign policy, because they have the most knowledge of foreign affairs, along with
extraordinary political power and speak with single voice, presidents have the ability to
define how audiences view various issues, ideas, and situations that concern U.S. foreign
relations.  This does not mean that when presidents define the reality of American
international relations it will resonate with audiences.  Nevertheless, the president’s
prominence within American politics, especially in the area of foreign relations, gives
him the power to shape the way the public views and understands foreign policy.
An example of this power of definition can be found in the president’s ability to
shape the reality of foreign policy crises.  In fact some international crisis situations do
not become crises until the president names them as such (Windt, 1990).  Ronald
Reagan’s discourse on Grenada is a case in point.  When Reagan spoke about the
situation in Grenada his discourse promoted the idea of a building crisis within the
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Caribbean nation (Bostdorff, 1994; see also Klope, 1986).  Reagan created a sense of
urgency for American action by stating that communist insurgents, financed by Cuba and
the Soviet Union, had taken over the country and were endangering the lives of American
medical students.  Even though these students were in no immediate danger, in providing
this rationale for responding to the Grenada situation, Reagan connected Grenada to the
larger battles of the Cold War.  His decision to intervene, which was defined as much by
his words as by American military action on the ground, was for Reagan another battle in
which the United States countered Soviet aggression and contained the spread of
communism.  Thus Reagan helped to influence political reality through his oratory.
Presidents also define foreign policy reality through overarching principles, as
well as specific situations.  For many Americans, the world is a bizarre and mysterious
place (Kuusisto, 1998) for which presidential speech creates a sense of order (Ryan,
2000).  In this context, a president must provide “directional clarity”—clear presidential
leadership through foreign policy rhetoric (Rockman, 1997, p. 40).  The president should
offer “broad visions and values” in American foreign policy because these visions tell us
about America’s place in the world, including our responsibilities and enemies, as well as
the instruments we utilize within global affairs (Stark, 1993, p. 28). The elements of
America’s foreign policy vocabulary encapsulate these visions and values. While not
included in every presidential speech on foreign policy, this lexicon certainly appears in
the overall body of a president’s discourse and supplies the substance for a president’s
“broad vision” of international relations.  By using a foreign policy vocabulary a
13
president defines the opportunities and challenges the United States pursues in its
involvement with the world.
Not only does a president’s discourse help to delineate reality, but it also is
didactic.  Edwin Hargrove (1998) argued the first task of presidential leadership is to:
teach reality to publics and their fellow politicians through rhetoric . . . Teaching
reality involves the explanations of contemporary problems and issues but, at its
best, must invoke and interpret the perennial ideals of the American national
experience as expressed in the past and the present, and as guides for our future
(pp. vii-viii).
Presidents must teach their constituents about the issues important to the United States.
To do so, they couch these issues into larger American ideals such as individual rights,
freedom, and democracy.  In foreign policy, although the public has little to no
information about other states, the president is privy to a good deal of information.  In
teaching the American public about foreign affairs, the president offers a history lesson
about a particular area or the reason a particular issue or nation is important to American
interests (Kuusisto, 1998; Cornog, 2004).  Often these regions present specific
opportunities and/or threats to the United States.  Just as America’s foreign policy
vocabulary supplies the substance to define our political reality in foreign relations, it
also supplies the rhetorical ingredients to teach publics and politicians about the issues in
the world at large that directly affect the United States.  American presidents utilize this
vocabulary to educate the audience as to what America’s role should be in the world, the
threats that we face, and the means the United States should use to achieve its interests.
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Ultimately these two functions of presidential rhetoric help to order the U.S.
symbolic universe in global affairs.  Therefore, the order for this symbolic universe
comes through the president’s use of America’s foreign policy vocabulary.  In this next
section, I explore the specifics of this lexicon.
America’s Foreign Policy Vocabulary
 Rhetorical scholars have offered a number of insightful essays on presidential
foreign policy speech.  Typically, these studies elaborate on war or crisis genres,5 while
few have attempted to characterize the general mode of foreign policy argument.6 For this
project, I maintain that presidents often use a common foreign policy vocabulary rooted
in American political culture.  This lexicon contains specific features that provide the
structure and substance upon which the president builds many of his specific
justifications for a particular situation or for a larger foreign policy vision.
The core characteristics of America’s foreign policy vocabulary are America’s
relationship and role within the world, the adversaries it confronts, and the means to
achieve its foreign policy goals (Judis, 2004).  Depending on the international
5 The literature on war and crisis rhetoric is voluminous.  For notable studies see Bostdorff (1994);
Campbell & Jamieson (1990); R. Cherwitz  (1980).  Making inconsistency: The Tonkin Gulf Crisis.
Communication Quarterly, 28, 27-37; R. A. Cherwitz & K. Zagacki (1986).  Consummatory versus
justificatory crisis rhetoric. Western Journal of Speech Communication, 50, 307-324; B. J. Dow (1989).
The function of epideictic and deliberative strategies in presidential crisis rhetoric. Western Journal of
Speech Communication, 53, 294-317; R. L Ivie (1974).  Presidential motives for war. The Quarterly
Journal of Speech, 60, 337-345; A. Kiewe (1994). The modern presidency and crisis rhetoric.  Westport,
CT: Praeger; J. Kuypers (1997). Presidential crisis rhetoric and the press in the post-Cold War world.
Westport, CT: Praeger.
6 For exceptions see T. A. Hollihan (1986). The public controversy over the Panama Canal treaties:
An analysis of American foreign policy rhetoric. Western Journal of Speech Communication, 50, 386-387;
P. Wander (1984).  The rhetoric of American foreign policy. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 70, 339-
365.
15
environment, these features have been recast by presidents in varying ways to
accommodate different situations.  I delineate these elements as America’s relationship
and role in the world (mission), the threat environment confronting the U.S. (adversaries),
and the grand strategy used to advance America’s interests (means).
These traits structure presidential foreign policy rhetoric as evidenced most
recently in discussions about the direction of post-Cold War foreign policy.  For example,
Henry Kissinger (1994) explained that during the Cold War disagreements arose about
how to employ the grand strategy of containment against the Soviets, but there was no
disagreement over the strategy itself.  After the Soviet collapse America’s foreign
policymakers attempted to outline various ideas on how American foreign policy should
be conducted.  These ideas included what America’s role in the post-Cold War should be
and what new threats the United States might face in this new era (Schonberg, 2003).   In
the following pages, I lay out the theoretical literature that underpins each feature of
America’s foreign policy vocabulary.
America?s Role Within the World
America’s role in the world is structured by the widespread belief in American
exceptionalism.  In this section I examine the basics traits of American exceptionalism
and the way these exceptionalist beliefs are expressed through its two narratives of
exemplar and intervention while at the same time demonstrating how presidents have
used these narratives to define America’s role in the international order.
The basic tenets of American exceptionalism
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To start the discussion regarding American exceptionalism I begin with the word
“exceptionalism” itself.  In defining a state’s image of itself, exceptionalism is used to
describe a particular nation that posits its experience as being distinct from (and superior
to) the rest of the world (McCartney, 2004; Rodgers, 1998).  It is common to believe that
one’s nation-state is exceptional; in fact many political leaders project images of their
nation and people as deviations from the rules that govern most others.  As exceptional
nations, these states rarely experience devolution, and if they do, they are always
accompanied by eventual self-renewal.  This national attitude produces a sense of
national consciousness, a self-image that dictates how a nation-state should perceive itself
within the world.
America’s self-image is structured by its exceptionalist attitude that dictates the
United States is “an extraordinary nation with a special role to play in human history”
(McCrisken, 2003, p. 1).  According to this logic, America is a superior, distinct, and
chosen nation among the various states.  Alexis de Tocqueville (1835/1977) was the first
to use the term exceptional to define the United States and its citizenry, but America’s
exceptionalist roots go back much earlier, all the way to America’s Puritan tradition.  For
example, John Winthrop (1634) issued his famous dictum that the United States was a
“new Israel” and a “shining city upon a hill” (qutd in McCrisken, 2003, p. 5).  According
to Winthrop, America was a beacon of hope for the entire world to admire and emulate.
Over one hundred years later, Thomas Paine (1776) pronounced a similar idea when he
expressed that America had the power to “begin the world over again.”  In other words,
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because it was chosen by Providence, the United States could escape the trappings of
monarchy, hereditary elites, and all of the other ills that plagued Europe.
Eventually this domestic exceptionalist image was transferred to foreign policy.
Here American exceptionalism functioned and continues to function to give Americans
“order to their vision of the world and defining their place in it” (Hunt, 1987, p. 15).  Our
exceptionalist tradition thus defines how the United States sees itself within the
international order.
Three ideas, which have been consistent throughout American history, make up
America’s belief that it is a chosen nation: the United States is a special nation with a
special destiny; the United States is qualitatively different from Europe; and the United
States can escape the trappings of history (McCrisken, 2003). First, as I have already
illustrated, the notion that the United States is a special nation with a special destiny goes
back to colonial pronouncements.  That public expression forged an idea in America’s
belief system that God chose the United States for a special role in history.  This faith
helps America sincerely maintain that its intentions are pure and that its spirit will be
emulated by other states and peoples.  In foreign policy, this claim lends support to the
idea that the U.S. role in the world is always performed with good intentions.
The second trait of exceptionalism is the claim that America is qualitatively
different from the Old World or Europe.  Corrupt European governments exploited their
own people, and then sought to dominate peoples abroad solely to increase their power
(McCrisken, 2003).  The settlers of the New World escaped this political environment to
come to a place imagined as a virgin land where people could build upon ideas, values,
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and principles untried in other parts of the globe.  The U.S. Constitution created from
these ideas offered the governmental structure for America to develop into the greatest
republican society in the world while escaping the corruption and discord found in
European politics (Hofstader, 1948). This claim imparts the justification for the United
States to remain distinct from other regions of the world.
 The final claim of American exceptionalism is that the United States can escape
the problems that eventually plague all states.  All great nations are destined to rise and
fall.  But America’s founders argued we could escape this natural national devolution
because of our unique geography, system of government, and Divine Providence.
America is exceptional “not for what it is, but what it could be” (McCrisken, 2003, p. 8).
Although a perfect union is never possible within the United States or in any nation,
because the United States always attempts to form a “more perfect union,” its exceptional
quality is never fully complete.  This distinctiveness and superiority of the United States
allows it to continually strive to better both itself and the world.  According to this logic,
America will never experience the devolution other great powers have experienced.  This
reasoning serves as the basis for the United States to declare it knows what is best for the
world because our heritage and experience are superior to that of other nation-states.
American presidents have long subscribed to these basic concepts of American
exceptionalism (McCrisken, 2003; McCartney, 2004; McEvoy-Levy, 2001). Evidence of
this claim can be found in American presidents inaugural addresses where one of their
tasks is to reaffirm America’s belief in its exceptionalism (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990).
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In foreign policy, the way presidents see the international order and America’s place in it
is supported through the basic claims of U.S. self-image.
Although presidents largely agree on the basic premises of America’s
exceptionalism, there has been a good deal of tension as to how presidents project and
enact a specific role for the United States within the world.  This tension has led to the
creation of two distinct narratives of what America’s role in the world should be: the
mission of exemplar and the mission of intervention (Baritz, 1985; Bercovitch, 1980;
Coles, 2002; Judis, 2004; Lipset, 1996; McCartney, 2004; McEvoy-Levy, 2001; Madsen,
1998; Merk, 1963; Reid, 1976).
The mission of exemplar
Proponents of the mission of exemplar define America’s role as “standing apart
from the world and serving merely as a model of social and political possibility”
(McCartney, 2004, p. 401).  Activities that create our exceptional model of “social and
political possibility” include perfecting American institutions, increasing material
prosperity, integrating diverse populations into one America, and continuing to strive for
more civil rights.  By doing these things, the United States demonstrates its exceptional
quality and becomes an symbol for others to emulate.  However, proponents of this
mission argue that achieving and maintaining an exemplar status is a full time job.  To do
more than that (such as meddling in the affairs of other states) would not do much good
for those nations or for the United States because it would put an undue burden upon the
American people. As H.W. Brands (1998) warned, “in attempting to save the world, and
probably failing, America could risk losing its democratic soul” (p. viii).  In other words,
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for adherents of this view, the United States stands as a beacon of freedom, but it should
not involve itself in the political or military battles of other states.  America’s mission of
exemplar thus acts as a deterrent to the United States getting heavily involved with other
nation-states.  By staying out of the affairs of other states, the United States can protect
its body politic.  Essentially, the mission of exemplar created the foundation for
pronouncements of American isolation.
In the 18th and 19th centuries American presidents used the mission of exemplar to
constrain the United States from involving itself with other nations.7 For example,
George Washington (1796) declared, “the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign
nations, is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political
connections as possible . . . It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with
any portion of the foreign world” (qutd. in McCrisken, 2003, p. 12; Ellis, 2004).  Note
that Washington advised against any “permanent alliance.” According to his logic, the
United States should not involve itself deeply with other nation-states, and, consequently,
in the creation and regulation of the international order. In addition, Washington’s use of
the phrase “foreign world” is revealing, as 18th century European politics was full of
monarchies, power hungry hereditary elites, revolution, and corruption—all of which
were “foreign” to the United States.  If America was to involve itself in European
7 I do not mean to suggest that the United States was not expansionist during the 19th century when it
invoked notions of “Manifest Destiny” as justifications for the Mexican-American War or acquired
territory in the Gadsen Purchase in 1853, Alaska in 1867, and the Spanish-American War in 1898.
However, the United States did not involve itself in European politics until the turn of the 20th century.
The mission of exemplar curtailed America’s involvement with the European continent, as it was dominant
over the mission of intervention during the 19th century.
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political struggles, it might actually “infect” its body politic with foreign contagions,
thereby stunting its own growth.  Therefore it was considered better to engage in
commercial rather than political relations with other nation-states.
Thomas Jefferson reinforced Washington’s advice on foreign affairs.  In his first
inaugural, Jefferson (1801/2001) asserted that the United States seeks “peace, commerce,
and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none” (p. 18; Browne,
2003).  According to this argument, Jefferson’s America was neutral—it gave no
preference to any nation-state and did not seek to involve itself in the political battles of
other countries.  Jefferson’s use of the word entangling was important, as an “entangling
alliance” suggests images of America involving itself in not only commercially in the
affairs of states, but also politically and militarily.  By keeping the United States out of
entangling alliances, both Washington and Jefferson laid the groundwork for the United
States to have the freedom to choose whether or not to intervene in the political struggles
of other nations.
 Therefore according to the founders, Divine Providence blessed America with
special circumstances and qualities.  By invoking the mission of exemplar and refusing to
become involved in the internal or external affairs of others, America’s distinctive
qualities were allowed to grow and develop, and then become an example for the whole
world to emulate.  The mission of exemplar was later extended into the 20th century
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where it established the basic foundations of isolationism that underwrote American
foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of World War I.8
The mission of intervention
Around the turn of the 20th century, American ambitions in international affairs
started to change.  Leaders began to advocate that a new mission—intervention—should
guide U.S. decisions in foreign policy matters.  Proponents of this mission, like the
exemplarists, hold that the United States was exceptional, but they way the United States
promotes this exceptionalism was the active engagement in the world not only
economically but also politically (Bostdorff, 1994). These advocates argued that the
United States could no longer stay out of international affairs; rather, America’s
exceptionalist heritage required the United States the duty to take the responsibility of
leading the world in continued progress and defending those who subscribe to similar
ideals.  In its most extreme form, interventionists allege that America has a duty to
impose its value structure on other nation-states.
Ultimately this interventionist mission underwrites the American role as “leader
of the free world.”  Interventionists argue that as few constraints limit American
involvement in foreign relations, America can essentially do what it pleases because of its
providential heritage.  The actions it takes are not only for its own best interests, but also
those of the world.
8 The United States has never been “isolationist,” which means that it has never cut off all contact from the
world.  It has always been involved in the affairs of other states, especially commercially.  However,
isolationism, in this dissertation, signifies refraining from excessive entanglement in the political affairs of
other states, which means the United States does not bind itself to large alliance structures, nor does it
attempt to impose its values on others.
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  The worldviews of those who espouse the mission of intervention as compared
to those that espouse the mission of exemplar create tension within American foreign
policy, as both convey different ideas of America’s role in the world.  In American
history, especially during the early part of the 20th century, prominent advocates of these
missions have been in direct conflict with each other over the direction of American
foreign policy.  For example, in the debate over the League of Nations, two diametrically
opposed views appeared regarding America’s involvement in the post-war organization.
Woodrow Wilson advocated the United States be fully invested in the League of Nations,
which would produce the opportunity for America to spread its values and interests.
However, the U.S. Senate, led by Henry Cabot Lodge, sharply hindered Wilson’s postwar
interventionism, as the Senate viewed full international involvement with skepticism.  In
the Senate debates over the League of Nations many favored a much more watered down
role for the United States in the post-World War I world (Ambrosius, 1987; Dorsey,
1999; Ikenberry 2001; McDougall, 1997).  These opponents upheld the exemplarist
worldview that America should continue to perfect its own institutions and not try to
export its interests and values to other nations.  The opposing views of Wilson and Lodge
led to open rancor between the White House and Senate over the direction of American
foreign affairs and eventually defeated the U.S. attempt to join the League of Nations.
Wilson’s dream of this international order eventually came to fruition in the wake
of World War II.  In dealing with the aftermath of World War II, like Wilson, President
Truman invoked America’s interventionary mission.  For Truman, World War II proved
America’s greatness.  An international order based on American principles had been
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created fulfilling the wishes of both Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt.  However,
America’s victory in World War II endowed it with the responsibility to protect freedom
and peace from the threat of Soviet communism.  In what came to be known as the
Truman Doctrine, the president contended:
the free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.
If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we
shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation (McCrisken, 2003, p. 22; see
also Ivie, 1986).
Here Truman used the phrase “maintaining their freedoms,” which meant America’s
victory in World War II had created freedom for a good deal of the world’s nations.
Because the United States was the primary progenitor of this freedom, Truman contended
America had the duty to maintain those freedoms against all threats that may appear,
including that represented by the Soviet Union.  According to this president, the failure of
American leadership by not standing up as the globe’s defender could mean the freedom
the United States had established for the world would be lost.  This duty to defend
freedom gave the United States justification for asserting its leadership role in the Cold
War.  By his logic, defending freedom abroad created more domestic security at home
because the United States would not have to worry about foreign threats coming to
America’s shores.
 As the Cold War progressed, American presidents continued to uphold Truman’s
maxim of defending freedom abroad to create greater security at home.  In his first
inaugural, John Kennedy (1961) asserted that every nation should know “whether it
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wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship,
support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty” (p. 4).
Here Kennedy joined his predecessors in committing himself to continuing America’s
mission to defend freedom to ensure its survival and maintain the security of the United
States.
After Kennedy, American presidents continually promoted the U.S. commitment
of leadership through the mission of intervention (McCrisken, 2003).  When the Cold
War ended, George H.W. Bush furthered the mission with his pronouncement of a “new
world order.”  For Bush, the Cold War had stunted democracy’s march, giving the United
States the job of maintaining what it had accomplished after World War II.  In the post-
Cold War world, America’s duty was to continue to as the world’s leader as well as help
spread democracy to every corner of the planet (Smith, 1995).
This brief overview of modern president’s commitments to the mission of
intervention yields two ideas.  First, the intervention duties that American presidents
expressed evolved over the course of the latter half of the 20th century.  Wilson argued
the role for the United States was to remain actively engaged in global affairs as
American leadership was necessary to help foster conditions that would create a stable
and peaceful international order.  Cold War presidents, such as Truman, Eisenhower,
Kennedy, and Reagan, pronounced their duty to be defender of the international order
against the Soviet enemy in which they would fight battles all across the globe to prevent
Soviet dominance.  In the post-Cold War world, George H.W. Bush announced the
United States would continue to lead the world, striving to bring stability and the rule of
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law, which included the spread of democracy, to the entire globe.  Each of these
presidents committed the United States to international engagement and leadership which
allowed for continuity between each commander-in-chief regardless of party.  This
continuity created a legacy of leadership future presidents may follow.
Second, it is important to note that these presidents, especially after World War II,
started to intertwine the missions of exemplar and intervention in justifying America’s
role as world leader.9  The logic that worked with intertwining these two narratives, as we
saw with Harry Truman, was that by confronting America’s enemies abroad we would
not have to be fought domestically.  Fulfilling the intervention mission allowed American
institutions to be renewed and flourish in our continuing expansion of equality through
civil rights and greater economic opportunities for all.  Continually perfecting America’s
domestic situation allowed the U.S. to carry on the exemplar mission.  In short, Cold War
presidents intertwined the two exceptionalist missions by arguing that to be strong at
home, you must be strong abroad.
To sum up briefly, American exceptionalism is a feature of the foreign policy
vocabulary that provides justification for what the United States considers its
responsibilities within the world.  America projects an image of a chosen nation that is
9 There is a growing consensus that the missions of exemplar and intervention are intertwined rather than in
tension.  See Bostdorff (1994); R. L. Coles (2002).  Manifest destiny adapted for 1990s war discourse:
Mission and destiny intertwined. The Sociology of Religion, 63, 403-426.  However, how they are
intertwined is still somewhat of a debate.  In Chapter Two of this project I contend that the two missions
are intertwined, but America’s mission of intervention is predicated on renewing the mission of exemplar;
whereas during the Cold War it was the reverse.   In this sense, Clinton tailored American exceptionalism
to meet his needs for a new era of international politics.  In short, being strong at home allows you to be
strong abroad; whereas his Cold War predecessors had argued being strong abroad allows you to be strong
at home.
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distinct and superior to the rest of the world because of its destiny, heritage, and ability to
escape the eventual devolution of all great powers.  In foreign policy, exceptionalism is
expressed through two statements of mission: exemplar and intervention.  Proponents of
the mission of exemplar hold that the United States should be an example for the world to
emulate.  The idea of America and what it represents, rather than our physical presence,
should be enough for the United States to play a significant role in the world.  This
mission was used by presidents to curb intervention into the internal conflicts of other
nation-states as well as lay the foundation for American isolation.
In contrast, rhetors employ the mission of intervention to urge the United States to
use its unique experience to involve itself in world affairs with the goal of bettering the
lot of humanity.  Presidents have used this mission to justify American involvement with
the world and to help create conditions for the spread of democracy, as well as to defend
those who embrace such as system.  Essentially, for proponents of this view, the United
States (and by extension the president) guard the international order.  America’s actions
abroad lead to greater security at home.  Taken in its most extreme form, proponents of
this mission argue the United States had the duty to impose its value structure on the
world.
Traditionally the missions of exemplar and intervention are in tension because
they represent two distinct visions for America’s role within the world, but as I noted
previously, this tension was lessened by presidents during the Cold War because these
leaders promoted the mission of intervention that would produce an environment
available to perfecting domestic matters.  A leadership role abroad offered the United
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States the security to improve domestic conditions which would continue America’s
mission as the exemplar nation.  By being strong abroad, the United States could
maintain its exemplar status, thereby lessening the tension between the two narratives
because one was necessary for the other.
In analyzing Clinton’s foreign policy discourse, my task is to provide an
understanding of how the president articulated America’s role in the post-Cold War
world.  Clinton’s rhetoric on this subject defined and educated audiences as to what he
understood America’s international position should be in an international setting defined
by the principle of change.  Moreover, an analysis of his oratory provides insight into
how he articulated the basic tenets and narratives of American exceptionalism for a new
international setting.
Constructing the Threat Environment
Since the founding of the United States, construction of threats has been a
constant part of American foreign relations.  The most pointed examples of constructing a
threat environment can be found in presidential justifications for the use of force.  When
a president intervenes militarily, the chief executive rhetorically creates an enemy to rally
public support for the intervention.  How a president constructs these threats gives us
insight into the general threat environment because presidents try to connect the enemy
we immediately face to the larger battles we may be fighting.  As noted earlier, when
Reagan announced his intervention into Grenada, he justified it by putting it into the
larger framework of the Cold War (Bostdorff, 1994) in which Grenada was part of the
larger threat environment the United States faced from the Soviets.  Reagan’s
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intervention reified the Soviet threat while continuing America’s commitment to defend
freedom against communism, wherever and whenever necessary.  Just as Reagan’s
Grenada intervention gave us insight into the larger threat environment faced by the
United States, understanding how Clinton rhetorically crafted our enemies and justified
our interventions gives us greater insight into the post-Cold War world he faced.
Constructing the savage
In advocating military intervention, presidents fashion their ideas through a
savage/civilization binary (Bates, 2004; Bhatia, 2005; Ivie, 1980).10  The savage is
portrayed as having negative motives for its use of force while those who represent
civilization are assigned positive motives to counter the savage’s aggression.  To lay the
groundwork for a possible escalation of the conflict, a president rhetorically manufactures
and shapes a type of image of the savage through contrasting features.
10 The savage/civilization binary is based on the writings of Kenneth Burke (1961), specifically his guilt—
purification—redemption cycle.  For Burke, human communication is centered on “guilt,” which he called
an undesirable state of affairs that occurs when expectations concerning behavior are violated.  Thus a
violation of America’s symbolic order by an enemy would create guilt, which must then somehow be
expunged, which can be done through two victimage strategies: mortification and scapegoating.  The
process to expunge guilt for war discourse is started by first identifying the threat through scapegoating.
By identifying the enemy and dehumanizing it, rhetors symbolically slay the enemy and the use of force
that follows will complete Burke’s cycle and fully expunge the guilt from the hierarchical order.  This
Burkean cycle is a rhetorical process that within foreign military interventions creates a savage/civilization
binary in American war and crisis rhetoric.  When an adversary attacks the United States, one of our allies
or innocents within another country, presidents depict these adversaries as enemies through images of
savagery (scapegoating), which become the basis for America’s use of force.  Presidents then delineate the
reasons why the United States must intervene creating an image of civilization (purification).  This
savage/civilization binary thus serves as the basis for presidential rhetoric concerning the use of force.
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   First, images of savagery have permeated war and crisis rhetoric throughout the
nation’s history.11 Over the centuries, presidents have crafted two images of savagery: the
modern and the primitive.  The former is typically a particular leader or a government
perpetrating acts of aggression against the civilized order, including deeds against the
United States, one of our allies, or the savage agent’s own people.  This enemy is
“modern” because it is a “centralized evil agent selfishly pursuing his or her goals
without a regard for the nation’s people” (Butler, 2002, p. 13).  Additionally, this evil
agent has a “level of cultural sophistication that is threatening to western culture” (Butler,
p. 14; Ivie, 1980, 1984).  The modern savage has some semblance of civilization, but is
bent on subjugating its foes by force of arms. The key rhetorical move in naming the
modern savage is to make this once rational member of civilization seem irrational
because if the enemy is irrational, then it has the propensity for unchecked aggression
against America’s civilized order and must be defeated.  The image of this modern
savage agent then becomes a primary rhetorical motive driving American military
intervention.
The second image of a savage agent is the imperial or primitive savage.  The
imperial savage is “a primitive society, an image of a decentralized enemy, a culture
11 The literature on the president’s use of images of savagery is immense.  See Bostdorff (1994).  Campbell
and Jamieson (1990). Deeds done in words: The genres of governance in presidential rhetoric.  Chicago:
University of Chicago Press; Robert L. Ivie (2005). Democracy and America?s war on terrorism.
Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press; R. L. Ivie (1984). Speaking “common sense” about the
Soviet threat: Reagan’s rhetorical stance. The Western Journal of Speech Communication, 48, 39-50;. R. L.
Ivie (1982).  The metaphor of force in prowar discourse: The case of 1812. Quarterly Journal of Speech,
68, 240-253; R. L. Ivie (1980). Images of savagery in American justifications for war. Communication
Monographs, 47, 279-296; R. L. Ivie (1974).  Presidential motives for war. The Quarterly Journal of
Speech, 60, 337-345.
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rather than an evil individual or government” (Butler, 2002, p. 18).  The imperial savage
consists of a particular people or culture instead of a central government or leader.  Like
the modern savage, this image of savagery has deep roots in American history.
Specifically, the image of the primitive savage was used to portray American Indians
(Stephenson, 1995).  Early American political discourse concerning American Indians
depicted them as a people “emblematic of chaos” who were “living without government,”
leading lives freed from the “restraints of family, church, and village,” and engaged in
acts of “incest, cannibalism, devil worship, and murder” (Rogin, 1987, p. 45).  According
to this argument, American Indians were devoid of any semblance of civilization and
could not handle the mores and responsibilities of modern life.  By considering them to
be lacking civilization, American Indians could be defined as sub-human who needed to
be dealt with accordingly.
This belief in the uncivilized nature of American Indians led to the creation of
policies that rendered them as “wards,” with the government as their “guardian,” a
discourse that established a paternal relationship between the government and American
Indians.  This relationship was justified through arguments that the government intended
to help American Indians move from barbarism to the habits of civilization (Stephenson,
1995).  American Indians were described as being akin to children who needed to be
raised in a proper fashion so that they might one day join civilized society.  This
depiction of American Indians as primitive savages clouded our ability to see Indians as
equals, thus making them subservient to the government and “civilized” society.  As
American Indians were considered primitive savages, they could not understand the
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benefits of owning property, tilling the land, becoming proper citizens, or participating as
part of the American public.  This enemy construction devolved into the “evidence”
needed to justify the government’s forced removal of Indians from their land, which
culminated in a variety of crimes committed against Native Americans (Rogin, 1987).
The images of primitive savagery used to depict American Indians eventually
were evoked in aspects of American foreign policy.  Specifically, President William
McKinley and his supporters used this same image of savagery to justify America’s
conquest of the Philippines.12  John Butler (2002) explained that American politicians
depicted the Filipinos as a barbarous, primitive race unable to understand the advantages
of civilization.  They were “primitive savages caught within a pre-modern condition,
aimlessly moving in no practical direction” who lacked the capacity to understand
civilization, so Filipinos had no opportunity to evolve as a culture (p. 16).  Therefore like
the American Indians, they required the help of the United States to put them on the path
to civilization.  Hence President McKinley and his successors set up a territorial
government in the Philippines and attempted to establish new schools, roads, hospitals,
and even local governments, all with the proposition of “helping” Filipinos accelerate
their abilities to join “civilized nations.”  This experience now gives the United States
impetus to attempt to “civilize” other cultures and states so that these peoples may join
the ranks of the enlightened.
12 For an excellent background read on this subject, look to R. Drinnon (1980). Facing the West: The
metaphysics of Indian-hating and empire-building.  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (pp. 307-
332).
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Use of either modern or primitive savagery presents the president in the post-Cold
War world two rubrics (instead of just the singular logic of a modern savage during the
Cold War) to craft a particular enemy.  The use of both modern and primitive savage
imagery expands how presidents define and educate audiences as to the threats the United
States encounters because audiences receive a broad definition of what constitutes the
threat environment and the various dangers America faces in the international arena.
In addition, the rhetorical use of either form of savagery provides insight into the
global stage as seen by the president and his advisers.  The use of modern savagery
discourse connotes a world of basic stability, because these savages do have some
semblance of civilization.  Thus, although threatened, the international order on the
whole is essentially civilized.  On the other hand, when a president uses primitive
savagery talk, he frames a situation as chaotic.  There could be an absence of government
involvement (or even no government at all), substandard living conditions, and
abounding lawlessness.  In that situation, the presidential discourse makes it appear as if
practically no civilization exists.  The president understands the overall threat
environment as unstable, with the implication being that somehow he must stabilize the
environment.  Managing these threats thus becomes the impetus for American
intervention.
These images of savagery are shaped by contrasting features, also called topoi or
lines of argument.  Robert L. Ivie (2004, 1984, 1982, 1980) referred to these lines of
argument as “decivilizing vehicles” or conduits describing a particular enemy itself
and/or the particular acts of the savage.  These means of expression are used to
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dehumanize an enemy and articulate “the key contrastive features distinguishing civilized
from savage agents while synthesizing several dimensions of meaning into an integrated
threat” (Ivie, 2004, p. 79). These decivilizing vehicles help to synthesize several
dimensions of meaning which distinguish the United States as a positive force while at
the same time defining the savage agent as negative.  A negative force is threatening to
the United States as it could potentially damage American interests.  Thus, the agent must
be dealt with before it can do more damage either directly to the United States or on the
larger global stage.
There are two lines of argument a rhetor uses to cultivate the image of a savage.
First, a rhetor may refer to the adversary through a variety of derogatory terms such as
“terrorist,” “murderer,” “barbarian,” “thug,” “dictator,” “Hitler” or a litany of other
names (Fiebig-von Hase, & Lehmkuhl, 1997; Keen, 1986).  Second, a rhetor may accuse
the agent(s) and their forces of specific acts of aggression, including atrocities such as
arson, forced migration, rape, or murder.  These acts demonstrate the true savage nature
of the enemy as no civilized agent, especially the United States, would brazenly commit
wanton rape, torture, or murder.  A president who defines the savage by these acts of
aggression only deepens the negativity associated with the savage.
These images of savagery function to “literalize” the image of the enemy for the
audience (Ivie, 1980).  Thus the enemy is not only metaphorically a savage, but actually
is a savage.  For example, if the savage is called a murderer, then the savage is literally
created as one, with all that entails regarding maliciousness, depravity, and bloodthirsty
actions.  As the public views savage agents largely through the prism the president has
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fashioned, an image of the savage is thereby created as something who must be stopped
before it continues its destructive acts.  The image of the savage, especially a modern
savage, supplies the impetus for the United States to use force to expunge the agent from
its symbolic universe.
Additionally, the construction of the enemy through images of savagery
rhetorically strips the target of civilization and humanity.  These images of savagery
make it unsustainable for audiences to publicly identify with a particular enemy, as to do
so they would have to rationalize the enemy’s actions—a task that appears to be
untenable because no civilized audience would ever approve of such actions.
 The crafting of an enemy offers a tangible image for the audience.  When a
president depicts a specific enemy, the public gains an understanding of what kind of
enemy we are fighting.  The greater the literalization of the enemy, the greater the
rhetorical  foundation a president has for defending the use of force and rallying the
public to support the decision to intervene militarily (Edelman, 1988; Lebow, 2000).
Manufacturing images of savagery is one part of the binary that conveys to the American
public the threats it faces and why it must use force in response.  The second part of the
binary is presidential discourse on shaping America’s image as the epitome of
civilization.  An image of civilization also helps to educate audiences as to why the
United States must confront a particular threat.
Civilization
When a president uses civilization arguments, it is because an enemy has become
(or at least the president wants to so argue) a threat to America’s foreign policy universe.
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Because the president is the “leader of the free world,” it is up to him to define the threat
so that it can be removed and balance restored. In these arguments, the president depicts
America’s motives in using force as rational, good, right, and just.  Moreover the United
States will take such action only if it is absolutely necessary (Bates, 2004; Ivie, 1984).  In
turn, these arguments create an image of the United States—and by extension
presidents—as defenders of civilization.  The president’s justifications for the use of
force outlines how stability will return to the universe while at the same time working to
reestablish his leadership position as the defender of civilization.
Such a justification is derived from an ideology of American exceptionalism.
Presidents have a specific duty to protect American lives, but according to the logic of
interventionist exceptionalism, also to defend and extend freedom to all parts of the
globe.  As long as the United States is there to fulfill its role as the world’s leader and
defender of the civilized world (or at least as the logic goes), stability is promulgated
within the global order.  Both modern and primitive savages threaten this stability.  When
a president makes the argument the United States has a duty and responsibility to protect
those threatened by savages, he supports this decision with the invocation of America’s
interventionist mission, which connotes images of the United States because of its
heritage doing something to help humanity.
The second layer of the civilization binary is contained in the specific reasons
commanders-in-chief give for American intervention.  These motives can range from
repelling an attack against the United States to protecting American interests, stopping a
future threat, or intervening for humanitarian reasons: all reasons that define America’s
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actions as virtuous.  At the same time, clearly stated justifications for military
intervention make the accusations of opponents who may question the worthiness of the
president’s decision to intervene seem unpatriotic.
This justificatory discourse has two net effects.  First, it can be a useful tool for
mobilizing domestic populations to support conflict.  Kimberley Elliott (2004) explained
that governments must rhetorically construct their enemies to gain both congressional and
public support because many of America’s enemies are of little threat to the public,
which also typically has no specific knowledge of any enemy.  Crafting an enemy in a
savage/civilization binary provides a focal point upon which the public can focus its
energy, which is the starting point for galvanizing the public to support American
intercession.
Furthermore, the arguments made as part of the civilization binary reinforce
American identity by contrasting the civilized with the savage.  David Campbell (1992)
described danger as inherent topoi of American foreign policy discourse.  A common
danger, along with the explanations to counter that danger, intensifies feelings of
identification.  When an “us” is created, it usually entails a “them” (Lebow, 2000). The
“us” is represented by the American public and implies that we are part of the civilized
order.  A savage agent who is excluded from this order but nonetheless poses some sort
of threat to “us” represents the “them.”  By justifying the expunging of “them” through
military intervention, the president tells us a little bit about who we are and what we
stand for.  At the same time, he reveals our responsibility on the international stage.
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Specific reasons for the use of force demonstrate America’s commitment to leadership
and its responsibility to defend and expand freedom.
In sum, constructing the threat environment through the savage/civilization binary
is an important part of America’s foreign policy vocabulary.  By focusing specifically on
America’s military interventions, we gain a better understanding of the threat
environment on a global scale.  The images of savagery that presidents create are
typically indicative of a larger geopolitical struggle in the United States.  In addition, the
justifications for the use of force through civilization arguments order America’s foreign
policy universe because they reify and recast its leadership on the world stage.
 For this project, my task is to analyze how Clinton constituted the threat
environment the United States faced in the post-Cold War world, primarily by focusing
on his rhetoric on military intervention.  Analyzing the president’s rhetoric on this subject
offers insight into the way he viewed the threats of the international order as well as how
he modified presidential discourse on military intervention.  This analysis then supplies
theoretical extensions on the rhetoric of military intervention and how the president
expanded and managed America’s threat environment.
America?s Grand Strategy
The final feature of America’s foreign policy framework is the grand strategy
presidents promote; thus before I continue this discussion, the concepts of “doctrine” and
“grand strategy” must be clarified.  In U.S. foreign affairs a number of presidents—
Monroe, Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter, Reagan, Bush (41), Clinton, and Bush (43)
—announced specific doctrines.  Presidential doctrines “tend to embody specific
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warnings to specific enemies, rather than assertions of general purpose” (Art, 2003, p.
50).  The terms doctrine and grand strategy are not synonymous as a presidential
doctrine is part of a president’s grand strategy.
The concept of grand strategy emerged from the work of military analyst Basil
Liddell Hart.  Hart, following the thinking of military strategist Carl von Clausewitz,
argued that grand strategy was how nations approach the subject of war. Over time, the
concept of grand strategy progressed to encapsulate various instruments of a state’s
foreign policy, not just the instrument of war. As Robert Art (2003) asserted, “grand
strategy deals with a full range of goals that a state should seek, but it concentrates
primarily on how the military instruments should be employed to achieve them” (p. 2).
This statement contains two important ideas regarding grand strategy: goals and
instruments.  In devising a grand strategy, American presidents will lay out a general
vision or articulate various interrelated ideas for American foreign policy.  These general
ideas, when taken together, supply the ends of American foreign policy, or the specific
goals a president would like to achieve.  Instruments are the specific items a president
privileges to achieve those larger goals.  According to Art, the military are the primary
instrument for achieving America’s foreign policy goals, with the United States having a
long tradition of American presidents using the armed forces to achieve American
interests.  For example, John Lewis Gaddis (2004) noted President James K. Polk
articulated a strategy of “manifest destiny”—creating an American state from “sea to
shining sea.”  To accomplish this goal, Polk advocated armed intervention against
Mexico.  Polk’s grand strategy was “manifest destiny” for which he privileged the
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instrument of military power to achieve his foreign policy goal(s) (Baritz, 1985; Bass &
Cherwitz, 1978; Stephenson, 1995).
Presidential grand strategy has come to mean more than a nation’s approach to
winning armed conflicts, as foreign policymakers have broadened the concept to include
all instruments of American power—diplomatic, economic, cultural, and military—
utilized to ensure both our security and our overall foreign policy goals (Hahn, 1997).
Former Senator Gary Hart (2004) concisely summed up this definition of grand strategy
as “the application of a nation’s powers to its larger purposes” (p. 81).  Thus, American
grand strategy is the use of particular instruments of American power to achieve its larger
goal(s).
Presidents, for better or worse, advocate a foreign policy mission for the United
States (Stuckey, 1995).  This term mission is akin to grand strategy.  Because the United
States has taken a larger international role in the twentieth century, clear advocacy of
means and ends in American foreign policy provides rhetorical leadership in international
relations because the public can understand the goals of the United States in global
affairs, and how it will achieve them.  Thus, American grand strategy is fundamental to
the “directional clarity” the public seeks in understanding the world around them.
In crafting his grand strategy, the president has a number of historical antecedents
from which to draw.  For example, recall Washington and Jefferson’s warnings about
American foreign policy.  Both presidents advocated a strategy of neutrality toward
European conflict.  Both presidents emphasized a limited role for the United States in the
world environment with America’s primary instrument of securing its interests being
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through extending commercial relations to all parties.   On the other hand, Presidents
McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt both advocated a strategy of progressive imperialism
(McDougall, 1997). By civilizing the East, the United States could accelerate the
assimilation of the globe according to Western standards (Butler, 2002; Stephenson,
1995).  McKinley and Roosevelt articulated a greater role for America on the world stage
with trade and military intervention (i.e., the Philippines) being the primary instruments
used to implement this strategy.
During the Cold War, the Truman administration announced its primary strategy
was to stop (or at the very least contain) the spread of communist aggression.  The
strategy known as containment was used by every president following Truman during the
Cold War period.  However, Cold War presidents privileged different means to contain
Soviet aggression.  For example, in his Truman Doctrine speech the president announced
immediate foreign aid to Greece and Turkey to assist them in their fight against
communist insurgents (Ivie, 1986).  Truman emphasized America’s economic power to
assist these two nations.   Later, the president announced the Marshall Plan that was
grounded in the belief that the more quickly nation-states were rebuilt, the more stability
that could be created within their government and the economy, with the result that they
would be more resistant to communist influence (Judis, 2004; Smith, 1995).  Thus
Truman favored economic means to contain the Soviets.13
13 I am fully aware that Truman intervened in Korea to stop communist aggression.  However, I contend he
privileged economic, as well as institutional instruments—the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the United Nations, and
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Dwight Eisenhower continued containment, but privileged a nuclear build-up to
combat Soviet aggression.  Although this “New Look” was supposed to integrate
political, psychological, economic, and military dimensions in containing the Soviet
Union, Eisenhower relied heavily on the build-up of nuclear weapons.  These weapons
assured American security at an affordable price while being an effective deterrent
against any massive Soviet aggression (Medhurst, 1994, 1997).  While it did use all
instruments of American power, Eisenhower’s containment policy privileged the military
dimension, as Truman had done to the economic dimension.  Favoring military means
concretized another pillar in the strategy of containment and added another way to
ameliorate Soviet aggression.
Like his predecessors, President Nixon continued the strategy of containment, but
he often emphasized diplomatic means not only to contain the Soviets, but also to soften
relations with them.  Nixon’s secret negotiation with China was one example of this
diplomatic instrument (Kuzma, Leibel & Edwards, 2003).  In 1969, Nixon and Henry
Kissinger devised the diplomatic strategy of triangulation which played the Soviets and
Chinese off one another.  In employing it, the president could bargain with each country,
getting the best deal for the United States, while at the same time making China and the
Soviets wary of each other.  This triangulation led to a de-escalation of conflict between
the Soviets and the United States by shifting it over to another relationship (Hoff, 1994;
Kissinger, 1994).  Nixon’s diplomacy was yet another way to contain the U.S.S.R.
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)—over military instruments in his overall strategy of
containment.
43
These examples demonstrate that presidents articulate large purposes for
American foreign policy, but privilege different means to achieve those goals, thus
modifying what previous presidents had established as their primary channels of grand
strategy.  Even during the Cold War when the common goal was to contain the spread of
communism (and by extension the reach of the U.S.S.R), presidents used different means
to achieve it, as Truman privileged economic means, Eisenhower the military, and Nixon
diplomacy, all of which were contained in the larger strategy of containment.  This
demonstrates that a grand strategy can be multi-faceted, with a particular president
favoring one particular mean over another.  But because using different means to support
grand strategy yields similar ends, it does not create strategic incoherence.
The end of the Cold War necessitated that the United States articulate a different
direction in grand strategy.  First, as the United States possessed greater economic,
military, and political power than any other nation on the planet, what America chose to
advocate and how it advocated it affected world politics.  Second, an American grand
strategy allowed the United States to shape the world in “its image,” which would
directly affect American interests and our role in the world.  By outlining a grand
strategy, the United States chose a specific direction as to how it will maintain and extend
its unprecedented power.
In this particular project my task is to gain insight into the grand strategy Clinton
articulated and the means he privileged to accomplish that goal(s).  The president’s grand
strategy both shaped American interests in the world and established how we could best
accomplish those objectives.  These means were important in continuing American
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primacy during his term, but also built a foundation for maintaining that primacy into the
future.
Thus far, I have explained the three core elements of America’s foreign policy
vocabulary: America’s role in the world, construction of a threat environment, and
America’s grand strategy.  For this study, I am interested in the way Clinton affirmed and
recast these attributes for the post-Cold War world.  How did Clinton maintain and
extend America’s exceptionalist tradition? How did Clinton construct his threat
environment, and how did he craft his justificatory discourse? For grand strategy,
according to Clinton, what was America’s grand mission, and what particular instruments
did he privilege to achieve this mission? The answers to these questions provide some
insight into the way Clinton employed America’s foreign policy vocabulary.
Methodology
This project is one step in gaining insight into how Clinton dealt with a complex,
diverse, and interdependent international environment.  In this section, I discuss the
selections of my texts and explain my methodological choices for this project.
Text Selection
Clinton gave more public speeches than any previous president.  His public
statements on foreign policy alone amount to over one thousand speeches.  For this
dissertation, I chose remarks I defined as “major” foreign policy addresses.  These
speeches lay out a broad agenda of both the opportunities and challenges of the post-Cold
War environment. For example, Clinton’s U.N. General Assembly Addresses deal with
subjects such as global climate change, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
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globalization, and free trade, as well as Clinton’s thoughts on the role of American
leadership within the world.  As I examined Clinton’s foreign policy rhetoric in a broad
way—which meant I did not focus on one specific aspect of his foreign policy, but
instead focused on the core elements of presidential foreign policy rhetoric—it was
appropriate to examine orations that discuss a variety of subjects.
Overall, I examined ninety major foreign policy addresses for this dissertation,
each of which can be found in The Public Papers of the President of the United States,
William Jefferson Clinton. These speeches include Clinton’s annual addresses; major
summit meeting remarks; Addresses to the Nation; and speeches to a specific domestic
audience such as a foreign policy organization or university.  Clinton’s Addresses to the
Nation concerned America’s use of force in Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, Bosnia, Afghanistan,
and Kosovo.  Unlike the others, these speeches do not discuss a broad agenda of
American foreign policy; rather they present to the American public specific
justifications for the use of armed intervention within other nations.  After reading these
speeches, I concluded they are a microcosm of the larger threat environment the Clinton
administration faced.  Focusing on these Addresses to the Nation thus creates insights
into how Clinton defined the challenges America faced within the world.
My choices of Clinton’s annual addresses were his State of the Union Addresses
and his remarks at the annual opening session of the United Nations General Assembly.
While the State of the Union is not specifically an address on foreign policy, it is
arguably the most important overall policy speech of the year for the president.  I
included them because Clinton’s State of the Union Addresses laid out a broad agenda for
46
American foreign relations.  The president’s summit meeting remarks include his orations
before annual meetings or conference proceedings of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), World Economic Summit,
Asian-Pacific Economic Community, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and
the Summit of the Americas.  Finally, Clinton gave major domestic speeches before
specific organizations and universities, which include the Council on Foreign Relations,
Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, American University, University of Texas,
University of Connecticut, and University of Nebraska-Kearney.
In conclusion, I chose speeches dedicated to the subject of American foreign
policy which cover a wide range of U.S. foreign policy topics.  I included Clinton’s
Addresses to the Nation because they offer an excellent microcosm for demonstrating
how Clinton constructed the overall threat environment.  Finally, I explored the
president’s State of the Union Addresses because these speeches set the president’s
agenda for both domestic and foreign policy in a particular year.  Each speech served this
inquiry’s goal of ascertaining how Clinton used and modified America’s foreign policy
vocabulary.
Methodological Choices
  For the past forty years, the concern over methodological issues within rhetorical
studies was driven largely by Edwin Black’s (1965) book Rhetorical Criticism: A Study
in Method, in which he argued the dominant method of the time (what he termed neo-
Aristotleanism), was unimaginative, formulaic, and restrictive. His text led many
rhetorical scholars to look for other ways to guide the study of rhetoric.
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 Since Black’s book dozens of rhetorical methods have been created (Jasinski,
2001).  In fact, the creation of a new method was a means to authority in rhetorical
studies. Method-driven criticism is so important that James Jasinski (2001) maintained
“method rules” in rhetorical studies (p. 319; Nothstine, Blair, & Copeland, 1994).  The
use of a specific statement of method provides authority and coherence for the critic.
However, at least for some, the rule of method-driven criticism is not as
prominent as it was once. Stephen Browne (2001) stated that he does not see much
preoccupation with method in the criticism he reads.  According to Browne, “method is
always a tedious matter.  We’ve done too much of it, and no one, after a certain age,
really cares much about it anyway” (p. 334).   For Browne, rhetoric has quietly moved
away from being driven by method-based criticism to being driven more by the
argument(s) of the critic.  Although considerable rigor is still found in rhetorical studies
projects, these scholars are not being “ruled” by method (p. 334).    Browne argues the
authority for criticism is derived from the critic and the thesis the critic advances.
Criticism is an act of judgment.  It involves understanding and explaining the
projects of humanity (Black, 1965).  James Darsey (1994) noted the critic’s job is to tell
us something worthwhile that clarifies and illuminates dark places in our science, our
histories, and our souls, something that increases “our understanding and facilitates our
functioning within the world” (p. 176).   Thus the goal of criticism is to increase
understanding of how the world functions and to evaluate those functions.  This increased
understanding comes from the thesis a critic advances.
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Bonnie Dow (2001) advocated a similar position when she noted that rhetorical
criticism has been seem by some as a “bastard discipline” which continually searches for
authority by using the language of scientific method (p. 337).  For Dow, this search for
authority is important, but one whose results should not be found in the language of
science as she maintained that critics are the ones who provide authority, not a particular
statement of method.  The authority of criticism comes from its enactment.  Illumination
of a text or set of texts is what should drive criticism, with this illumination coming forth
in the argument the critic makes.
Wayne Brockreide (1974) was even more explicit in asserting that rhetorical
criticism functions as argument.  The most significant argument is one that explains.  The
critic proceeds inductively by selecting concepts, categories, and dimensions of the
discourse in question. Then the critic, with no commitment to an a priori statement of
criticism, evaluates or explains a particular experience or accounts for rhetoric by relating
it to larger concepts and principles.
 For these authors, rhetorical criticism is a process used to argue for particular
theses.  The authority for this criticism lies in the argument—and depending on the length
of the project, the sub-arguments made—not a specific statement of method.  The
argument comes from a process that is often inductive.  For example, a number of cases
can be examined that will substantiate the overall argument.  A number of scholars have
conducted rhetorical criticism in this way such as looking at a number of cases, typically
in chapters to substantiate the overall argument and has been employed in a number of
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books and articles.14  This project follows a similar trajectory in that each chapter where I
analyze Clinton’s foreign policy rhetoric, the authority for my criticism is in the overall
argument and sub-arguments I make.  That does not mean that I do not examine the
rhetorical tools Clinton used to convey these arguments.  In my reading of Clinton’s
discourse the dominant tools he used were through metaphor and myth.  Thus I account
for the various metaphors and myths the president attempted to demonstrate how Clinton
shaped his foreign policy rhetoric for the post-Cold War world.
Metaphors & Myth
 Clinton conveyed his overall worldview on foreign policy and in specific
situations through his employment of metaphor and myth.  Metaphor has been studied in
variety of ways by scholars from numerous disciplines (see Albritton, 1995; Bates, 2004;
Ivie, 1987; Medhurst, et. al, 1997; Paris, 2002; Stuckey, 1992; Wander, 1984).  A basic
definition of metaphor can be found in Aristotle’s (1961) Poetics where he defined this
rhetorical tool as a “movement of an alien name either from genus to species or from
species to genus or from species to species or by analogy” (1457b 5-7; see also Benoit,
2001).  In other words, metaphors, at their most basic level, are two terms that draw a
comparisons between two things, places, situations, or events, typically, among things
that are unrelated (see also Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  This figure of speech is
fundamental to the way people communicate.  As Aristotle put it in On Rhetoric, “all
people carry on their conversations with metaphors” (1404b 6). Kenneth Burke (1965)
14 See Beasley (2004); J. Darsey (1997).  The prophetic tradition and radical rhetoric in America.  New
York: New York University Press; Stuckey, (2004); K. Wilson (2002). The reconstruction desegregation
debate: The politics of equality and the rhetoric of place, 1870-1875.  East Lansing: Michigan State cite the
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declared that metaphor was one of the four master tropes and Murray Edelman (1971)
pointed out that “thought is metaphorical and metaphor pervades language, for the
unknown, the new, the unclear, and the remote are apprehended by one’s perceptions of
identities with the familiar” (p. 67).  In short, metaphor is fundamental to human
communication.
Not only do metaphors draw similarities across different domains, but they also
have two other important characteristics.  First, metaphors “activate conscious and
subconscious, rational, and emotional responses” from audiences (Beer & De Landtsheer,
2004, p. 6; Paris, 2002).  The example that Roland Paris (2002) used was calling a
foreign leader “Hitler.”  If you call a leader “Hitler” rather than that person is behaving
like an autocrat, you are more likely to obtain an emotion response because there are
strong emotions and associations that go along with Hitler’s name.  Metaphors used in
this way can encourage the audience to support a position on an issue, a situation, or a
larger principle.  Second, metaphors do not have to be overt to be effective.  Subtly used
trigger words and phrases can be calibrated to the various associations and sensitivities of
the audiences the rhetors may engage (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Paris, 2002).  Use of the
subtleties allows the speaker to be flexible in their presentation so they may be able to
draw support and understanding from a variety of people.
These metaphoric characteristics were originally understood as a tool for stylistic
embellishment.  Cicero noted that metaphor was a “stylistic ornament” (1942, 3.42) and
this understanding of metaphor continues in some of the contemporary textbooks on
public speaking.  For example, Stephen Lucas (2004) in his Art of Public Speaking
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explained that metaphors can be used to make student’s public presentations come alive.
Patricia Andrews, James Andrews, and Glen Williams (2002) maintained that metaphors
are important ways to make one’s language more beautiful or clarify ideas.  At one level
metaphor can be used for rhetorical embellishment.
However, metaphor is not only some mere rhetorical flourish, but is an important
conduit for conceptualizing, defining, and understanding the world around us.  The use of
metaphor performs important rhetorical functions for the speaker and the audience.  First,
metaphors are fundamental for rhetorical invention (Ivie, 1987).  Metaphors work to
define and explain politics in a variety of ways that help audiences make sense of the
world around them and offers prescriptions to act in a certain way (Beer & De
Landschteer, 2004; Foss, 2004).  For example, the metaphor of “containment” presented
a broad vision of American foreign policy for the Cold War.  Employing the metaphor of
containment, presidents were able to present the world in such as way that there it could
rationalize various courses of American action and explain America’s role in the political
universe of international politics Another example, can be found in how Lyndon Johnson
waged a metaphoric “war on poverty.”  According to David Zarefsky (1986) Johnson’s
use of the metaphor “war on poverty” defined the objective of the war and encouraged
enlistment to help, identified the enemy, and dictated the choice of weapons and tactics to
use in this war.  Thus Johnson’s metaphor influenced how he crafted and reacted to the
poverty issue.
 A second function of metaphor is an orientation function.  Max Black (1962)
explained that metaphors are like a prism for screening data:
52
Suppose I look at the night sky through a piece of heavenly smoked glass on
which certain lines have been left clear. Then I see only the starts that can be
made to lie on the lines previously prepared upon the screen, and the stars I do see
will be organized by the screen’s structure.  We can think of metaphor as such as
screen (p. 41).
Speakers use metaphors in such a way to “screen” the message in such a way that the
audience will see the subject that is discussed by the rhetor in the manner that s/he wants
you to see it.  An example of this can be found in George H.W. Bush’s use of the
metaphor of World War II (Stuckey, 1992).  Bush presented the conflict between the
United States and Iraq as similar to World War II.  By presenting the situation in this
particular way, the president was able to stave off criticism that the intervention into Iraq
would be another Vietnam.  Bush’s discourse proved vital to framing the larger issue in
such a way to disassociate his intervention from the memory of the Vietnam conflict.
In foreign policy, as some of the examples I have used demonstrate, metaphors
can be extremely important for presidents to present a variety of ideas. Considering
audiences do not have access to as much information as the president and foreign affairs
can be fairly complex and difficult to understand, metaphors are used by policymakers to
guide people through foreign policy terrain to provide understanding of phenomena in
foreign policy, and to justify policy stances and actions to achieve legitimation and garner
public support (Kuusisto, 2002; Rosati & Campbell, 2004; Shimko, 2004).  In using
metaphors presidents are defining and educating publics on America’s place in the
universe, the enemies we must face and why we must face them, and what specific
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instruments we should use to advance our interests and that of our allies.  This does not
mean all audiences will accept or be influenced by the president’s use of metaphor.
However, the application of this trope projects a view of a subject that the president
wants to convey the public and positions the president to influence others to come to see
his overall worldview on foreign policy or a particular situation.
The second tool Clinton used to communicate his foreign policy was through
myth.  Myth is a form of discourse that is common to all cultures.  Joseph Campbell
(1949) went so far to argue that there are some myths that have universal characteristics.
At their most basic myths are narratives that have a specific plot line and perhaps specific
characters involving heroes and villains.  However, not all narratives are myths.  For
example, if I provide you with a narrative of my day’s happenings, that story is most
likely not mythic in nature because myths often involve stories that are engrained into the
specific political and social culture of a community, which articulate its beliefs,
dilemmas, and values (Rushing & Frentz, 2005).
Myths function in many ways, but two are important to us here.  First, myths offer
a sense of identification.  They are what Dan Nimmo and James Combs (1980) called
“social glue” (p. 13).  These narratives work to hold a society together in that they
provide the basis for peoples of diverse backgrounds to find common ground with each
other.  This common ground helps to define who “we” were, who “we” are, and who
“we” will be (Edwards, 2000; Kluver, 1997; Starr, 1973).  Political leaders who use these
myths attempt to unite a citizenry around a common ideal, which can be furthered if they
go along with this person’s casting of the myth.
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Second, myths aid in our comprehension of the world (Nimmo & Combs, 1980).
At times, collectivities are struck by some form of disorder.  For a community, this
disorder can be a natural disaster, an attack by another nation, a specific illness, a
downturn in the economy, or any other disturbances to the regularities of life.  Here is
where myth often enters the picture to offer easily grasped ways of reducing the disorder.
The world, especially in American foreign policy, is often too difficult to grasp.  There is
so much information, so many people, so many countries, which is difficult for people to
cope with all of these ideas.  Myths provide a specific structure to our world so that we
may better understand the opportunities, challenges, and limits of what we can
accomplish both individually and as a society.
In this project, I argue that Clinton employed a variety of metaphors and myths to
convey his principles on American foreign policy.  For this president, there was no single
metaphor or myth that encapsulated these tenets.  This lack of a unifying idea gave the
impression that Clinton lacked total incoherence within his foreign relations (see Haass,
2000).  However, his use of multiple rhetorical tools provided him the flexibility to
explain foreign policy to various audiences and leads me to how this project is structured.
Chapter Outlines
In this dissertation, I explore the question of how President Clinton crafted his
foreign policy discourse.  I suggest a change/order binary underwrote Clinton’s foreign
policy rhetoric.  For Clinton, change was the dominant principle in the context of the
international environment.  Within the context of this change, I suggest that Clinton
relied upon, but modified the resources of America’s foreign policy vocabulary.  His use
55
of this vocabulary served to define, guide, manage, order, and outline American foreign
policy in an accelerated age of globalization.  The next three chapters are dedicated to a
specific feature of America’s foreign policy vocabulary and provide support this overall
argument.
 Each chapter deals with one feature of how Bill Clinton crafted America’s foreign
policy vocabulary.  In Chapter Two, I explore how the president crafted America’s role in
the post-Cold War world, arguing that within the context of an accelerated era of
globalization, the president continued America’s role as world leader, but also modified
in subtle ways how that role is defined.  This chapter has three primary sections of
analysis.  In section one, I analyze Clinton’s view of the international setting, asserting
that he understood the post-Cold War world was dominated by an era of accelerated
globalization.  Sections two and three illustrate the president’s justifications for
continuing America’s role as world leader within the context of a changing international
setting through his employment of the missions of American exceptionalism.  In section
two, I demonstrate the president’s reaffirmation of the mission of exemplar, which
provided rhetorical grounds for continuing America’s role in the world.  Finally in
section three, I demonstrate how Clinton employed the mission of intervention, in which
he offered specific arguments why the U.S. must continue its leadership role, but also
limited American leadership in key ways. Although the president’s use of both missions
of exceptionalism maintained the U.S. position as world leader, the president modified
American exceptionalism in subtle ways.
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 Clinton made these arguments through various natural, historical, and directional
metaphors as well as Greek mythology.  Analysis of the president’s use of these
metaphors offers insight into how he made his arguments not just for continuing, but also
modifying America’s role in the world.
 Chapter Three explores how Clinton posited the threat environment facing the
United States, arguing that Clinton fashioned a post-Cold War threat environment
underwritten by chaos. For the president, chaos was a virulent form of change involving
threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, AIDS, and ethnic and religious
violence.  Chaos thus replaced the Soviet Union as America’s global enemy, one that
because it could shape-shift in a variety of forms required different ways to confront it.  I
further argue that to fight and/or manage this enemy, Clinton used a good deal of
rhetorical flexibility, which meant there was no specific construct or justification for
intervention to combat a particular threat.  To fully explicate this argument, I examine the
president’s discourse concerning four American military interventions.  These conflicts
with which Clinton dealt were intrastate in origin, often caused by civil wars, ethnic and
religious conflict, or the dissolution of government (Olson, 2004).  The four interventions
I examine—Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo—were chosen because all involved the
use of American ground forces.  For these interventions Clinton employed images of both
the primitive and modern savage to fashion the enemy as well as provide a variety of
justifications for American action within these states.  His drawing upon these rhetorical
resources reveals the chaos of the threat environment the Clinton administration faced
and how it attempted to manage and contain that chaos.
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 In this chapter, I also again turn to metaphor to analyze Clinton’s discourse on
military interventions.  As metaphor is a primary source of rhetorical invention in war
discourse (Ivie, 1987), I examine the metaphors Clinton used in crafting the savage and
civilization.  In each case study, I briefly outline the context of the situation faced by
American foreign policymakers, break down the president’s discourse into his
construction of the savage and civilization, and end by connecting this discourse to the
larger threat environment.
In Chapter Four I explore Clinton’s grand strategy for the post-Cold War world,
arguing that the president’s grand strategy was to realign the liberal order to concretize
and extend American interests while simultaneously dealing with the problems of age of
global change.  His discourse to renew the liberal order contained three categories of
arguments: economic, institutional, and regional.  Taken together, these arguments form a
network of reforms concerning economic policy, international institutions, and America’s
relationship with regions and nation-states.  For Clinton, this network helped to manage
the change brought on by globalization.  Clinton’s discourse set the agenda to achieve
these reforms while at the same time offering lessons as to what the United States needed
to accomplish in the post-Cold War world to secure both U.S. interests and those of its
allies.
Clinton articulated these various arguments through historical and natural
metaphors as well as the myth of the American dream.  The use of these rhetorical
strategies positioned the United States to achieve its foreign policy objectives.  Moreover,
they instructed the president’s audience as to what needed to occur and what could
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happen if the United States readjusted the liberal international order for the post-Cold
War world.
Chapter Five concludes this dissertation.  Here I illustrate the theoretical
extensions and implications this dissertation has provided concerning Clinton’s foreign
policy rhetoric as well as America’s foreign policy vocabulary.  I also discuss the
problem of order for American foreign policy.  Finally, I offer directions for future
research.
Throughout this dissertation, my inquiry centers on the question of how Clinton
constructed America’s foreign policy vocabulary for the post-Cold War world.  Each
chapter supplies part of the answer to that question.  Ultimately this examination on the
way Clinton crafted his vocabulary offers insight into the way he viewed his presidency,
the vocabulary of America’s foreign policy, and the institution of the presidency.
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CHAPTER TWO:
STAYING THE COURSE AS WORLD LEADER:  INTERTWINING
AMERICA’S EXCEPTIONALIST MISSIONS IN A CHANGING GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT
Bill Clinton assumed the presidency promising to focus primarily on America’s
economic woes, as his unofficial campaign slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid,” made
clear.  His defeat of George H.W. Bush was in part due to the nation’s domestic agenda
being in trouble (Berman & Goldman, 1996; Smith, 1994).  However, the new president
also found himself confronted with a different international relations environment than
the bipolar international order of the Cold War.  This different environment led many in
America’s foreign policy intelligentsia to offer a variety of different viewpoints as to the
composition of the post-Cold War world.  For example, Francis Fukuyama (1992) argued
the United States entered a post-Cold War era that he described as the end of history.
Fukuyama observed that liberal democracy and free markets triumphed over their
communist rivals, with the result being a prosperous and free world leading to increased
interdependence and integration of the global environment.
 Others were not as optimistic.  Robert Kaplan (1994, 2001) depicted the post-
Cold War world as a “coming anarchy.”  He envisioned a future where small nation-
states break down amid dysfunctional environments.  This environment created a hornet’s
nest of problems for the world including conflict dominated by ethnic, religious, and
tribal hatreds such as occurred in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia.  At the same time, small
governments did not have the capabilities to fight terrorists, drug cartels, or criminal
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organizations.  For Kagan, this anarchic situation threatened to tear the world apart,
providing innumerable headaches to the great powers and international institutions
(Haass, 1997).
 Samuel Huntington (1996) shared Kagan’s pessimistic view of the post-Cold War
world, although instead of a “coming anarchy,” Huntington argued the world was headed
toward a “clash of civilizations” between the cultural blocs of Western, Sinic, Japanese,
Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and African civilizations. For
Huntington, cultural communities replaced the bipolar international order of the Cold
War.  The fault lines between civilizations resulted in increased conflict because these
communities disagreed about how to order the civic and social life of the international
community. Whereas Fukuyama constructed a vision of integration for the post-Cold War
world, Kaplan and Huntington saw an environment of disintegration.
 While Fukuyama, Kagan, and Huntington’s views on the world do not have much
in common, they do demonstrate that Clinton faced a global order devoid of fully formed
guideposts.  There was no specific and widely shared understanding of the post-Cold War
setting.  For the first time in 40 years the United States faced no single external threat, but
at the same time it lacked a common purpose unifying American foreign policy.  This
lack of purpose created a debate as to what role the United States should take in the post-
Cold War international setting as evident in the 1992 presidential campaign.
Both President George H. W. Bush and Clinton proposed the United States
continue America’s leadership responsibilities, but both faced opposition for continuing
this mission.  On the Right, Pat Buchanan openly challenged Bush’s vision of a “new
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world order” and America’s continued leadership for the post-Cold War era.  Buchanan’s
worldview resembled 1920s’ and 1930s’ isolationists who maintained the United States
should leave the world to its own devices.  Specifically, Buchanan argued the United
States should end foreign aid, withdraw troops from Europe and South Korea, and halt
payments to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (Ornstein, 1992).
According to Buchanan, as the United States had fulfilled its mission to win the Cold
War, it no longer faced any large external challenge; therefore it should retreat from the
world and return to its 19th century mission of an exemplar nation.15
On the Left, Bill Clinton faced opponents such as Virginia Governor Douglas
Wilder and Iowa Senator Tom Harkin, both of whom claimed the Bush administration
was more concerned with the economic development of Bangladesh, Turkey and the
Soviet Union than it was with the U.S. economic recovery (Schonberg, 2003).  As did
Buchanan, Wilder and Harkin adopted a “put America first” attitude that issues at home
needed to be addressed before any international involvement could occur.  Even after the
election when Clinton entered office in January 1993, divergent views still existed as to
what the international order would look like and how specifically America would adjust
its role to this different setting.
In this chapter, I analyze how Clinton shaped understanding of America’s role in
the post-Cold War world.  I argue that amid what the president identified as a still-
forming international landscape, he constantly advocated for the United States to
15 Recall the mission of exemplar was the predominant view of American foreign policy in the 19th
century.  America’s goal was to perfect its institutions at home so it could be a model nation for others to
emulate, but it predominantly stayed out of the internal affairs of other nations, especially Europe.
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maintain its leadership role, but communicated limits to this position.  Clinton understood
continuing America’s role as global leader positioned the United States to manage the
change brought by an age of accelerated globalization and to offer stability within the
international setting.  For Clinton, continuing the role as world leader offered a
semblance of order in a sea of accelerated change.
  To make the case for continued United States leadership, the president affirmed
but tailored America’s exceptionalist missions.16  As I noted in Chapter One, presidents
during the Cold War started to intertwine America’s exceptionalist missions in their
public discourse.  Clinton continued this tradition, but he did so with a reverse logic.  He
maintained that continuing America’s leadership role flowed from renewing America’s
mission of exemplar.  In other words, America’s leadership role abroad was predicated
on its renewing the domestic arena, not the other way around as it was during the Cold
War.  Making this converse argument suggests a development how presidents make their
case for a prominent role in international affairs, while also modifying this aspect of
America’s foreign policy vocabulary.  This advancement indicates that within
presidential discourse there has been a full removal of the tension between the two
exceptionalist narratives.  Moreover, it signifies integration between domestic and foreign
policy arenas.  For Clinton, they were no longer separate, but had to be taken together
when discussing America’s role in the world and American foreign policy in general.
16 Throughout this chapter I refer to the missions of exceptionalism in various ways, using the terms
mission, narrative, and worldview interchangeably.  My referring to the exceptionalist narratives in this
way is in accordance with how various authors also refer to the way Americans express their views of the
place of the United States in an international setting.
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In this chapter, I analyze Clinton’s discourse on America’s role in the world in
three major sections.  First, I explore Clinton’s perception of the international order after
the Cold War.  The president viewed the post-Cold War world as a time of growing
interdependence and integration marked by constant change.  Second, I turn to the
president’s use of the mission of exemplar, in which Clinton argued the changes in the
global landscape caused a good deal of anxiety for Americans.  In this new setting, the
president reasoned the United States needed to renew its domestic order both
economically and perceptually in the way it thought about the national community.  By
renewing American domestic order, the United States also reaffirmed the exemplar
mission.  Moreover, this renewal became a justification for continued American
leadership.  According to Clinton’s logic, being strong at home allowed the United States
to be strong abroad.  In this sense, Clinton tailored American exceptionalism for the post-
Cold War world because American leadership was predicated upon being strong at home.
Finally, I turn to Clinton’s use of the mission of intervention, which reinforced his
argument that the United States must continue to lead.  According to this reasoning,
America must do so to venerate past generations of American leadership while at the
same time shaping the future for American interests; however, the president also limited
the exercise of American power.   This chapter concludes with discussions on the way
Clinton modified America’s exceptionalist narratives, including his broadened use of the
World War II metaphor and modification of the basic tenets of American exceptionalism.
To frame these arguments, Clinton tended to use metaphors of nature, history,
direction, and Greek mythology.  These metaphors demonstrate how the president viewed
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the international landscape and understood the intervention narrative.  This analysis
details the way the president tailored this aspect of America’s foreign policy vocabulary
and the role the United States played in the world during his administration.   Moreover,
the chapter reveals how the president can define for and educate audiences about a
particular aspect of American foreign policy.
The Post-Cold War Era as Context
For Clinton, the international order in the post-Cold War world was in constant
flux.  The president maintained the United States was moving away from the Cold War to
an age of globalization,17 which is a difficult term to define as it has two different
conceptualizations.  On the one hand, globalization is used to signify an epoch of
international affairs.  According to Thomas Friedman (2000), the era of globalization
replaced the Cold War, bringing with it a constant movement toward integration and
fragmentation.  The mobility of capital and ability to travel further and communicate
more openly through technology, as well as the creation of similar economic and political
systems across the globe, drove the world toward greater integration.  However, at the
same time these forces created displacement among workers and unleashed ancient ethnic
and religious hatreds that had been glossed over during the Cold War, resulting at times
in the fragmentation of whole nation-states.  These forces rapidly changed the
international setting, which meant adjustments in how foreign policymakers viewed
America’s place in the international order.
17 Clinton used the terms globalism, integration, interdependence, global village, and at times global
economy as synonyms for globalization.
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On the other hand, “globalization” is a process defined primarily by the
liberalization of free markets and the interdependence and eventual integration of those
markets (Munck, 2002).  “Globalization” has also been expanded to discuss the global
integration of all levels of society: technological, political, social, cultural, and economic
(Jameson, 1998, 2000).  This process provided both opportunities and challenges to
American foreign policy.  Opportunities for American foreign policy ranged from the
increased ability to extend American economic power to greater openness among all
sectors of global society where U.S. culture, technology, politics, and society could
influence others.  Challenges for American foreign policy ranged from the destruction of
local culture to the heightened awareness of threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction, and drug trafficking within the global environment.
Clinton’s foreign policy discourse on globalization mirrored these two
conceptualizations.  For Clinton, the age of globalization was rife with transformation.
So much change was evident that Cold War principles could no longer guide American
foreign policy.  As he put it, “this is an interesting time in which the clear, simple,
monolithic way we used to look at the world, the cold war abroad, constant economic
progress at home, steady slow, certain resolution of our social difficulties, all those are
kind of out of the window” (1995g, p. 956).  Clinton asserted the international
environment of the Cold War stood for slow, steady growth and stability.  Division along
two specific camps made the Cold War order “simple and clear.”  These camps created a
good deal of conflict on the battlefield and in the marketplace of ideas, but also offered
stability and predictability in world affairs. Domestically, the Cold War brought with it
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“economic progress” that was “steady” and “slow,” but also “certain.”  The stability and
predictability of the Cold War stood in stark contrast to a post-Cold War world that had
rapidly became an age of accelerated globalization where the guideposts of the
international order were in constant motion, thus resulting in instability and
unpredictability.
Clinton viewed globalization as the dominant logic of the international
environment.   The president perceived the movement toward global interdependence as
an “inexorable logic” (1999b, p. 279), an inevitable progression of the international order.
He further described globalization as the “central reality of our time,” which created a
world in which we were all “clearly fated to live” (2000a, p. 135; 1999b, p. 279). The
world was meant to come together.  Ultimately, the president argued that no nation could
turn its back on this era because “whether we like it or not, we are growing more
interdependent” (1995i, p.1567; 2000b, p. 1759).  For Clinton, the advent of the age of
globalization was a simple fact that could not be avoided.  The change occurring within
the world brought it closer together and moved us toward a path of interdependence.
This perception of the inevitability of globalization meant American foreign policy would
have to adjust its role.  Ultimately American foreign policy discourse would have to
outline this adjustment to deal with global change.
The president also defined globalization as a process, one that brought with it a
good deal of change, especially in economic terms.  Clinton articulated his idea of
globalization as a process in two ways.  First, he defined the process through an image of
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dueling forces of positive and negative energies.  Second, he used a variety of natural
metaphors to demonstrate how globalization was changing the international landscape.
 First, the president maintained that forces of integration—economics and
information technology—drove globalization, but at the same time counter forces of
disintegration threatened its progress.  As Clinton told the United Nations General
Assembly:
From beyond nations, economic and technological forces all over the globe are
compelling the world towards integration.  These forces are fueling a welcome
explosion of entrepreneurship and political liberalization.  But they also threaten
to destroy the insularity and independence of national economies, quickening the
pace of change and making many of the people feel more insecure.  At the same
time, from within nations, the resurgent aspirations of ethnic and religious groups
challenge governments on terms those traditional nation-states cannot easily
accommodate (1993f, p. 1613; see also 1995e, p. 617-618).
Clinton described the process of globalization as working from the outside in.  The
president described these forces of integration as economic and technological forces
propelling the world together.  However, these energies were not part of the “normal”
part of a nation-state’s development.  The forces that drove globalization were strange, as
they were “from beyond nations,” which was not negative per se, but different from the
“slow, steady, certain” change that came with the Cold War.   Clinton asserted these
energies needed to be internalized and harnessed because they helped create more
business opportunity through a growth in “entrepreneurship” while at the same time
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liberalizing domestic political systems. Nation-states that shared similar economic and
political systems naturally gravitated toward each other, further cementing ties between
states. These ties were emblematic of a larger more integrated world in which the United
States had to stake out its position.
 The sense of speed within Clinton’s discourse is notable.  Globalization was
quickening the “pace of change.”  The effect of this increased pace of change made
people feel “insecure.”  The integrative economic and technological forces occurred so
quickly that it had unleashed “resurgent aspirations of ethnic and religions groups.”  The
speed by which these processes happened created an environment of instability among
nation-states and populations that were not harnessing and lessening the pace of global
change.  In turn, these harms threatened to imperil the progress towards integration and
interdependence.  Because Clinton believed globalization was inevitable, any harm that
would imperil that progress would also affect American foreign policy, forcing it to
manage those harms.
The dueling forces of integration and fragmentation resulted in a push-pull
dialectic in the formation of the international order.  This duality presented both
opportunities and challenges for the United States and the world.   The twin engines of
globalism connoted an image of an international order in constant flux and change.  In the
post-Cold War world, the United States had to live with constant adjustment, unlike the
stable bipolar order of the Cold War where change was minimal.  For Clinton, change
was one of the pillars of the new international order.  Change caused insecurity and
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uncertainty.  It was within this flux that the president argued the United States must
adjust its role.
The president also discussed the changes occurring in the international
environment through a variety of natural metaphors, which like the push-pull dialectic
fashioned images of an unchecked, unpredictable, and still-forming international
environment.  For example, Clinton stated integration was creating an environment that
was “like a new river, providing both power and disruption to all of us who live along its
course” (1994d, p. 1195).  In another address, the president noted “the forces of global
integration are a great tide, inexorably wearing away the established order of things”
(1997f, p. 1205).   Further, the president stated this global economy was “unruly” and “a
bucking bronco that often lands with its feet on different sides of old lines and sometimes
with its whole body on us” (1993b, p. 214).   The metaphors of a “new river,” a “great
tide,” and a “bucking bronco” connoted images of an age containing forces filled with
power, but that power was raw, unharnessed, and lacking in any particular direction.
Clinton’s use of the phrase “new river” to define globalization illustrated this idea, as
rivers have a good deal of raw power to cut through a landscape, but new rivers have no
particular path.  They are unpredictable and can essentially go anywhere.  The paths these
rivers generate leave considerable beauty, but also destruction. Simply put, new rivers
alter the ecosystems they encounter.  For Clinton, globalization was a river that had not
yet established a particular path, so in cutting across the international landscape, it left
both beauty and destruction. Globalization was unpredictable and unstable, altering the
international landscape in fundamental ways that were as yet only poorly understood.
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His employment of these metaphors connotes images of post-Cold War world as an era of
instability and unpredictability—a context to which American foreign policy would have
to adjust.
In sum, Clinton’s discourse on globalization demonstrates that he saw the post-
Cold War world as fundamentally different from previous geopolitical eras.  It was an
international context where the central pillar was now change, which according to the
president’s logic, offered both prospect and anxiety.  Within this context, the president
argued the United States must domestically adapt so all Americans might have the
opportunity to benefit from globalization.  Adapting to globalization and rejuvenating
America’s domestic order became a way for Clinton to order the change put forth by
globalization while also serving as a reason to maintain the U.S. role of world leader.
Fulfilling the Mission of Exemplar
The change that globalization wrought offered a challenge to Americans.  As
maintained by Clinton, globalization recreated the landscape of the international order.
The president’s goal for America’s role in this environment was not to stop change, but to
manage it so that it would work for Americans.  Clinton made three arguments as to how
the United States could manage this era of globalization.  First, he maintained the United
States must change its thinking regarding domestic and foreign policy matters.  Second,
he reaffirmed America’s mission of exemplar by exhorting Americans to renew
America’s economy.   Finally, the president implored Americans to renew the American
community.
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This renewal rejuvenated America’s self-image as the nation-state for the world to
emulate.  In turn, renewal reaffirmed America’s mission of exemplar, which became an
argument for continuing America’s role as global leader which inversed the logic his
predecessors had used in making the case for America’s leadership role. For Clinton,
being strong at home was a prerequisite to continuing America’s leadership abroad.  This
use of American exceptionalism adapted the exemplar narrative to meet the needs of
American foreign policy in what he understood to be a new era.  Taken together, these
three arguments provided rhetorical support for continuing America’s role as global
leader.  For Clinton, American leadership allowed the United States to harness
globalization so America could build a better future.
Rethinking the Connection Between Foreign and Domestic Policy
 To deal with globalization, Clinton argued Americans must change the way they
think about policy matters.  In the president’s eyes, there was no “sharp dividing line
between foreign and domestic policy” (1995i, p. 1568; see also 1993b, p. 214; 1994k, p.
2056; 1996e, p. 1257; 2000c, p. 2654).  Globalization erased the line between these
arenas, which meant that all issues were now what Ryan Barilleaux (1985) called
“intermestic,” or “those matters of international relations that by their very nature, closely
involve the domestic economy” (p. 754).  Clinton understood all issues in the post-Cold
War world to be intermestic.  The new reality of an age of integration was that issues in
the domestic arena directly affected those in the international sphere and vice versa; thus
whatever he proposed to curb America’s domestic ills would directly impact international
affairs.
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The president explained this new way of thinking should be extended into how all
Americans talked about policy matters.  As Clinton put it:
If I could do anything to change the speech patterns of those of us in public life, I
would almost like to stop hearing people talk about foreign policy and domestic
policy and instead start discussing economic policy, security policy,
environmental policy, you name it.  (1995h, p. 1547).
According to Clinton’s logic, most public officials were stuck in archaic speech patterns
regarding policy, whereas the president had adjusted his discourse for a new era of
politics. As he was the prototypical politician for an accelerated age of globalization,
those in public life and the public at large should emulate his speech.  By promoting
thinking and speaking in different ways, Clinton defined a new reality as to how we
should think about policy matters.  As domestic matters directly impact what occurs in
the international arena, through a renewal of the domestic order, the United States could
put itself on a more solid foundation to justify continuing its leadership role.  Leadership
offered a sense of order that supplied the United States the opportunity to manage
globalization to its advantage.
Renewing America?s Economy
 The second task was to rejuvenate the American economy, an idea carried over
from Clinton’s presidential campaign and inaugural address (Procter & Ritter, 1996).
Clinton set forth two arguments that underscored why there was a need for economic
renewal.  First, globalism altered the economic order causing concern for some
73
Americans.  Second, America’s political leadership had failed to adjust the U.S. economy
to this new age.
 In his first argument, economic renewal was needed because the post-Cold War
world profoundly changed “the way we work and live and relate to each other” (1997f, p.
1206).  The implication of this quotation was that the rate of change occurring within the
international landscape in the post-Cold War world caused a semblance of disorder in
contrast to the stability of the Cold War era.  Globalization changed the way Americans
operated in the global economy.  According to Clinton, the realities of globalization
changed not only how nation-states conducted their commercial relations, but how
individuals related to their work, to their lives, and to each other.  Globalization had
altered the economic order of the Cold War but America had not prepared itself to deal
with these changes.
 This alteration of the economic order, the president explained, caused a good deal
of anxiety among many Americans.  He stated
Across America I hear people raising central questions about our place and
prospects in this new world we have done so much to make.  They ask: Will we
and our children really have good jobs, first class opportunities, world-class
education, quality affordable health care, safe streets? After having fully defended
freedom’s ramparts, they want to know if we will share in freedom’s bounty
(1993b, p. 208).
In this passage, Clinton demonstrated his election pledge to make the economy the center
of his agenda.  Here Clinton tied the domestic and international spheres together.  In the
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“new world” of the post-Cold War world, the president recognized caused a good deal of
anxiety for Americans.  In recognizing this anxiety, Clinton fulfilled his presidential role
as interpreter-in-chief (Stuckey, 1991).  In this role, Mary E. Stuckey (1991) argued the
president tells us stories about ourselves, revealing what kind of people we are, the
problems we face, and how we constitute ourselves as a community.  Clinton’s story for
America was that the American people had helped to build a “new world” by defending
“freedom’s ramparts,” resulting in “bounty” for the world.  These specific bounties
should have been “good jobs, first class opportunities, world-class education, quality
affordable health care” and “safe streets.”  However, Americans were not reaping the
benefits of the world they had built in their own image.  Fulfilling his role as interpreter-
in-chief put Clinton in tune with the citizenry, allowing him to speak for those feeling
anxiety, identify their problems, and suggest what new directions were needed to abate
America’s apprehension.
 Clinton understood this new global economy was not actually new, as it had
started long before the Cold War was over.  Specifically, the global economy began “20
years ago” and immediately “put great pressures on the wages and benefits of our
working people, put great pressure on many of our companies to compete and win, to
make internal changes in order to survive and prosper” (1994i, p. 2056).  Economic
disorder at home from increasing competition from other nation-states that offered lower
wages, produced similar goods, and created larger profit margins for American
companies moving overseas was the “pressure” Americans felt.  This was emblematic in
the “20 years of declining productivity and a decade more of stagnant wages and greater
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effort” (1993b, p. 208).  Here, Clinton’s usage of “20 years” stood for a generation of
primarily Republican presidents not doing enough for the American people.  The implied
emphasis on Republican leadership was important because Clinton wanted to highlight
how little success had come to Americans under their leadership in the global economy as
opposed to (by implication) the new Democrat in office, Clinton, who truly understood
the impacts of the global economy.  Under his leadership, Americans would no longer
suffer in this new economic environment as Clinton’s administration would provide them
the tools with which to abate the anxiety caused by globalization.
 Also note Clinton further highlighted incompetent Republican presidential
economic leadership when he stated that these presidents had built America’s economy
“around our responsibilities in the cold war” and financed “our continuing leadership in
that war and our needs at home,” but “with massive deficits” (1995g, p. 956).  The
implication of that discourse was that these presidents had the foresight to win the Cold
War, but did not have the prudence to change America’s economy to deal with new
realities.  The burdens of fighting that war now passed to the current generation who
would pay for incompetent leadership.
Ultimately Clinton declared the leaders of the previous generation “have failed to
take steps that harness the global economy to the benefit of all people” (1993b, p. 210;
see also 1993b, p. 214). The president argued U.S. public officials failed in their primary
duty on economic matters: to lead and make necessary changes to America’s economic
structure.  When the changes in the geopolitical order were coupled with the lack of
foresight among Clinton’s predecessors, it was little wonder Americans felt uncertainty
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about the new world they helped to build.  Discussing these changes put the president in a
position to lead America’s domestic renewal.  Economic renewal would help Americans
deal with the changes in the global economy as well as serve as a reason for the United
States to continue its position as world leader.  In turn, continuing this role gave America
greater opportunity to harness globalization for its own advantage.
Renewing America’s economy began with putting “our own economic house in
order” (1993a, p. 114; 1993b, p. 211).  Clinton’s vision for economic order came through
a combination of jobs creation, domestic investment programs, universal health care,
increased funding for education, and reduction of the federal deficit through a modest tax
increase on the rich and elimination of government waste and spending (1993a, p. 114).
By implementing these programs (and many of them were actually implemented)
America would rejuvenate itself.
As indicated by Clinton’s account, his vision of renewing domestic order
achieved real results.  In his 2000 State of the Union Address, Clinton declared “we have
built a new economy” (2000a, p. 129).  The president’s economic plan had yielded
positive results for the economy and a renewal of America’s domestic order.  He exalted
America’s economic progress:
Let me just ask you to focus on this and measure where we are as against what
has been happening in the debate about maintaining our leadership.  We have the
lowest unemployment in the country in 30 years, the lowest welfare roles in 30
years, the lowest crime rates in 30 years, the lowest poverty rates in 20 years, the
first back-to-back budget surpluses in 42 years, and the smallest federal
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government in 37 years.  In my lifetime we have never had—ever—as a people,
the opportunity we now have to build the future of our dreams for our children
(1999p, p. 2012; see also 1994i, p. 2056).
Note three things from this passage.  First, it was certainly not unusual for a president to
highlight how America’s economy achieved great success during his tenure.  However,
these domestic accomplishments meant that America’s economy had been “rebuilt,”
reaffirming America’s status as the nation to emulate.  According to this logic, the U.S.
economy was the largest and most diverse in the world.  It had rejuvenated itself even
amid the chaotic landscape of globalization.  In part, America’s economic renewal made
it an exemplar nation once again.  Thus, it was natural for other states to want to renew
their economic order as the U.S. had done.
The reaffirmation of the exemplar mission functioned as a justification to
continue America’s global leadership.  The accomplishments Clinton listed were done in
support of our ability to “maintain our leadership,” which meant keeping and extending
American leadership abroad.  Because domestic and foreign policies were inextricably
linked, American success at home allowed the United States to continue its global
mission.  U.S. economic success gave America the resources it needed to “maintain our
leadership” in the world.
Finally, Clinton’s discourse recast the mission of exemplar.  Domestic success
meant that the United States had the domestic resources to continue America’s leadership
role.  This usage of the exemplar mission runs counter to how it has been historically
understood.  Recall in Chapter One I explained that rhetors whose primary worldview
78
concerning America’s role is the world is the mission of exemplar advocate that the
United States should be removed from global affairs; in short, America should stay out of
the politics of other nations (Coles, 2002; Merk, 1963; Stephenson, 1995).  This primary
worldview traditionally operates in tension against those that espouse the mission of
intervention.  Either the United States is an exemplar nation perfecting its own
institutions so it will be a model for the world while staying out of the politics of other
nations, or it projects its providential self-image, which provides the justification for the
United States to engage and lead other states in the international arena.  In Clinton’s
discourse he intertwined the two missions where the exemplar mission could now be a
justification to maintain American leadership.  Clinton intertwined these two missions to
meet his rhetorical needs in a different international environment.   For this president, in a
post-Cold War world of change, the two narratives work in concert rather than tension, as
domestic success is also success internationally.  This success provided the United States
with the ability to continue its role as world leader.  By continuing to lead, the United
States positioned itself to manage and order the change brought by an age of accelerated
globalization.
Renewing America?s Community
 The third task to manage globalization and continue America’s leadership role
was to reconstitute our ideas about the national polity, which was a subject of great
interest to Clinton.  According to his speechwriter Michael Waldman (2000), Clinton
often was at his most eloquent when speaking about the racial tensions within the
American community.  The president’s most notable discussion of this issue came in his
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second term Initiative on Race, but he also spoke about the tensions within the American
community in his first term, observing:
Look now at our new immigrant Nation and think of the world, which we are
tending.  Look at how diverse and multiethnic and multilingual we are, in a world
in which the ability to communicate with all kinds of people from all over the
world and to understand them will be critical.  Look at our civic habits of
tolerance and respect.  They are not perfect in our own eyes.  It grieved us all
when there was so much trouble a year ago in Los Angeles.  But Los Angeles is a
country with 150 different ethnic groups of widely differing levels of education
and access to capital and income.  It is a miracle that we get along as well as we
do.  And all you have to do is look at Bosnia, where differences were not so great,
to see how well we have done in spite of our difficulties (1993b, p. 214).
This quotation made clear that Clinton felt the United States was a community to emulate
because we practice “tolerance and respect” in a nation that was so “diverse,”
“multiethnic,” and “multilingual.”  The people of the United States know how to make
community work.  Note his comparison of Los Angeles to Bosnia.  In Los Angeles “over
150 different ethnic groups” lived and worked together on a daily basis without the level
of violence that Bosnia experienced, even though Bosnia had only a handful of ethnic and
religious groups.  As indicated by his discourse, America was the model of tolerance and
respect the other states of the world should emulate when they faced threats to their
communities.  For Clinton, valorizing America’s ability to work and live together in a
cohesive community was another example of the United States fulfilling its exemplarist
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mission.  As the arenas of domestic and foreign politics were inextricably linked, being
the exemplar of a diverse democracy provided another justification for the United States
to continue to lead globally because the U.S. example provided a lesson for all other
nation-states.
  However, problems still emanated from that diversity.  The president argued the
United States was still too divided along racial and ethnic lines, which were one of the
reasons for his Initiative on Race which he asserted would assist in building “One
America” (Clinton, 2004). One example indicative of the president’s discourse can be
found in his 1998 State of the Union Address where Clinton explained to the American
people:
Community means living by the defining American values, the idea heard ‘round
the world: that we’re all created equal.  Throughout our history, we haven’t
always honored that idea, and we’ve never fully lived up to it.  Often it’s easier to
believe that our differences matter more than what we have in common.  It may
be easier, but it’s wrong . . .the answer cannot be to dwell on our differences, but
to build on our shared values . . .I’ve launched this national initiative on race to
help us recognize our common interests and to bridge the opportunity gaps that
are keeping us from becoming one America (1998a, p. 119).
For Clinton, “community” meant equality.18 It was this idea that made the United States
such an exemplar nation because it was the idea “heard ‘round the world.”  America was
18 I do understand that this is a contested argument, as not all view the founding as creating equality.
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founded on a principle that in the 1990s was gaining currency throughout the globe.
However, instead of indicating the United States had truly fulfilled its exemplarist
mission as his predecessors contended, the president argued there was more work to be
done at home (Coles, 2002).  Clinton’s race initiative was a program in which Americans
could find resonance in their commonalities, not their differences.  By doing so,
Americans demonstrated they were willing to work on their problems of community.
Doing this work made the United States an even greater nation to emulate.  The
willingness to work domestically demonstrated the United States would also continue to
work abroad, a necessary component for it to continue its global leadership position.
According to the president, while being the model nation to emulate because of its
community of equality, the United States did not always live up to that ideal as there
were still many “opportunity gaps” between races and ethnicities within the United
States.  These gaps were part of the work needed to reconstitute America’s community.
Narrowing the opportunity gaps demonstrated to the world that the United States was
serious about taking care of its problems at home, thus also affording the United States
the ability to maintain its leadership role abroad.
For Clinton, opportunity gaps were not deep-seated institutional and cultural
problems; rather they referred to the economic situation that resulted from these
problems.  Part of the president’s management of America’s race problem was to get
people to focus on common ideals as well as to create more material opportunities.   This
treatment of material gains indicate the president privileged economic means for
overcoming racial tension instead of excavating the deep roots of America’s race
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problem.  Martin Carcasson and Mitchell Rice (1999; see also Goldzwig & Sullivan,
2003) explained that one of the primary reasons for the failure of Clinton’s race initiative
was that it spent so much time talking about economic solutions to problems of race.
Therefore Clinton’s solution to build “one America” only scratched the surface in solving
racial division as it emphasized economic means without providing more substantive
answers to bridging the racial gaps separating Americans.
That said, Clinton’s discourse on renewing the American community provided
justification for maintaining America’s global leadership.  As he stated in his 1997 State
of the Union Address:
In the end, more than anything else, our world leadership grows out of our
example here at home, out of our ability to remain strong as one America.  All
over the world people are being torn asunder by racial, ethnic, and religious
conflicts that fuel fanaticism and terror.  We are the world’s most diverse
democracy, and the world looks to us to show that it is possible to live and
advance together across those kinds of differences.  America has always been a
nation of immigrants . . .My fellow Americans, we must never, ever believe that
our diversity is a weakness.  It is our greatest strength.  Americans speak every
language, know every country.  People on every continent look to us and see the
reflection of great potential, and they always will, as long as we strive to give all
our citizens, whatever their background, an opportunity to achieve their own
greatness (1997a, p. 116).
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On an initial reading, this passage may smack of presidential arrogance.  To declare that
“people on every continent” look to the United States as a shining example of diversity
signaled to other states that they did not match American standards on that particular
issue.  Yet this passage was also a textbook example of the mission of exemplar, as
indicated by Clinton’s sentence, “the world looks to us to show that it is possible to live
and advance together across those kinds of differences.”  The United States was the
quintessential example of a “diverse democracy.”  All nations have some form of
diversity within them.  To learn how to deal with that diversity, nation-states should look
to the United States as the quintessential example of a “diverse democracy.”
One of the basic premises of the mission of exemplar is that the United States is a
symbol of what is possible for other nation-states to achieve (McEvoy-Levy, 2001; Merk,
1963; Stephenson, 1995).  Clinton identified the idea of America—what other nations
could become—as being a powerful image in late 20th century geopolitics.  This image
meant the United States must continue its exemplar mission in order for other nation-
states to strive for America’s accomplishments with community.  As long as the United
States continued to reconstitute its sense of community, it demonstrated to the rest of the
world why it should lead.  In turn, this leadership put the United States in a position to
best manage the changes of globalization.
Moreover, Clinton’s celebration of diversity was a remarkable change from his
predecessors.  Vanessa Beasley (2004) explained that presidents have often been
inattentive when it comes to difference in defining who and what constitutes an
American.  Past presidents have argued the American people evoked a composite of
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shared beliefs which eschewed difference.  Difference and diversity were subsumed for
higher American ideals.  In Clinton’s case, he asked his fellow citizens to celebrate
diversity as United States’ greatest strength.  The president understood America to be an
exemplar state because of our ability to live with difference.  We, the United States, were
the idealic image in the mirror that the world should see when it tries to deal with
difference.  This image reaffirmed the currency of the exemplar narrative in
contemporary presidential discourse as well as American exceptionalism in general.
Clinton’s use of this narrative imparted a lesson as to why the United States needed to
continue its role as global leader, while at the same time it extended one piece of
America’s foreign policy vocabulary.
The celebration of difference constituted one approach to renewing America’s
community.  If the United States shifted its attitude from disdaining diversity to
celebrating it, then it changed its political culture to renew that culture for a new post-
Cold War environment.  This attitudinal shift built a stronger America.  In turn, the
United States became a stronger example for the world to emulate.  By celebrating
diversity, Clinton’s presidency marked a shift in the way presidents constitute the
American community (Beasley, 2004). It also translated into fulfilling America’s mission
of exemplar.  Celebrating difference within the United States was a means to renew
America’s community.  Building a stronger American community creates a stronger
image for other nation-states to copy.  Projecting this image reaffirms America’s
exceptionalist culture and supplies another justification for Clinton continuing U.S.
global engagement and leadership.
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Overall, Clinton asserted the United States must break down the walls in its
thinking and speech between the foreign and domestic policy arenas as the two arenas
directly impacted one another.  To continue American leadership in a new era, the
president argued the United States must renew both its economy and its community.
Renewal in both areas reaffirmed the contemporary currency of the exemplar narrative in
Clinton’s discourse.  His discourse tailored the exemplar narrative to be used as a
justification for American leadership.  For this president, continuing U.S. leadership
abroad fulfilled the mission of exemplar.  In turn, continuing America’s role as global
leader allowed the United States to also maintain and extend the mission of intervention
preserving a sense of rhetorical continuity with his predecessors.
Continuing America’s Mission of Intervention
While Clinton’s discourse in the domestic arena provided rhetorical grounds to
promote keeping the United States as the world leader, he also explicitly stated the
United States would not retreat from the position it achieved after World War II.  For
Clinton, the United States occupied a “unique position” in geopolitics in the age of
globalism, so much so that he declared it “the indispensable nation” because “there are
times when only America can make the difference between war and peace, between
freedom and repression, between hope and fear . . .we must act and lead” (1996g, p.
1891).  Clinton’s moniker of “indispensable nation” for the United States reaffirmed
America’s providential role within the world.  According to the doctrine of American
exceptionalism, the United States was destined to be the world’s greatest power.  This
power led the president to assert that only the United States could prevent war,
86
repression, and fear.  This extraordinary power imparted America with the responsibility
to lead the world that was expressed through the intervention narrative in American
foreign policy.  Within Clinton’s discourse, this mission served to shape the
understanding of Americans that they needed to be global leaders instead of global
retreaters.
In promoting the continuation of the intervention mission, Clinton dedicated most
of his energy to justifying why it was still an important worldview for American foreign
policy.  The president supported his position with two overarching claims. First, the
United States had to live up to the legacy of the historical leadership of the past,
specifically the World War II generation.  Clinton used historical metaphors to bring
similar circumstances of the past into the present to define for and educate his audiences
as to what the United States should and should not do.  Second, America led so it could
shape and mold a better future for itself and the international community.  For this claim,
Clinton employed metaphors concerning urgency and direction.  American leadership
was necessary to provide the proper direction for change, but it was imperative to
immediately chart the path because of the fleeting nature of the moment.  Both these
claims acknowledged America’s continued mission of intervention, provided the
American public and the larger world audiences with explanations as to why America
must lead, and countered claims that America should retreat from the world.  By
continuing to promote the mission of intervention, Clinton reaffirmed America’s claim as
global leader.
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Clinton?s World War I Dystalgia
 Historical metaphors are comparisons between the past and the present (Paris,
2002). These metaphors attach historical events and tales to a new situation as people,
places, and events of the past become symbols for certain actions and policies in the
present (Hellsten, 1997; Stuckey, 1992).    For example, the British acquiescence at
Munich today stands for appeasement, while the name of Adolf Hitler is shorthand for
evil.  These metaphors are often bound to the specific culture, time, and context when
they are used, but in this context, they nevertheless serve as cognitive guides through
foreign policy terrain.  In justifying America’s mission of intervention, Clinton relied on
the post-war politics of World War I and World War II to serve as guides for the 1990s’
generation on the kind of international leadership they should exhibit.
As I noted earlier, Clinton viewed the United States as the “indispensable nation,”
meaning the United States had a unique responsibility to continue to lead in the post-Cold
War world.  The president called America’s decision whether to lead or to retreat in the
post-Cold War world as “the third great moment of decision in the 20th century” (1993b,
p. 208).  Clinton’s presidency was the third “moment of decision” because it was the
third great transition period in American foreign affairs in the 20th century. The two
other times the United States had to make decisions about its global responsibilities
occurred in the aftermaths of World War I and World War II.   Clinton depicted
America’s decision on foreign policy leadership after World War I in these terms:
Twice before in this century, history has asked the United States and the other
great powers to provide leadership for a world ravaged by war.  After World War
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I, that call went unheeded.  The United States was too unwilling.  The great
powers turned inward as violent, totalitarian power emerged.  We raised trade
barriers.  We sought to humiliate rather than rehabilitate the vanquished.  And the
result was instability, then depression, and ultimately a Second World War
(1993b, p. 207).
Note Clinton’s recitation of history. According to the president’s version of World War I
events, the United States had an opportunity to lead, but chose not to do so as America’s
leaders were “unwilling” to answer history’s call for American leadership.  Because
America chose isolationism, “trade barriers” were erected.  Concomitantly, the great
powers (Great Britain and France) turned “inward” and the Allies heaped humiliation
upon Germany for starting World War I.  America’s decision not to lead the world further
resulted in the rise of “totalitarian power,” the (Great) “depression,” and eventually a
“Second World War.” For Clinton, there was a causal link between the rise of
totalitarianism and depression and America’s unwillingness to take a global leadership
role.
Certainly, one can dispute the president’s history’s lesson; however, the point of
the president’s historical metaphor was to present the choices made regarding American
foreign policy after World War I in a dystalgic light, as dystalgia occurs when a rhetor
depicts the past negatively.  The negativity of the past is highlighted so that it will not be
used as a guide for decision making in the present (Janack, 1999).  Clearly Clinton
offered a dystalgic view of American foreign policy decision making in the aftermath
World War I.  As a historical metaphor, the foreign policy choices in the aftermath of
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World War I stood for failure because the U.S. unwillingness to embrace the mission of
intervention after the war led to grave consequences both domestically and abroad.  In
recalling this event, the president demonstrated for his audience what the United States
should not do in its foreign policy role.  He repudiated the choices made by American
presidents immediately after World War I by evoking a period when America did not
answer history’s call for leadership.  By extension, the president implied he would not
make the same mistake; rather he would maintain America’s leadership position in world
affairs.
 Clinton concretized this history lesson by defining his foreign policy opponents as
“new isolationists.”  As did their historical brethren, the new isolationists argued America
should withdraw and retreat from the world.  Clinton stated these rivals sang “siren songs
of myth” that “once lured the United States into isolationism after World War I” (1995m,
p. 1798).  Clinton’s use of the sirens of Greek mythology was instructive of how he
viewed those who opposed continued American global leadership, as the Sirens were
beautiful musicians who hypnotized mariners and lured them to their rocky shoals,
resulting in the destruction of their ships and the death of all aboard.  By implication, if
the siren songs of neo-isolationism took hold, American foreign policy would lead to the
destruction of America’s foreign policy ship.
Clinton further argued “the new isolationists are wrong.  They would have us face
the future alone.  Their approach would weaken this country.  And we must not let the
ripple of isolationism that has been generated into a tidal wave” (1995d, p. 285; see also
1993f, p. 1489; 1994a, p. 10; 1994i, p. 1627).  Here the president considered isolationism
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to be a “ripple” in the ocean of international relations that could become a “tidal wave” if
America withdrew, doing irrevocable damage to America’s reputation as a leader,
American foreign policy, and presumably the world.  Simply put, isolationism impugned
America’s exceptional character.  In contrast, the maintenance of America’s leadership
reaffirmed and extended American exceptionalism.  Thus Clinton’s advocacy of U.S.
leadership saved America and its exceptionalism from being damaged, which in turn kept
America’s leadership responsibility intact.
World War II Nostalgia
The second historical metaphor Clinton employed was the aftermath of World
War II in which this generation’s decision whether to take a leadership role on the world
stage was characterized as the second great moment of decision in 20th century American
foreign policy.  The president described American foreign policy in the postwar period in
this way:
It will serve us to remember that when World War II was won, profound
uncertainty clouded the future.  Europe and Japan were buried in rubble.  Their
peoples were weary.  People did not know what to expect or what would happen.
But because of the vision of the people who were our predecessors here in the
United States . . .the path that was followed after World War I was abandoned and
instead the world was embraced with optimism and hope (1994d, p. 1198).
Two things should be taken from this passage.  First, Clinton’s history lesson was a
parallel to America’s foreign policy circumstances in the post-Cold War era.  For
example, the president expressed that after World War II, “profound uncertainty clouded
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the future” of U.S. foreign policy.  That uncertainty stemmed from the international
setting not being fully formed.  Prior to the Cold War, there was a brief interregnum
where the composition of the international setting was in doubt. A similar uncertainty
surrounded American foreign policy after the Cold War because the international
environment of the post-Cold War world was also still forming.  After World War II, the
leadership path the United States would take was uncertain, just like its post-Cold War
leadership path.  But, as Clinton noted, the World War II generation chose to lead by
embracing the world “with optimism and hope” which allowed America to assume a
leadership position.  The president invoked the memory of World War II to signal to the
post-Cold War generation that it should embrace the post-Cold War transition period with
the same optimism and hope as its predecessors, thus resulting in an extension of
American leadership.
The president’s memory of the aftermath of World War II certainly glossed over
various negatives of the postwar period such as the hysteria and paranoia rampant within
American political culture because of the rise of the Cold War.  However, as with his
recollections of World War I, the president’s purpose legitimized his advocacy that the
U.S. must continue to lead.  His history lesson was nostalgic, with nostalgia being the
opposite of dystalgia.  Rhetors who use nostalgia recall the past in a positive light to
produce a rationale that justifies decisions made in the present (Janack, 1999; Parry-Giles
& Parry-Giles, 2002).  The president depicted America’s choice to lead after World War
II in a positive light to demonstrate the need for continuing what the “greatest generation”
had started.  As a historical metaphor, the World War II generation stood as a benchmark
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of foreign policy leadership in a time of transition.  The president’s discourse supplied a
clear lesson as to what the United States should do about its place in the international
order.  Associating the post-Cold War generation with that of World War II offered
legitimacy for his advocacy of continuing America’s leadership responsibility.   Clinton
implied through his historical metaphor that his generation would continue the job started
by the former generation.  In turn, carrying on America’s role as world leader offered a
semblance of stability within the international environment.
Second, Clinton’s invocation of the World War II generation itself was important
because of the cultural impact this generation had on the 1990s.  During the Clinton
presidency, a number of texts, such as the movie Saving Private Ryan and Tom Brokaw’s
(1998) bestseller The Greatest Generation, represented the “greatest generation” as the
ideal of national belonging.  According to Barbara Biesecker (2002), the World War II
generation and the texts that promulgate the service of its members offered a “civics
lesson” for what it meant to be an American.  For American foreign policy, the World
War II generation was the benchmark of global leadership that provided a “civics lesson”
for American foreign policy.  Maintaining that leadership responsibility afforded the
Clinton administration’s generation the opportunity to live up to the standard left by
America’s “greatest generation” whereby they could enact the “civics lesson” of the
World War II generation.  By leading in the post-Cold War world, Clinton’s generation
proved itself a worthy heir to the standard of leadership left by those who shaped
America’s leadership role in the postwar period.
Harry Truman: An Exemplar of Transitional Leadership in Foreign Policy
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 The final historical metaphor the president employed involved former President
Harry Truman.19 It is not unusual for American presidents to call upon the memory of
their predecessors to lend support for decisions made in the present as recollections of the
deeds of presidents past supply a foundation for current and future action.  Clinton
represented himself in some respects as the Harry Truman for post-Cold War American
foreign policy by perceiving he and Truman shared three specific items.  First, they both
came from similar backgrounds.  Second, Clinton argued that Truman had also
articulated a principle of foreign policy leadership that was not encased in a specific
vision of foreign policy.  Finally, the president asserted he and Truman faced similar
transitional problems in American foreign policy.  When Clinton invoked the memory of
Harry Truman, he brought that legacy of leadership into the present.  By advocating the
United States continue its leadership role, Clinton lived up to, maintained, and extended
Truman’s legacy.
More specifically, Clinton perceived the two shared similar personal
backgrounds.  For example, the president declared Harry Truman was a “man of very
common roots, but uncommon vision” (1993a, p. 208).  The key phrase here was
“common roots” as Clinton like Truman was a rural southerner, with Clinton being from
Arkansas and Truman from Missouri.  Both presidents grew up in fairly poor conditions.
Both men were largely self-made.  Truman, the only non-college graduate of the modern
19 In his foreign policy discourse, Clinton venerated Harry Truman in two ways.  First, Truman was the
model of presidential leadership in times of major foreign policy transition, which is what I discuss in this
chapter.  Clinton also valorized Truman for his leadership in creating the institutional architecture for the
Cold War, something that Clinton argued needed to be retooled for the age of globalization.  This subject I
will deal with more extensively in Chapter Four.
94
presidents, became a successful businessman and politician, while although college
educated, Clinton also relied greatly on his intellect to build his political career.  Thus the
common roots of Harry Truman could be found in the life story of Bill Clinton.  The
president’s invocation of Truman implied that just as Truman extended American
leadership after World War II, Clinton would follow the same course. America’s
exceptionalist mission was secure.
Not only did these two presidents share similar roots, but they both articulated a
principle of American global leadership during a time of transition.  Clinton argued that
like himself, Truman advocated this position without a specific summary of foreign
policy being put on a bumper sticker (i.e., the strategy of containment.)  Evidence of this
claim came from Strobe Talbott (2002), Clinton’s Ambassador to Russia and Deputy
Secretary of State.  In his memoirs, Talbott recalled that Clinton was a voracious reader
on the subject of the presidency.  When early in his first term, Clinton finished reading
David McCullough’s (1992) biography of Harry Truman, Talbott tells us that Clinton
concluded Truman did not have a set vision of America’s role in the world in the
transition from World War II to the postwar period.20 Rather, Clinton understood
Truman’s advocacy of U.S. global leadership to be built on a conviction of what Truman
thought was right for the United States and the world.
20 Clinton’s understanding of Truman’s foreign policy was that historians later superimposed their own
ideas onto Truman’s presidency regarding whether or not he had a specific vision (namely containment) for
American foreign policy in the postwar period.
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Similarly, a principle of an unwavering commitment to U.S. global leadership
guided Clinton’s international affairs (Edwards & Daas, 2005; McCormick, 2002;
Soderberg, 2005; Talbott, 2002).  Clinton eschewed the search for his foreign policy to be
summarized in a word or a phrase as it was during the Cold War.  Instead, the president’s
continuous advocacy that America had a global responsibility to lead both defined and
educated audiences as to what the United States should do in the post-Cold War world.
Through this advocacy, Clinton maintained and extended Truman’s principled foreign
policy leadership during a time of transition.
In addition to sharing personal qualities and principles with Truman, Clinton
argued they shared similar foreign policy circumstances.  As Clinton put it, Truman
“persuaded an uncertain and weary nation, yearning to shift its energies from the
frontlines to the home front to lead the world again” (1995d, p. 285).  At the end of
World War II, Truman faced a transition in international politics.  As of the start of his
presidency, the Soviet Union was not the great enemy it would later become.  Although
he faced a domestic audience who wanted to concentrate on problems at home and curtail
their commitments abroad, he persuaded Americans to live up to their missionary duties.
Similarly, Clinton faced a transitional period in U.S. international affairs when he
encountered a weary population after the Cold War suffering from anxiety because of a
world awash in change, as well as a challenge from the new isolationists.  But like
Truman, Clinton remained steadfast to the principle of continued American leadership,
persuading Congress to remain steadfast in its pledge of global leadership (McCormick,
2002).  Truman’s commitment to American global leadership in the face of anxiety at
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both home and abroad provided a standard for Clinton to emulate in his own leadership.
Accordingly Clinton’s profession of American leadership in the face of domestic anxiety
was in the mold of Truman.  He thus positioned himself to be a model himself for future
presidents to emulate in U.S. foreign policy, especially in times of transition.
Ultimately, Clinton’s use of Truman as a historical metaphor showed the
continuity he shared with Truman’s leadership tradition.  Speaking before a conference
on American leadership at the Nixon Center, Clinton told his audience:
We cannot let history record that our generation of Americans refused this
challenge, that we withdrew from the world and abandoned responsibilities when
we knew better to do it, that we lacked the energy, the vision, and the will to carry
this struggle forward . . .So let us find inspiration in the great tradition of Harry
Truman . . .a tradition that builds cooperation, not walls of operation, that opens
the arms of Americans to change instead of throwing up our hands in despair . .
.That is the tradition that made the most of this land, won the battles of this
century against tyranny, and secured our freedom and prosperity (1995d, pp. 288-
289).
Note that in the first sentence, the president implored his audience to wake up to the
realities of the post-Cold War world and answer the challenge history had laid before the
United States.  Historians should not record that the globalization generation had shirked
America’s historical responsibilities.  Instead, Clinton invoked Harry Truman to further
his argument as the model for transitional leadership into a new age of geopolitics.  The
message from Clinton was clear: if Truman’s generation could resolve to lead after a
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World War, the United States should be able to do the same in the aftermath of the Cold
War.  By invoking Truman, Clinton made himself the heir to Truman’s legacy, which
meant the global leadership role Truman had fostered and developed would be
maintained and extended by Clinton.
Overall, the use of the historical metaphors demonstrated what the United States
should and should not do in the international setting.  Clinton’s discussion of World War
I created a dystalgic effect of what America should not do, whereas invoking the World
War II generation and Truman maintained continuity with the mission of intervention that
had become an entrenched part of American foreign policy during the Cold War.  In turn,
this mission affirmed the duty of the United States to continue to lead the world to not
only secure our interests, but those of our allies as well.  In the next section, I analyze
how Clinton also substantiated American leadership as a mission to shape the future for
the benefit of the United States and the world through the use of metaphors of urgency
and direction.
Leadership to Shape the Future in America?s Image
The president’s second justification for continuing the mission of intervention was
that America’s future in the international arena was dependent on its leading in the
present.  This claim was set out through metaphors that concerned urgency and direction.
The urgency of American leadership was needed because as Clinton understood them, the
forces of globalization were transforming the global landscape.  As he put it, “change is
upon us.  We can do nothing about that” (1993i, p. 2014).  As change stemming from the
rapidly changing global environment was inevitable, there was no use fighting it. Change
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put pressure on America’s ability to lead because the United States had to react to and
manage the global landscape in some way.  According to this logic, if America did not
act, its ability to continue its global role would be negatively affected.  That is why
Clinton explained to the American public that the United States must be proactive within
the international arena to shape the changes happening across the globe in its favor so it
could prosper into the future.  For example, he observed that America’s mission of
leadership was to be “shapers of events, not observers of it, if we do not act, the moment
will pass and we will lose the best possibilities of our future.  We face no imminent
threat, but we do have an enemy.  The enemy of our time is inaction” (1997a, p. 109).
Here Clinton made three rhetorical maneuvers.  First, note the urgency within the
president’s discourse, in which his commitment to global leadership provided America
with the opportunity to mold the international setting for its benefit, but only if it acted
now.   The United States could not sit by and wait.  The urgency of the moment
demanded American leadership, because as Clinton admitted, if the United States did not
act, “the moment will pass.”
Second, if the United States did not shape and mold the future in its image than it
would have been beaten, not by an external threat, but by an internal one.  Getting beaten
by an internal threat would harm America’s exemplarist mission because it would reveal
the United States was not the state to emulate.  Moreover, inaction would prevent the
United States from influencing the direction of the globe, which could hurt American
interests in the long-term.  By providing the American public with an internal opponent,
the implied message to the audience was that there was still a good deal of work to be
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done.  Under Clinton, the United States had achieved domestic and international renewal;
now the president called upon his fellow Americans to extend that mission so that
American interests would be secured for decades to come.
Finally, the president’s admission of this fleeting moment directly contradicted a
central tenet of American exceptionalism.  Recall that America’s alleged ability to escape
the deterioration common to all great powers was one of the basic characteristics of
American exceptionalism.  Traditionally, American presidents have upheld that tenet,
including Clinton’s predecessor George H.W. Bush (Coles, 2002).  However, Clinton
understood America’s destiny as the temporary product of human agency in which the
United States could not (as some in the past have suggested) escape the devolution of its
power.  Here, Clinton again modified American exceptionalism for his presidency.  For
the president, the United States must continue its traditional advocacy of intervention, but
the future of the mission would not be infinite, as he understood the window of American
primacy to be narrow.  By continuing to lead and construct the international landscape
toward U.S. interests, Americans could obtain some security, even if it lost some power.
American leadership in the present assured its presence into the future.
Not only must the United States shape the changes brought by globalization for its
own security, but also for that of the world.  Speaking on American foreign policy for a
global age Clinton stated:
Change is inevitable but the particular change is not.  And we have to make some
decisions to seize the opportunities and meet the challenges before us.  To put it
another way, the train of globalization cannot be reversed, but it has more than
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one possible destination.  If we want America to be on the right track, if we want
other people to stay on the right track and have the opportunity to enjoy peace and
prosperity, we have no choice but to try and lead the train (2000c, pp. 2654-55;
see also 1996e, p. 1256; 1997b, p. 560; 1999g, p. 506).
The “other people” to whom Clinton referred were the general population of the world
for whom he was privileged to speak in his role as world leader.  The president
maintained that as the destinies of America and the rest of the planet were fused, to
succeed, America and the world must go down together the same “track” of
globalization.  The leadership of the United States was imperative to remain on the right
track as the world’s greatest opportunity to shape the future in the proper way depended
on U.S. leadership.  To use an earlier reference, American leadership was truly
“indispensable” for the world’s future. Shaping future change for the United States and
the globe provided a polestar for American foreign policy, which then maintained
continuity with the intervention narrative inherent in the foreign policy discourse of
Clinton’s predecessors.
 In the end Clinton argued shaping America and the world’s future required the
American people to be farsighted like their World War II forbearers.  Speaking to the
American people in his 1997 State of the Union Address, he explained:
To prepare America for the 21st century we must master the forces of change in
the world and keep American leadership strong and sure for an uncharted time.
Fifty years ago, a farsighted American led in creating the institutions that secured
victory in the Cold War and built a growing world economy.  As a result, today
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more people than ever embrace our ideas and share our interests. Already we have
dismantled many of the blocks and barriers that divided our parent’s world.  For
the first time, more people live under democracy than dictatorship including every
nation in our hemisphere but one, and its day, too, will come.  Now we stand at
another moment of change and choice and another time to bring America 50 more
years of security and prosperity (1997a, p. 116).
Here the president again employed historical metaphors in a context where they stood for
future global stability.  To “prepare America for the 21st century,” U.S. leadership would
be needed for an “uncharted time.”  Clinton defined the age of globalization as unruly
and unpredictable. American leadership acted as a counterweight to the unpredictable
state of global affairs. The United States was stable and strong.  Although globalization
brought great change, America’s leadership could master the forces behind it.   In doing
so, the vision of Clinton’s generation of the 1990s would be equated with the World War
II generation’s foresight in creating institutions that proved vital to fighting the Cold War.
Accordingly the 1990s’ generation would be revered by future generations if it took steps
to shape change to America’s benefit.
Notably Clinton made himself (just as he had Truman) a progenitor of America’s
ability to be a stabilizing force and master of change.  The president invoked Harry
Truman by stating a “farsighted American led in creating the institutions that secured
victory in the Cold War,” which resulted in more people in the world sharing American
ideals and interests.  As Truman’s heir, Clinton would continue to produce farsighted,
transitional leadership. America’s and the world’s future was secure with Clinton because
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fifty years from now, history would record that he was also a “farsighted American” like
Truman.  Justifying American leadership to shape the world not only gave the United
States a mission, it provided Clinton a foreign policy legacy as a visionary transitional
president.  Thus Clinton’s discourse used the missions of exceptionalism to justify
continued American engagement and leadership. Under his presidency, the United States
continued and extended its position as global leader.  At the same time, Clinton also
highlighted the limits of American leadership, and through acknowledging these limits,
modified key aspects of American exceptionalism.
The Limits of American Global Leadership
 Clinton reaffirmed America’s exceptionalist missions, but as we saw in the last
section, he also rhetorically disallowed one of the basic tenets of exceptionalism: that the
United States as a power would not degenerate as had other great powers of the past.
Clinton realized America’s ability to dominate international affairs was fleeting.
Eventually the United States would not be the only superpower, as others would rival its
primacy in economic, military, or political terms.  Certainly this would impede America’s
ability to maintain its global leadership.  He also imposed two more limitations on U.S.
leadership abilities: the amount of power the United States actually had and the
commitments it could make.
 First Clinton noted there were limits to America’s power within an age of
globalization.  For example, Clinton often repeated to various audiences that “we can’t
take on all the world’s burden. . .We cannot become its policeman” (1996e, p. 1257;
1993g, p. 1614; 1994a, p. 128; 1996g; p. 1891).  Note two things from this statement.
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First, Clinton used the metaphor of equating the United States to a policeman for the
world.  A police officer is supposed to protect and serve the community.  The United
States is not only part of a global community, but the most powerful force within that
community.  However, Clinton observed that unlike the police officer, the United States
could not fully protect and serve the entire global community—it can only patrol those
neighborhoods where it has the most authority.21  The inability to be a global police
officer meant that some parts of the global neighborhood would have to be neglected.
Being able to extend its power to only some parts of the global neighborhood meant
America needed the help of other police officers.  According to Clinton’s logic, without
that assistance parts of the global neighborhood would have to be left unpatrolled.  In
other words, in the age of globalization America’s power to lead was great, but as we still
needed the assistance of others,  America must share the burden of leadership.  However,
that need to share the burden  meant the United States was not in some ways as dominant
as it portrayed itself.  Therefore America’s role as global leader was somewhat
diminished in the post-Cold War world.
 Second, the president’s commitment to the world was markedly different than that
of his Cold War predecessors.  For example, Kennedy (1961) argued the United States
would be a leader that would “bear any burden” in order to help out its allies. While
Kennedy was responding to an ever-escalating communist threat,  Clinton had no central
21 In Chapter Four, I will discuss the means Clinton promoted to finesse the notion that the United States
was unable to be a global police officer.  Essentially, Clinton argued the world should set up neighborhood
watches in partnership with the United States, which would give regions of the world the ability to police
themselves while having U.S. back-up.  The United States would work with these smaller communities
rather than with the entire global community.
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foe to oppose, so there was no reason for the Clinton administration to “take on all the
world’s burden.”   For Clinton, the post-Cold War world was too chaotic and
unpredictable as it was ever-changing.  Moreover, the American public, while certainly
not isolationist, did not want America involved in every aspect of international affairs
(Leiber, 1997).  Instead the United States would have to pick and choose its battles and
the amount of involvement it could give to the conflicts and challenges of an age of
globalism.  By limiting the amount of the burden the United States could take on, Clinton
rhetorically constrained the U.S. role as global leader.  While the United States would
still lead, the implicit answer to it not “bearing all the world’s burden” was for it to share
that burden with other regions and nation-states.  The president understood the United
States must increase its multilateral ties and recalibrate its organizational and regional
relationships to meet the burden of the 21st century.22  Thus for Clinton, the United States
must continue to maintain its role as global leader, but its power and commitment to use
that power was limited.
Conclusion
 In this chapter I have examined how the president crafted his understanding of
America’s role in the post-Cold War world.  Clinton portrayed the post-Cold War
environment as underwritten by change which caused uncertainty concerning America’s
role in this new environment.  Despite an age of accelerated globalization, I argued
Clinton maintained and extended America’s role as global leader. He did so by
22 The way Clinton rhetorically reconfigured these associations  is taken up in Chapter Four.
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reaffirming—but also modifying— America’s exceptionalist mission of exemplar and
intervention for a changing world environment.  For Clinton, a global leadership role was
dependent on renewing the U.S. domestic order to supply a foundation to continue
America’s mission of intervention.  He argued this leadership position was necessary to
create order within the international environment as well as harness the changes of the
post-Cold War world for the United States and its allies.
Domestically, the president explained the United States must first rethink how
domestic and foreign policy were related.  Moreover, the United States must renew its
own economy and community. This revitalization allowed the United States to continue
its mission of exemplar.  In turn, this mission provided rhetorical support for continued
leadership abroad, which intertwined the two exceptionalist missions together.  Clinton’s
use of the exemplar mission to justify U.S. leadership abroad suggests an evolution in
how presidents employ and link the two narratives.  By connecting the two missions in
this way Clinton mitigated the tension between these divergent worldviews of America’s
role in the world, as his predecessors had done.  This modification of American
exceptionalism lays the groundwork for future presidents to meld the two narratives in
similar ways.
 In reaffirming the mission of exemplar, the president also continued using the
mission of intervention to justify global leadership.  Clinton maintained the United States
was the “indispensable nation,” which meant that only it could provide leadership for the
world.  The president justified American leadership in two ways.  First, he explained that
continuing to lead would venerate the World War II generation.  According to Clinton’s
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logic, his generation was the heir to the sacrifice of those who fought during World War
II and the Cold War.  If his generation continued to lead, future generations could look to
the post-Cold War generation as a model for American engagement in the world.
Moreover, Clinton justified continuing U.S. leadership by venerating the presidency of
Harry Truman.  For Clinton, Truman was the model of transitional leadership whose
presidency helped the United States truly mold itself into a global superpower and
established the benchmark for America’s role as defender of civilization, especially
against the Soviet enemy.  According to Clinton’s logic, continuing Truman’s legacy of
transitional leadership would guarantee him a legacy of a visionary transitional leader.
The president became the heir to Truman’s example of keeping American foreign policy
strong in a time of change.  By venerating one specific element of the past, America
maintained its ability to be the central actor in global affairs.
 The second claim to continue the intervention worldview was that American
leadership was needed to secure American and global interests in the near and distant
future.  Shaping the future for America’s purposes was part of Clinton’s vision for
America’s mission in the post-Cold War world.  During the Cold War, the U.S. mission
was to contain Soviet communism, but in the post-Cold War world, the ability to fashion
the future for American interests was one aspect of larger plan of the president’s foreign
policy grand idea.  For Clinton, providing direction for the age of globalization helped to
affirm, but also extend, America’s role as the “indispensable nation.”
 However, Clinton’s discourse also constrained U.S. leadership in two ways.  First,
the president realized the horizon of American power was finite rather than unlimited.
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This idea stood in stark contrast to his predecessors who argued America could escape
the inevitability of decline that comes to all great powers. His recognition of this fact
helps explain his urgency that Americans shape globalization without delay: the United
States must make its mission to mold the future now instead of later.  Clinton recast
American exceptionalism by introducing the idea there was a time limit on America’s
ability to shape the globe in its image.
 Furthermore, Clinton constrained what the United States could actually do in a
new era of interdependence.  As America’s actual power and its commitment to use that
power was limited, according to the president’s logic the United States could not take
care of all the world’s problems, nor did it even want to commit itself to attempting to
solve them.  In short, America in Clinton’s advocacy was still the world’s leader, but its
leadership extended only so far.
 Clinton’s understanding of America’s role in the world was only one piece of his
foreign policy puzzle.  His presidency was a moment of transition that required a nuanced
understanding of the massive and rapid change he perceived occurring within the world
and its challenge to the U.S. leadership tradition.  He continued to espouse American
exceptionalism, but recast it in a variety of ways.  In the next chapter, I explore the
second feature of America’s foreign policy vocabulary: constructing the threat
environment.  Here again, Clinton used a variety of rhetorical tools to manage the
opportunities and challenges provided by the post-Cold War environment.
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CHAPTER THREE:
MANAGING CHAOS THROUGH RHETORICAL FLEXIBILITY
 Nation-states often organize their foreign policy according to the threats they face
in the global environment (Leiber, 1997).  The concept of threat helps shape foreign
policy because a large external threat to a number of states makes them more receptive to
cooperation; thus it can be a rallying point for public opinion and supply a central
organizing device for international relations (Cameron, 2002; Leiber, 1997).  The threat,
or multitude of threats identified, creates a threat environment.
 During the Cold War, presidents defined their Cold War threat environment
through discursive constructions of the USSR.  These constructions were ordered by a
savage/civilization binary.  The Soviets constituted the prototypical modern savage:  a
specific state or leader bent on subjugating its own people as well as others, typically by
force of arms.  Ronald Reagan described the Soviet Union as fanatical, satanic,
menacing, and bent on world domination (Ivie, 1984).  These images of savagery help to
“establish the enemy’s culpability” for a particular situation (Ivie, 1980, p. 279).
Simultaneously, presidents portrayed the United States as a defender of civilization and
champion for freedom.  American leaders contrasted the USSR and United States through
images of dark and light, evil and good, immoral and moral (Wander, 1984).  This
discourse offered a logic as to who was the enemy and why the United States must
oppose it and intervene in places if necessary.
 When the Cold War ended, America’s threat environment lost its coherence.
Questions arose among foreign policy elites, such as what major threats would the United
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States face in the post-Cold War world? How, when, and why should the United States
intervene?  (MacGregor Burns & Sorenson, 1999; Ornstein, 1992; Schonberg, 2003).  As
Clinton entered office these questions lingered.  As we saw in Chapter Two, Clinton
argued that the U.S. faced a qualitatively different international setting than his Cold War
predecessors.  In this environment, Clinton continued America’s commitment to global
leadership, but also emphasized a greater emphasis on sharing the burdens of leadership
with others.
  Similarly, Clinton rhetorically adjusted American foreign policy for a different
threat environment, which was more diffuse, complex, and diverse than during the Cold
War, one that amounted to chaos (Edwards & Daas, 2005; McCormick, 2002; Soderberg,
2005).  The argument of this chapter is that Clinton characterized America’s threat
environment as being underwritten by chaos. This enemy of chaos, as Kathryn Olson
(2004) noted, acted as a “writhing, many headed creature that shape-shifts moment by
moment” (p. 316).  The president understood this adversary to be composed of a
multitude of threats such as terrorism, religious and ethnic violence, AIDS, weapons of
mass destruction, and climate change which combined made chaos a virulent form of
change that could severely damage American interests.  Because this enemy was different
than the one the United States faced during the Cold War, I further argue that Clinton
used a good deal of rhetorical flexibility to define the problem and provide arguments on
how to manage this threat environment.  Evidence of this rhetorical flexibility can be
found in Clinton’s discourse concerning America’s use of force as the president’s
speeches on these subjects give us insight into the larger threat environment the United
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States faced and how he proposed to manage it.  Additionally, the president’s public
discourse on military interventions demonstrates a changing logic as to why the United
States must intervene in the post-Cold War world.
I maintain that military interventions serve as a microcosm to understand the
larger threat environment the United States faces.  When Cold War presidents used force,
they often couched their arguments as to how the situation fit in the larger superpower
struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union (Bostdorff, 1994).  For example,
President Johnson justified his intervention in Vietnam by arguing it was another
battleground in the fight against the spread of communism.  For Clinton, the armed
interventions involving the United States were small battlegrounds in combating and
managing chaos. As former Clinton foreign policy official Nancy Soderberg (2005)
wrote, the president recognized that “local conflicts have global consequences and
therefore must be resolved before they escalate and harm vital interests” (p. 97).  When
the United States used or threatened the use of force, it did so to curtail and manage those
situations so they did not escalate and threaten American interests.  This represents a
different logic of intervention than his Cold War predecessors.
Since the enemy was chaos and could shape-shift in various ways, Clinton also
had a variety of ways for constructing America’s enemies and explaining why the United
States must involve itself.  The president’s discourse was in some respects “chaotic”
because he did not rely on one specific way to justify the use of force, which may have
contributed to the criticism that Clinton lacked clear principles for America’s use of
force.  However, the president’s “chaotic” rhetoric of military intervention was
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understandable when you consider the United States faced an enemy that could shape-
shift in a variety of ways.
To justify the use of force, presidents employ a rhetorical savage/civilization
binary.  They cultivate images of the enemy (savage) and the United States (civilization)
in their rhetoric on armed intervention. These images are crafted through rhetorical topoi
which employ a variety of metaphoric vehicles. These vehicles are a primary source of
invention for American leaders to use in rallying the American public to support the use
of force. Taken together, these images create what Robert Ivie (1974) called
“vocabularies of motives” or reasons for action.
To examine how Clinton crafted and managed that threat environment, I use four
specific military interventions: Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo.  During his
administration, Clinton intervened more than any post-Vietnam president (McCrisken,
2003).  Although there were six primary interventions (Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo,
Iraq, and Afghanistan) rather than four,  I excluded Iraq and Afghanistan from this
chapter for two reasons.  First, under Clinton neither Iraq nor Afghanistan were sustained
interventions by the United States military, but were merely flashpoints where the United
States bombed various military and intelligence installations within both states.  Second,
neither situation involved deploying ground troops, while in the interventions analyzed in
this chapter, each crisis situation eventually involved thousands of American ground
forces.  As I wanted consistency in the cases, I chose to examine only these four
conflicts.
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In this chapter, I argue Clinton utilized both images of savagery—imperial and
modern—as well as various civilization arguments to justify military intervention.  His
use of both types of images and civilization arguments demonstrate four things.  First, the
diverse justifications used represented the larger enemy of global chaos which the
administration battled in the global environment. Second, the use of images and
arguments gave Clinton more rhetorical options to employ in a world without a
monolithic enemy.  Third, exploring the president’s justifications for intervention offers
the opportunity to expand the theoretical ideas concerning the savage/civilization binary.
Finally, the president’s motives for intervention, in some cases, marked a change in the
justifications for the use of force.  This change signified an evolving attitude as to why
the United States uses force in the post-Cold War world.  In exploring Clinton’s
discourse on the use of force, I demonstrate how he tailored this feature of America’s
foreign policy vocabulary for the post-Cold War world.  His discourse positioned the
United States to manage these threats before they spread to other parts of the world.
 This chapter has three main parts.  First, I explore Clinton’s use of imperial
savagery in Somalia and Bosnia, briefly outlining the contextual situation he faced for
each intervention.  I then analyze his construction of images of savagery and civilization
in which each image is formed through the use of metaphoric vehicles. Second, I explain
the president’s use of modern savagery in Haiti and Kosovo.  Finally, I discuss how this
analysis expands the theoretical considerations regarding presidential rhetoric on military
intervention as well as outline how this analysis demonstrates the way Clinton crafted a
rhetorical legacy concerning America’s threat environment.
113
Bringing Stability to the Primitives: Somalia and Bosnia
 The Clinton administration inherited the Somalia and Bosnia (as well as Haiti)
crisis situations from the former Bush administration.  In Somalia, the crisis began in
1988 as the civilian government collapsed and Siad Barre, Somalia’s leader since 1969,
was overthrown in a coup.  Barre’s overthrow left a power vacuum in Somalia that soon
resulted in civil war.  Differing factions led by what both Bush and later Clinton referred
to as “warlords” fought for control of the Somali government and countryside.  As these
factions battled, the conflict created a humanitarian crisis within Somalia.  Hundreds of
thousands of civilians were threatened, not only by armed violence, but from the famine
that accompanied it (Besteman, 1999; Butler, 2002; McCrisken, 2003).
By the fall of 1992, almost a half a million Somalis had died from armed conflict
or starvation.  The United Nations had set up a relief mission (UNOSOM I) for Somalia,
but because of continued attacks by the various factions could not deliver aid to those
who needed it.  The local militia looted airfields and ports that contained precious food
and medicine.  The inability to initially achieve the relief mission prompted the U.N.
Security Council to order an emergency airlift to Southern Somalia where aid was
needed.  This “Operation Provide Relief” was the first intervention by American ground
forces (Butler, 2002).
Although the United States helped to airlift 20,000 tons of food and aid over the
next few months, the situation became graver.  The anarchy that arose from the continual
fighting did not allow foreign aid to flow to those Somalis who needed it, resulting in an
even larger humanitarian disaster.  It became evident to many in the international
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community that a larger American military commitment was needed to provide relief to
the Somalis suffering from the civil war (Hirsh & Oakley, 1996).
On December 4, 1992, with incoming President Clinton’s approval, George H.W.
Bush announced in a national address that the United States would lead a U.N.
humanitarian mission called “Operation Restore Hope.” Bush assured the American
people the intervention was strictly a humanitarian mission to protect those attempting to
deliver international aid to the Somalis (McCrisken, 2003).  When Clinton entered office,
he also initially kept the mission as solely “humanitarian.”  However, in March 1993 the
administration supported a resolution introduced into the U.N. Security Council to
continue with the humanitarian operation, but also expand it to help create government
institutions in the hopes of establishing order (Hirsh & Oakley, 1996; McCrisken 2003).
Initially the mission was considered a success because it restarted the flow of aid
to troubled regions and helped to abate some of the civil conflict.  However, from June to
October 1993, American and U.N. forces came under ferocious attacks by Somalis, most
of whom were under the direction of the self-proclaimed general, Mohammed Aideed.
The largest attack on American forces came on October 4, 1993, causing the death of
eighteen Army rangers, injuries to scores more, and capture of Army helicopter pilot
Michael Durant (Bowden, 1999; Butler, 2002).  Americans were stunned by the images
of American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu (Dauber, 2001) and
pressure mounted upon the administration to withdraw American ground forces.  On
October 7, 1993, Clinton announced a plan to temporarily continue the Somalia
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intervention to stabilize the country. but indicated the United States would remove its
forces by the end of March 1994.
Shaping the Primitive Savage I: Somalia
Throughout the conflict in Somalia, Clinton fashioned America’s adversary using
an image of a primitive savage in two ways.  First, the president employed amorphous
and vague terms to depict the Somalia belligerents. For example, he stated that the
Somalis who were doing the fighting were nothing more than “warlords,” “armed gangs,”
“a small minority of Somalis,” and “the people who caused much of this problem”
(1993c, p.565; 1993d, p. 840; 1993d, p. 840; 1993h, p. 1703). From this rhetoric, three
items should be noted.  First, the use of these terms translated in crafting the enemy as the
epitome of a primitive savage because there was no visible sign of civilization in the
president’s description of the Somali enemy.  Using ambiguous and amorphous terms
such as warlords, armed gangs, and merely a people projected an image of a nation
engulfed in lawlessness and chaos.  The term warlord evokes memories of those who
dominated the feudal ages of Europe, Russia, Japan, and China, not leaders of a nation-
state at the end of the 20th century.  Calling those who caused this chaos “warlords” and
“armed gangs” further implied there was no governmental authority to stop these
belligerents.  The president made it appear that Somalia was a premodern civilization
unable to rein in the belligerents and achieve self-rule without help from the United
States and the international community.  As chaos reigned supreme within Somalia, the
problems emanating from this African nation were a microcosm of the larger threats the
United States faced in the post-Cold War world and his shaping of the Somalis as
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primitive savages gave the impression the African nation could not survive without
international intervention because without some semblance of civilization, the underlying
implication was that Somali society would further devolve into anarchy.
Another thing to note about Clinton’s enemy construction was that it was
qualitatively different than his Cold War predecessors.  During the Cold War, presidents
focused their rhetorical attention upon a central enemy agent, typically the Soviet Union,
which became the focal point of American action.23 While the president did not blame
one specific agent for Somalia’s problems, his depiction of the Somali enemy was similar
to the Filipino antecedent at the turn of the 20th century.  At that time, American rhetors
depicted Filipinos as a barbarous race who were incapable of maintaining a democratic
form of government.  Americans in the Philippines battled an insurgency that had no
centralized authority.  According to Senator Albert Beveridge and President McKinley,
the Philippines were a premodern civilization in which the Filipinos were not “fit” to
govern themselves; thus they needed the assistance of the United States to aid in their
evolution (Butler, 2002).  Clinton reintroduced this image of savagery into the
presidential lexicon in his Somalia discourse.  According to Clinton, the enemy in
Somalia was not a centralized agent, but an entire premodern civilization.  The
23 During the conflict in Somalia, various media accounts pointed to the warlord Mohammed Aideed as the
primary belligerent. Thus, there was a discernable centralized agent on which to focus American military
action.  However, Clinton’s public discourse made little mention of the general, except when he was asked
questions by reporters about the Somali warlord.  A notable exception to this occurred on June 12, 1993
when in his radio address Clinton discussed Aideed’s role in the attack on U.N. peacekeepers; however,
Clinton used mostly vague references to characterize the enemy such as “warlords,” “Somali gangs,” and
“these people.”  Even in the president’s address to the nation on October 7, 1993 where Aideed’s forces
were clearly responsible for the attack on America’s forces four days earlier , Clinton did not put the onus
of responsibility for the attack or Somalia’s general plight on the shoulders of Aideed.
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employment of this image of savagery supplied more rhetorical options as to how his
successors could define adversaries in the post-Cold War world.
 Finally, Clinton’s ambiguous language made it more difficult for the public to
directly pinpoint who was responsible for the daily threats to American and U.N. soldiers,
thereby undercutting his ability to rally public support for an intervention. It is much
easier to envision gaining support to deal with a centralized enemy than an amorphous
one.  Richard Cherwitz and Kenneth Zagacki (1986) noted, “whether or not presidents
take military action, the very act of discoursing allows rekindling of ideological fervor
and use of this fervor to rally public opinion around a central enemy” (p. 318).  A
“central issue” of an armed intervention is stopping the enemy and its belligerency.  A
centralized agent allows the president to focus on a clear and specific enemy that can be
vanquished.  Clinton’s use of ambiguous imagery gave the public no focal point, no
chance to kindle the “ideological fervor” and support of the vanquishing of a clearly
defined enemy.  Consequently, Clinton’s construction of an image of a primitive savage
made it more difficult for him to rally public support for intervention.  A chaotic enemy
provided little to no rhetorical grounds to make a case for intervention, thus making it
more difficult for the president to gain public support.
Aside from his use of ambiguous language to name the adversary in Somalia,
Clinton also employed the results of the atrocities committed by Somali “warlords” to
define the situation in this African nation.  For example, he stated these “warlords”
created a chaotic scene where “over 350,000 Somalis already had died in a bloody civil
war, shrouding the nation in famine and disease” (1993d, p. 840). These agents created a
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civil war that brought an “agonizing death of starvation, a starvation brought on not only
by drought, but also by the anarchy that then prevailed in that country” (1993h, p. 1704).
The armed gangs were “determined to provoke terror and chaos” and to stop the vast
majority of Somalis “who long for peace” from enjoying stability and security (1993d, p.
840).   Here Clinton’s use of the results of the civil war stand for the chaotic scene within
Somalia that was created by the “warlords.”  This scene within Somalia needed to
managed, creating a motive for American intervention.  For this particular threat, as well
as the larger threat environment, the United States had to act to diminish and even halt
the chaos lest it spread to other places.
Note the importance of scene as a vehicle within Clinton’s Somalia rhetoric.  This
emphasis on scene is similar to presidential discourse surrounding armed interventions
deemed “rescue missions.”  David Procter (1987) argued that presidents who use rescue
mission rhetoric do not assign guilt to the savage agent, but rather to the chaotic scene
itself.  Procter went on to argue the scene infuses the savage agents with its qualities of
lawlessness, violence, and lack of control.  Scene, not agent, thus becomes the most
important aspect of rescue mission rhetoric.
Scene was a rhetorical topos for creating an image of an imperial savage as well.
Butler (2002) asserted the primitive savage is a decentralized enemy that is either a
people or culture; however, he never indicated how a rhetor may cultivate the image of a
primitive savage.  Traditionally, images of savagery are made through decivilizing
vehicles that dehumanize the enemy.  The savagery of the agent becomes the motive for
American intervention.  Clinton’s discourse revealed that a contrastive feature to add to
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the theorizing of the construction of the “other” was scene.  The results of the civil war in
Somalia—famine, anarchy, refugees, and homelessness—gave the impression chaos was
rampant, with these scenic qualities becoming native attributes of Somalis.  The chaotic
scene became the motive for American action rather than actions of the agent.
Here we have seen that Clinton’s discourse re-introduced the use of primitive
savagery in creating and shaping an opponent, especially his emphasis on scene.  The
chaotic scene within Somalia became a motive for American intervention while at the
same time was emblematic of the larger chaos the United States attempted to manage.
The Goals of Civilization: Bringing an Opportunity for Stability
 When Clinton constructed the image of the primitive savage, he also cultivated an
image of the United States as the epitome of civilization.  President Clinton justified the
U.S. mission as “humanitarian and not combat” (1993c, p. 565; see also 1993d, p. 840;
1993h, p. 1704).  Clinton argued that America needed to stay in Somalia for the short-
term because “only the United States could help stop one of the great human tragedies of
this time” (1993h, p. 1704).  The actions of the United States, in cooperation with the
United Nations, “created a secure environment so that food and medicine could get
through” which “saved close to one million lives” (1993h, p. 1704).   Overall, most of
Somalia saw life “returning to normal” as crops were “growing,” and markets, as well as
“schools and hospitals,” were “reopening” (1993h, p. 1704; see also 1993d, p. 840).  All
of these accomplishments were due to “American leadership and America’s troops”
(1993h, p. 1704).  In the above examples, Clinton’s discourse relied upon what Benjamin
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Bates (2004) called “civilizing vehicles.” These vehicles help to shape America’s image
of civilization and provide motives for why the U.S. was fighting in Somalia.
According to Clinton, America’s mission was humanitarian as the United States
desired only to help the Somali people, not achieve some geopolitical objective.  Because
of American efforts, the Somali scene of chaos and starvation had been arrested: schools
reopened, food grew, and life returned to normal.  U.S. positive actions balanced the
negative motives of the enemy.  Through the use of civilizing vehicles, the president
tapped into an important rhetorical reservoir to justify the intervention, at least in the
short-term.  For Clinton, civilizing vehicles were just as important in his Somalia
discourse.  Most rhetorical studies focus on the decivilizing vehicles political leaders
employ to craft their enemies, but analysis of Clinton’s discourse reveals civilizing
vehicles may be just as important in some forms of intervention.
Furthermore, America’s actions prevented the enemy—chaos—from advancing
further.  The intervention in Somalia was one way the United States would attempt to foil
its new post-Cold War world foe in which the use of force supplied America with one
method to curtail chaos and keep it from spreading to other parts of the world.
 Even with the tragic events of October 3, 1993, the president continued to justify
America’s intervention.  For example, he declared “we started this mission for the right
reasons and we’re going to finish it in the right way” (1993h, p. 1704).  If the United
States were to leave, “other nations would leave, too. Chaos would resume.  The relief
effort would stop and starvation would return” (1993h, p. 1704).  America needed to
finish the mission because otherwise “our own credibility with friends and allies would
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be severely damaged” and we needed to give “Somalia a reasonable chance” at creating
some semblance of stability, even though there was “no guarantee that Somalia will rid
itself of violence and suffering” (1993h, p. 1705).  Here, Clinton offered two reasons for
continuing the intervention.  First, if the United States left, then the credibility of
American leadership would be damaged.  By leaving Somalia immediately, the United
States could not sustain its position as world leader.  Thus, American intervention must
continue in the interim, with not leaving Somalia immediately allowing Clinton to
salvage the credibility of American leadership.
In addition, Clinton argued American intervention was needed to further control
Somalia’s chaotic scene.  According to the president, “chaos would resume” if the United
States left because the implication was that the initial U.S. intervention had stopped
Somalia from resuming an all-out civil war.  According to Clinton’s reasoning, Somalia
was a premodern civilization with little to no visible signs or semblance of civilization.
As the ultimate civilized society, the United States had given Somalia a chance for
stability, with the American presence in Somalia providing Somalis a “reasonable
chance” but not “guarantee” to succeed.  For Clinton, the opportunity to give Somalis a
chance to achieve a political solution would help to stem the chaos emanating from the
civil war. Thus American military intervention worked to stamp out one more area of
chaos the United States had to battle in the post-Cold War world.
Two rhetorical impacts can be taken from Clinton’s justification for the Somalia
intervention.  First, the president’s discourse demonstrated a change in the logic over
intervention for the post-Cold War world.  During the Cold War, American intervention
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was rationalized through the strategy of containment.  The United States intervened
during this time to stop the spread of communism, to protect the “free world,” and to
keep the Western hemisphere under American influence.  In contrast the United States
intervened in Somalia, at first under George H.W. Bush, to help with humanitarian
efforts, and eventually under Clinton to give Somalis the opportunity to stabilize civil
society, in essence, helping them to build a healthy nation-state.  According to Clinton’s
logic, through nation-building in Somalia the United States can manage chaos so that it
will not spread to other nations.  Thus the president’s logic of intervention marked an
evolution in justifying the use of force for the post-Cold War world.
Second, the nation-building mission of Somalia contained echoes of America’s
imperialist past. According to Clinton, the Somalis were a premodern civilization that
needed to be “civilized.”  The intervention into Somalia, to not only combat famine and
death, but also to help them build civil society was reminiscent of America’s intervention
within the Phillipines (Butler, 2002).  This logic of intervention made the president and
future presidents who conduct these kinds of interventions vulnerable to the accusation
that the United States attempted/is attempting to create an imperial order within Africa
and extend American influence even further.  The perception of the United States
establishing an imperial order makes the motives of America’s intervention, in the case of
Somalia to bring an opportunity for stability, seem questionable.  Questionable motives
then create a space for opponents of the Somalia intervention, as well as the opponents of
other interventions, to operate.  This rhetorical space can operate in competition with a
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president’s definition of a situation and perhaps even affect his ability to define the
situation for audiences.
In sum, Somalia was one battleground in America’s post-Cold War threat
environment.  The chaos within Somalia stemmed from its own civil war so there was no
centralized agent to vanquish.  Instead, President Clinton cast Somalia as a premodern
nation engulfed in lawlessness: a chaotic scene that needed to be brought under control.
This control had rhetorical echoes of America’s imperial past.  The other aspect of
Clinton’s battle against chaos was his construction of America’s civilized image.
According to Clinton, America’s intervention had arrested the chaos and given Somalis
the opportunity to create some semblance of stability, which marked a change in the
intervention logic of the Cold War.  The president’s rationale served as a justification for
getting involved in Somalia in the first place and staying after the October 3 attack on
American forces.
For Clinton, combating chaos in Somalia prevented it from spreading to other
nations.  Clinton’s discourse on Bosnia followed a similar pattern.  In discussing the
president’s rhetoric on Bosnia, I focus primarily on his November 27, 1995 address to the
nation. Here Clinton also portrayed the belligerents within Bosnia through the prism of
primitive savagery.  Bosnia, like Somalia, was a chaotic scene that needed to be
managed.  Thus American intervention would combat the chaos within Bosnia and bring
the opportunity for stability within this Central European nation.
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Bosnia
 Clinton also inherited the Bosnia crisis from the Bush administration.  Up until
1995, the Clinton administration largely stayed out of the civil war.  The following
paragraphs outline a brief timeline of the conflict and place in context the ultimate
decision to deploy troops there.24
 The country of Yugoslavia born after World War II was made up of a number of
ethnic and religious groups within six regions: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. 25   The Yugoslavia constitution did not privilege
one ethnic or religious group above another.  Marshall Tito, leader of Yugoslavia until his
death in 1980, attempted to balance the various ethnic identities in hopes that a national
identity could be forged (Cohen, 2001).  However, after the Cold War, nationalism swept
many of Yugoslavia’s regions leading to June 1991 where Slovenia and Croatia declared
their independence from Yugoslavia.  The actions of these two regions started a chain of
conflict that continued up until the end of 1995.  The declarations of independence
prompted the Yugoslav army, led mainly by Serbians, to attack Slovenia and Croatia
(Kaplan, 1993).  In February 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina seceded, but Bosnian Serbs
24 The timeline for Bosnia was compiled from a number of sources.  Most importantly, see D. Halberstam
(2002). War in a time of peace: Bush, Clinton, and the generals.  New York: Touchstone; J. Kuypers
(1997). Presidential crisis rhetoric and the press in the post-Cold War world.  Westport, CT: Praeger;
Bosnia: Keeping the peace. Time. Retrieved on July 25, 2005, from
http://www.time.com/time/daily/bosnia/bosniatimeline.html (Accessed July 25, 2005).
25 The ethnic groups in Yugoslavia included Slovenes, Croatians, Serbs, Albanians, and Montenegrins.  The
religious groups were predominantly Croatian Catholics, Bosnian Muslims, and Serbian Orthodoxy.
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refused to recognize the secession and declared their independence.  It was at this time
that Bosnia became the major theater for the civil conflict within Yugoslavia.
 In August of that same year, the Western media published the first pictures of
emaciated Bosnian Muslims held in Bosnian Serb prison camps.  In March 1993, Croats
and Bosnian Muslims started fighting over other parts of Bosnia not controlled by
Bosnian Serbs.  The following month, the U.N. Security Council declared six places as
safe areas for Bosnian Muslims: Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Srebrenica, Zepa, and
Gorazde.26 At this juncture, Bosnian Muslims were at war with Bosnian Serbs and Croats
and the violence within the conflict increased.  U.S. Secretary of State Warren
Christopher remarked that the Bosnia situation for the United States and its allies was the
“problem from hell” (Kuypers, 1997).  In 1993, there appeared to be no solution to the
civil war there.
At the time, any U.S. military intervention into Bosnia would have been opposed
for two reasons.  First, Bosnia was not of vital interest to the United States, as it was not a
strategic area in which the United States had ever involved its forces.  Second, President
Clinton had suffered from the Somalia debacle.  After the attacks on Army Rangers in
Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, the administration faced immense public and
congressional pressure to curtail America’s military presence in Somalia.  As Clinton was
blamed for the U.S. failure in Somalia (Hyland, 1999), he was not left with any political
26 The safe areas were to be zones of non-combat with no acts of belligerency to be allowed.  If combat did
occur, the U.N. Security Council authorized U.N. peacekeepers to use force to protect the population of
these areas.
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capital to make a case for intervention into Bosnia  Therefore a military intervention in
Bosnia in 1993 was untenable.  However, as the Bosnian civil war continued, the
administration was continually criticized for not doing something about the bloodshed
within the Balkan republic (Kuypers, 1997).  Bosnia continued to be a constant problem
for the Clinton administration over the next two years.
In February 1994, Bosnian Serbs launched a mortar attack into a Muslim safe area
Sarajevo, killing 68 civilians.  The next month the United States brokered a peace deal
between Bosnian Muslims and Croats while at the same time a cease-fire was declared
among all the belligerents.  However, in May 1995, Bosnian Serbs broke the cease-fire
and refused to move their military forces away from Sarajevo.  The action by the Serbs
resulted in the first bombings by NATO aircraft against Bosnian Serb forces.   In turn,
these forces started shelling Muslim safe areas (Cohen, 2001; Hyland, 1999; Kuypers,
1997).
In July, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Serb General Ratko
Mladic were indicted on war crimes, but Bosnian Serbs seized the safe areas of
Srebrenica and Zepa, bringing with them reports of numerous atrocities committed
against Bosnian Muslims.  In August, NATO warplanes began a bombing campaign
against Bosnian Serb forces outside of Sarajevo.   In September, ministers representing
Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia agreed to the creation of a multi-ethnic state in Bosnia
(Hyland, 1999).
 Finally, in November 1995 the leaders of these three countries, including
Slobodan Milosevic, began peace talks in Dayton, Ohio.  Three weeks later, leaders from
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these three nations officially agreed to a peace settlement and later signed the agreement
in Paris in December 1995.  These details provide some overview of the level of conflict
that occurred prior to the Dayton Peace Accords.  It was against this backdrop of violence
and the breakthrough at Dayton that Clinton announced the deployment of American
forces into Bosnia.  The violent chaos of Bosnia was a scene the president hoped to
prevent, as we shall see from his discourse.
Crafting the Primitive Savage II: Bosnia
Throughout the entire Bosnian conflict, President Clinton never identified a
specific adversary (Kuusisto, 1998); instead, Clinton cultivated an image of a primitive
savage.  As he did in Somalia, the president eschewed the use of decivilizing vehicles to
depict this adversary.  For example, in 1994 he defined the source(s) of belligerency in
Bosnia by stating:
The fighting in Bosnia is part of the broader story of change in Europe.  With the
end of the Cold War, militant nationalism once again spread throughout many
countries that lived behind the Iron Curtain, and especially in the former
Yugoslavia.  As nationalism caught fire among its Serbian population, other parts
of the country began seeking independence.  Several ethnic and religious groups
began fighting fiercely with the Serbs, but the Serbs bear a primary responsibility
for the aggression and ethnic cleansing that has killed tens of thousands and
displaced millions in Bosnia (1994d, p. 283).
Here Clinton incorporated Bosnia’s civil war into the larger changes going on across
Europe.  According to the president, after the Cold War a “militant nationalism” started
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to spread across all of Eastern Europe as a force that fragmented nation-states.  This
nationalism really caught hold in Yugoslavia especially “among its Serbian population.”
Although Clinton stated the Serbs held the “primary responsibility” for the “aggression
and ethnic cleansing” of thousands of people, he also pointed out that “several ethnic and
religious groups” began fighting against the Serbs and other ethnic groups. Therefore,
there was no single agent responsible for the Bosnian conflict; rather, the various ethnic
groups, including the Serbs, were the responsible agents.  These groups were
“primitive”—without the coordination of a centralized modern agent.  These groups,
especially the Serbs, could not obey the civilized ideals of self-determination and the rule
of law.  By portraying the conflict as among primitives, Clinton limited American
involvement until all the belligerents could come to the “civilized” negotiation table for a
peaceful solution.  Demonstrating that these groups could come to a peaceable solution
made it easier for Clinton to make the argument to deploy forces into Bosnia because the
nature of America’s mission to Bosnia would be different than other interventions.  Thus,
the potentially deadly cost to American forces was minimized.
 The cultivation of a primitive savage carried itself over into the president’s
November 27 address. Clinton told an American audience the reason he had not sent
American ground troops to Bosnia prior to the Dayton Accords was “the United States
could not force peace on Bosnia’s warring ethnic groups, the Serbs, Croats, and
Muslims” (1995l, p. 1785).  Again Clinton singled out no specific adversary, but instead
defined the conflict as one between “warring ethnic groups” who did nothing but create
chaos.  For Clinton, this chaos made Bosnia the epitome of a society without any visible
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signs of civilization (i.e., governmental institutions.)   Prior to American intervention to
force negotiations, these ethnic groups could not solve their differences peacefully.  By
crafting them as primitive savages, the president made it appear that Bosnia needed
America’s intervention to bring “civilization” to the region.  For Clinton, bringing the
opportunity for “civilization” to grow within Bosnia was a way to battle and manage the
enemy chaos.
 In further shaping the image of the primitive savage, Clinton referred to some
wrongs committed during the war.  He noted:
Horrors we prayed had been banished from Europe have been seared into our
minds again: skeletal prisoners caged behind barbed-wire fences, women and girls
raped as a tool of war; defenseless men and boys shot down into mass graves,
evoking visions of World War II concentration camps; and endless lines of
refugees marching toward a future of despair (1995l, p. 1785).
The president’s discourse clearly evoked images of atrocities committed by the Nazis
during World War II, but in referencing atrocities he used the past tense.  Women
“raped,” boys “shot,” and prisoners “caged” depict a chaotic scene of the past.
According to Clinton’s logic, because the atrocities were now a part of the past, the
prospects for peace in Bosnia were better than ever.  Yet the passage also contains an
assumption that if the United States did not intervene, these crimes from the past could
happen again.  Thus Clinton used the actions of the Bosnia’s warring ethnic groups to
justify American intervention in the present and future.
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Notably Clinton’s depiction of the atrocities committed in the Bosnian crisis was
different than in his other justifications for military intervention.  Presidents often recite
transgressions that have been committed as a way to decivilize and dehumanize an enemy
and provide a focal point for the American audience to vent their anger at a particular
belligerent that threatens the U.S. symbolic universe.  In the president’s Bosnia discourse,
the atrocities committed by the primitives were not centered upon the agent, but focused
on the scene.  The president’s discussion of the crimes committed connoted an image of
Bosnia as a land of lawlessness, violence, and disorder with no semblance of civilization,
only instability and chaos.  This chaotic scene was part of Bosnia’s past, but could be part
of its future if the United States did not intervene.  Thus, Clinton’s message to Americans
was that the United States should intervene—to bring “civilization” to the primitives—
because without American ground troops to enforce the peace accords, the same crimes
might be committed again.  Therefore the chaotic scene, just as in Somalia,  became a
part of the justification for American intervention.
Bringing Civilization to Bosnia
 If arresting the chaotic scene of the Bosnian civil war—lawlessness, violence,
homelessness—was part of the motivation for American intervention, then the other part
of the motive was through Clinton’s fashioned the image of civilization for the United
States.  By Clinton’s logic, America’s civilized nature could bring a calm and stability to
the Bosnian civil war.  In crafting this image of civilization, the president’s discourse
consisted of two key features: the use of civilizing vehicles to provide justification for
intervention and the scope of the mission.
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First, Clinton employed the use of civilizing vehicles within the address to explain
why the United States should help keep the peace in Bosnia.  Clinton (1995l) declared the
United States was more than “just a place,” but something that “embodied an idea” (p.
1784). America was “freedom’s greatest champion” (p. 1787).  During the 20th century,
Americans had “done more than simply stand for these ideals,” it had also “acted on them
and sacrificed for them” (p. 1784). The exceptional background of the United States
meant that there were still times “when America and America alone can and should make
the difference for peace” (p. 1784) as it was part of the “responsibilities of leadership” (p.
1784) the United States enjoyed after its victories of the 20th century. According to the
president, the United States was built upon an “idea.” It was “freedom’s greatest
champion” that had “sacrificed” for the ideals of “liberty, democracy, and peace” through
the use of force in World War I, World War II, and the Cold War.  For Clinton, America
“alone” could help bring stability to Bosnia.  Because America was truly the only nation
that could make the “difference for peace,” it must intervene. Through the deployment of
the military, the United States would prevent further civil war while at the same time
providing the opportunity for stability to return to the Balkans.
 These civilizing vehicles were embedded within a larger belief structure of
American exceptionalism which rhetorically structures the United States as a special
place, a proverbial “shining city upon a hill” that has a unique destiny to fulfill (Baritz,
1985; Brands, 1998; Cole, 1996; Coles, 2002; McCartney, 2004; McEvoy-Levy, 2002;
Merk, 1963; Rodgers, 2004).  This destiny is expressed through two mission narratives:
the mission of exemplar and the mission of intervention.  Rhetors employing the mission
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of exemplar argue the United States best fulfills its destiny by rarely involving itself in
the affairs of other states as the United States should instead strive to perfect its own
institutions and leave other states to their own devices (McCartney, 2004; Merk, 1963).
In contrast, rhetors employing the mission of intervention maintain that as the U.S.
destiny is to promote freedom and liberty abroad, America should involve itself in the
affairs of other states not only to secure its own interests, but to promote universal
American values (Coles, 2002; McCrisken, 2003).
Further, American exceptionalism was embedded in Clinton’s civilizing vehicles.
The Bosnian situation was a fulfillment of the mission of intervention in which the
United States had a “responsibility of leadership” to help the “warring ethnic parties”
obtain peace.  By employing American exceptionalism and its accompanying mission of
intervention, Clinton furthered the need for U.S. involvement in implementing a peace
agreement.
 The second feature was Clinton’s discussion of the mission.  The president stated
American troops were needed to “secure the peace,” stop “the killing” and bring
“stability to Central Europe” (p. 1784).  If America did not intervene, “peace would
collapse, the war would “reignite,” and the “slaughter” of innocent people would start
again (p. 1785).  The president assured the American people that the mission was
“defined,” “realistic,” and “limited” (p. 1784; p. 1784; p. 1786).  American forces would
be under the “command of an American general” while we worked alongside our
“Russian and European allies” (p. 1784).  Although the president did admit “it will take
an extraordinary effort of will for the people of Bosnia to pull themselves from the past
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and start building a future of peace,” he argued with American leadership “the people of
Bosnia can have the chance to decide their future in peace” (p. 1787).
Note how Clinton characterized America’s Bosnia mission as “defined,”
“realistic,” and “limited.”  The president emphasized the “limits” of the American
mission in Bosnia for two reasons: the legacy of Vietnam and the restrictions intrinsic to
the Bosnian mission. First, the Vietnam conflict proved the United States was not
invincible as America could not win every conflict.  Moreover, the American public did
not support protracted conflicts without clear ideas about the mission for intervention.
Trevor McCrisken (2003) argued that Vietnam forced American presidents to define
military interventions in more precise terms so as to be very specific about the missions
the United States undertook.  Clinton’s discourse in Bosnia was no exception; therefore,
he implicitly argued that Bosnia was not going to be another Vietnam.  America’s
mission was specifically to be a peacekeeper, not help one side fight against another.  The
mission in Bosnia was just enough to keep the conflict from escalating, but limited so that
the United States would not get involved in a physical confrontation between the
belligerents.
 A second reason for the “limits” of America’s peacekeeping mission in Bosnia
was the limited nature of the mission itself.  Typically in war discourse, the mission is to
vanquish a savage agent.27  In the peacekeeping mission, intervention is about creating
stability within a nation-state.  According to Clinton, America’s mission for Bosnia was
27 Evidence for this claim can be found in a perusal of presidential justifications for the use of force.  Often
American presidents have declared war because the United States is threatened in some way by an outside
agent, with war being an instrument to remove this threat.
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to “secure the peace” and bring “stability to the Balkans,” not to search out a fight against
a particular enemy.  Thus there was a difference between the motive to intervene within
Bosnia and other forms of military intervention.  This difference is a nuance in
presidential rhetoric concerning military intervention.  Nevertheless, by intervening in
Bosnia, the United States managed to quell chaos and keep it from spreading to other
parts of Europe.
Note also how Clinton viewed the potential outcomes of the American mission in
Bosnia.  From his perspective, there was no guarantee of success for a Bosnia
intervention because it would take “extraordinary efforts” for the ethnic groups to build a
nation.  Clinton implied that the United States would not be a guarantor of peace that
could create long-lasting stability; rather, the United States was simply providing the
people of Bosnia the “chance to decide” for peace.  America’s intervention gave the
“warring ethnic groups” the opportunity to create a “civilized,” modern order.  The
motive for American intervention was stability to be created for the short-term so that
mechanisms could be put in place to create long-lasting stability.  By creating the
opportunity for stability the United States managed the chaotic scene of the Bosnian civil
war and eliminated another battleground in America’s larger fight against global chaos.
Additionally, this analysis of Clinton’s Bosnia discourse demonstrated an
evolution in the grounds for the use of force.  According to his logic, United States troops
in Bosnia offered that nation the opportunity to build a productive nation-state because
America, along with its NATO allies, would be there to stabilize the tensions between the
warring ethnic groups; whereas, Bosnians could concentrate on trying to build some
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semblance of a “civilized” order.  The Bosnia intervention was another battleground in
the fight against chaos, but also signified a changing rationale for the United States to use
force in the post-Cold War world.
 In the Bosnia intervention, Clinton never singled out a particular enemy Other,
although he did put most of the blame on the Bosnian Serbs for causing the civil war.
Instead, as he had done previously regarding Somalia, Clinton emphasized a chaotic
scene that characterized the situation in Bosnia and thus necessitated American action.
To further persuade the public that America must act, the president justified American
intervention based on civilizing vehicles rife with American exceptionalism.  Clinton’s
discourse also revealed America’s mission in Bosnia would be limited partly due to the
“Vietnam syndrome” (McCrisken, 2003), but also the inability of the United States to
impose civilization on a chaotic situation involving primitive peoples.  All the United
States could do was secure the peace and create the opportunity for Muslims, Croats, and
Serbs to attempt to live in peace and build a future together.  The president’s justification
for the use of force in Somalia and Haiti emphasized defining the belligerents in these
conflicts by using images of primitive savagery.
Clinton also involved the United States in two other significant interventions in
Haiti and Kosovo.  Here the president crafted the belligerents through images of modern
savagery which offered the United States another—but qualitatively different—
battleground to fight and manage chaos.
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Modern Savage Battlegrounds: Haiti and Kosovo
In this section, I examine Clinton’s discourse concerning the use of force in Haiti
and Kosovo.  For these interventions, the president crafted the more conventional modern
savage, but the adversaries in Haiti and Kosovo were qualitatively unique.  According to
Clinton’s discourse, the major difference was that in Kosovo America faced a genocidal
enemy instead of a conventional modern agent out to subjugate people by force of arms.
Aside from vanquishing the savage agent, the justifications for the use of force were also
different in each intervention.  The changes in Clinton’s discourse suggest different
reasons were needed for different battlegrounds in the fight against chaos.
Haiti
Clinton inherited an unresolved situation in Haiti from the Bush administration.
In December 1990, Haiti conducted the first free and fair election in its history in which
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a young Catholic priest, became the first democratically elected
president of Haiti (Pastor, 1997).  However, nine months later on September 30, 1991,
Haiti’s military leaders overthrew Aristide and imposed a military dictatorship.  President
George W. Bush immediately condemned the coup and issued an executive order
declaring a trade embargo (Kuypers, 1997), but Bush took a cautious position with
regards to intervention in Haiti.  He negotiated with Haiti’s military through the
Organization of American States (OAS) in hopes that the organization could put pressure
on the military junta to leave the island and restore Aristide peacefully (Pastor, 1997).
 Over the next few months, Bush continued the policy of trade sanctions, but also
received continued pressure from certain interest groups and states to take some greater
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action because of the mass exodus of refugees from the island.  From the beginning of the
coup until April 1992, over 34,000 Haitians attempted to leave the island and obtain
political asylum within the United States.  Unfortunately some of these “boat people” lost
their lives as they tried to make it to American shores.  In April 1992, Bush issued
another executive order authorizing the U.S. Coast Guard to pick up Haitians who were
caught at sea and repatriate them, but Clinton criticized this policy as “cruel” and pledged
during the campaign that he would change the Bush policy (Pastor, 1997).  Yet on
January 14, 1993 just prior to his inauguration, Clinton rejected a host of options
regarding Haiti and announced he would continue Bush’s policy of repatriation.  The
President-elect stressed his three major goals for Haiti: 1) restoration of Haitian
democracy; 2) saving of human lives; and 3) establishment of a new system to process
political refugees more quickly (Kuypers, 1997; Pastor, 1997).  Essentially Clinton
continued Bush’s policy and made it his own.  He intensified negotiations to restore
Haitian democracy, but like Bush continued to use the OAS and United Nations to
pressure the military junta.
 For the first few months of his administration, Clinton continued the policies of
his predecessor.  Then, in July 1993, Aristide and General Raoul Cedras, the Haitian
military junta leader, signed what became known as the Governors’ Island Agreement.
The military promised to step down from power by the end of October 1993, thus
allowing Aristide to return to power, with the United States creating an aid package to
help Aristide rebuild the country.  As part of the agreement, the American military would
also train the Haitian military and a civilian police force.
138
However, on October 11, 1993, the U.S.S. Harlan County carrying American and
Canadian military trainers was not allowed to dock in Port-au-Prince.  Armed junta
supporters lined the docks of Port-au-Prince protesting the American landing.  The
American and Canadian military personnel were lightly armed and because of the
impending danger caused by junta supporters, the Harlan County returned to the United
States (Hyland, 1999).  Clinton blamed the Haitian military for “reneging” on the
agreement (1993, p. 1731).  According to Clinton, as Haiti’s military leaders wanted to
“cling to power for a little bit longer,” the trainers were not allowed to land in Haiti.  In
essence, the Harlan County crisis killed the Governors Island Agreement.
 Over the next year, Clinton remained committed to restoring Haiti’s democracy.
In July 1994, the United States persuaded the U.N. Security Council to pass a resolution
authorizing the use of force to compel the return of Aristide (Hyland, 1999; Pastor,
1997).  The following month Clinton decided to prepare for an invasion of Haiti to
restore Aristide to power.  Finally on September 15, the president used a national address
to announce his plans for Haiti.  The president declared that as the United States had
exhausted all diplomatic efforts, Haiti’s military leaders were warned to leave the country
or be prepared for an American invasion.
In examining how Clinton defined the negative and positive forces involved in the
Haitian crisis, I focus on Clinton’s national addresses on the subject given on September
15 and September 18, 1994.
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Constructing the Modern Savage I: Haiti
In both Haiti and Kosovo, Clinton shaped the belligerents of both nations as
modern savages.  Recall that what makes the savage modern is the semblance of
civilization (i.e., government institutions such as an organized military.)  Belligerents are
savage because they engage in behaviors beyond those of any rational civilized agent.
This savage agent threatens American ideals in some way.
According to Clinton, in Haiti the belligerents responsible were “Haiti’s dictators,
led by Raoul Cedras” (1994g, p. 1558).  These dictators controlled “the most violent
regime in our hemisphere” (1994d, p. 860).  They had created a “reign of terror” and
must “bear full responsibility” for the death and destruction they caused (1994g, p. 1558;
1994g, p. 1558).  Clinton went on to cultivate an image of savagery by enumerating the
atrocities committed by Cedras and the junta.  The president stated that Cedras’s Haitian
military had conducted operations that involved “executing children, raping women,
killing priests” (1994g, p. 1558).  Moreover, Cedras’s “reign of terror” involved
murdering “innocent civilians,” crushing “political freedom,” and plundering “Haiti’s
economy” (1994g, p. 1558) while those who resisted the junta were “beaten and
murdered.” Ultimately, the military government “launched a horrible campaign of rape,
torture, and mutilation.  People starved, children died, thousands of Haitians fled their
country, heading to the Untied States across dangerous seas” (1994g, p. 1558; 1994g, p.
1558).
Several items should be noted regarding Clinton’s discourse on Haiti.  First, the
language he used to describe the atrocities committed by Cedras contained a mixture of
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both the past and present tense.  Using both tenses demonstrated a continuum of action
taken by the Haitian dictator.  In other words, Cedras and the junta committed and
continued to commit acts that were best understood as a “reign of terror.”  According to
Clinton, Cedras and the junta had “launched” campaigns of terror where people
“starved,” “died” and had “fled” the country.  These atrocities continued into the present
as Cedras and the junta continually were “executing,” “raping,” and “killing” people.
This language was stark and active giving the impression that Cedras’s campaign of
terror was ongoing, something that needed to be stopped immediately, thus establishing a
sense of urgency.  By portraying the Haiti threat as imminent, the implication was the
public would be more apt to support an intervention before the chaos could further spread
within Haiti and possibly into the United States.
Second, in Burkean terms, Cedras was a pollutant in America’s symbolic universe
(Bobbitt, 2004; Burke, 1965, 1961; Huglen & Brock, 2003).  All people organize their
lives through order. When a situation is presented that contradicts that order, the situation
is polluted.  The order must be purified from this pollution in some way, such as
expunging it by assigning blame or guilt to a party who is responsible for the pollution.
This assignment of guilt can come in two ways: mortification or victimage.  Mortification
is an assignment of guilt to oneself, while victimage assigns guilt to someone else.  As
this assignment of guilt helps to remove the pollution from the order, it becomes a means
to purify the order and restore equilibrium.
Similarly, a president’s foreign policy universe is organized through a symbolic
order.  There is a hierarchy within that order with the United States at the top.  When an
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agent commits acts of aggression, especially within the U.S. sphere of influence, it
violates America’s symbolic order and creates a pollutant which must be removed from
this symbolic universe.  In Clinton’s case, Cedras was to blame for the atrocities within
Haiti.  Cedras violated America’s symbolic order by ordering atrocities committed in
America’s backyard which resulted in the killing of innocent civilians.  The president’s
description of these crimes placed culpability for Haiti’s plight upon the shoulders of
Cedras, therefore beginning the process of expunging the “pollutant” from America’s
foreign policy hierarchy.  Through military intervention, the United States fully removed
the pollutants from its order and restored stability to its symbolic universe.
Third, Clinton’s discourse provided a centralized, organized, modern savage that
became a clear and distinct focal point for the U.S. military response.  The president
could specifically point to Raoul Cedras as the culprit for Haiti’s problems as well as
someone who had become a threat to American national security.  By cultivating the
image of a central enemy figure, the president laid the groundwork for a military
intervention where the mission of removing the pollutant Cedras from America’s
symbolic universe was clear.
Fourth, the president’s discourse made it difficult for anyone in the audience to
identify positively with the Haitian general. In exploring how President Bush constructed
Saddam Hussein, Bates (2004) observed that “for a person not to see Saddam Hussein as
a savage, s/he must argue that violations of international law, aggression against a
sovereign state, and the murder of children are not the acts of a savage” (p. 454).
Correspondingly, Clinton made Cedras synonymous with modern savagery because of
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the systematic campaign of terror the Haitian leader launched against innocent Haitians.
The president’s discourse stripped the Haitian leader of any civilized identity he might
have possessed and made it impossible to identify him as anything but a savage.  The
implication was that the audience was left with only one choice: to support America’s
intervention into Haiti.
Finally, note that Clinton’s enemy construction for Haiti was qualitatively
different than for the Somalia and Bosnian intervention.  The primary difference between
the interventions was that for Somalia and Bosnia he emphasized the chaotic scenes of
each situation rather than a particular agent.  The scene became part of the motive to
intervene in Somalia and Bosnia.  The American mission in Somalia and Bosnia was to
stabilize, as best it could, the chaotic scene, not remove the roots of the troubles within
the nation-state.   In contrast Clinton’s Haiti discourse emphasized the culpability of a
savage agent.  According to Clinton, Cedras’s “reign of terror” was premeditated and
planned: a created chaos.  As this agent was another form of chaos that needed to be
managed, Cedras as the agent became the motivating force for an American intervention
in Haiti that would vanquish the savage agent and restore stability to the island nation.
Goals of Civilization
In rallying support for the invasion of Haiti, Clinton not only crafted a diabolical
enemy in Raoul Cedras, but also portrayed the United States as being in direct contrast to
the Haitian leader and his supporters.  Clinton stated that the use of force was a last
resort.  He assured his audience the United States, along with the international
community, had tried to “bring a peaceful end to the crisis” through “persuasion and
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negotiation, mediation, and condemnation” (1994g, p. 1559).  The United States had sent
“humanitarian aid” in the forms of “food” and “medicine” (1994g, p. 1559).  America
was not alone in this new intervention as it would be joined by “25 nations” including
“Poland,” “Israel and Jordan,” and “Bangladesh” (1994h, p. 1572; 1994g, p. 1559).
These nations were “struggling” to “preserve their own security” and “freedom,” while
also working on their “own economic problems” (1994g, p. 1559).  Clinton’s discourse,
as in Somalia and Bosnia, was laced with civilizing vehicles which shape the U.S. image
as the exemplar of civilization.  In contrast to the irrational behavior of the savage agent,
according to Clinton America acted calmly, rationally, and peacefully.  Along with its
allies, the United States had exhausted every civilized step available, including
diplomatic and humanitarian avenues, with the junta still refusing to leave and escalating
the conflict.  This image of civilization made the United States along with those who
pledged to assist in the intervention appear superior to the savage agent.  According to
Clinton’s logic, the United States as the ultimate “defender of civilization” must act to
purify the savage from its traditional backyard, the Western Hemisphere.  By not doing
so, America would denigrate its civilized image while the guilt within America’s
symbolic universe would remain.
Clinton also supplied the cultivation of America’s image of civilization through
the various justifications for American intervention aside from getting rid of Cedras.
Clinton assured the auditor America’s mission would be “limited and specific” as it was
in “Panama and Grenada” (1994g, p. 1560).  The United States advocated intervention,
first to “stop the atrocities,” because “when brutality occurs close to our shores, it affects
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our national interests.  And we have a responsibility to act” (1994g, p. 1558; 1994g, p.
1559).  These atrocities created “immigration problems from a “mass exodus of refugees”
which made it difficult to gain “control of our borders” (1994g, p. 1559).  Here Clinton
identified three distinct reasons for American intervention.  First, Haiti was a threat to
both national and international security.  Within the president’s discourse the two policy
arenas were combined, but considering there was no difference between domestic and
foreign policy, as we saw in Chapter Two, the president’s logic should be understandable.
The atrocities committed in Haiti were a problem of international security because those
people that left Haiti’s oppression via make-shift rafts and boats could die in international
waters.   Yet those Haitian refugees were also a problem for domestic security because
the destination for a large number of those refugees was the United States.   Therefore the
U.S. intervention prevented an international and domestic security problem from getting
out of control.
  Clinton’s second rationale for the Haiti intervention was that the deployment of
U.S. forces would allow democracy to be restored to the country.  The “Haitian people
want to embrace democracy” because they “went to the ballot box and told the world”
they wanted to have a democratic state (1994g, p. 1559).   More democracy in the
Western Hemisphere is good for the United States because democracies are “more likely
to keep the peace” and “create free markets,” thus resulting in “stability and prosperity in
our region” (1994g, p. 1559-1560).  For Clinton, intervening in Haiti brought more
democracy back to the country and increased hemispheric stability in the Western
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hemisphere—a stability that was a way to manage the global chaos the United States
fought against during the Clinton administration.
Finally, Clinton asserted we could not be “letting dictators, especially in our own
region, break their word to the United States and the United Nations” (1994g, p. 1560).
In the “post-cold war world,” America has to continue to “uphold the reliability of the
commitments we make” to lead and defend the free world (1994g, p. 1560; 1994g, p.
1558).  Here Clinton justified a Haitian intervention to uphold American leadership.  As I
noted in Chapter Two, American leadership was vital not only for its commitments in the
Western hemisphere, but across the globe.  Intervention continued U.S. global leadership
while at the same time the United States remained a vital force against global chaos.
Overall, four items should be taken from Clinton’s justifications for the use of
force.  First, note that these justifications helped to craft the U.S. image of civilization
because the U.S. reasons for intervention were dedicated to peace, order, and stability.
According to the president, America was acting to help an innocent population bring
more “peace” and “stability” to the region and to keep “United States and the United
Nations” “commitments.”  The intervention into Haiti was thus serving national, regional,
and international interests while America’s actions upheld the values of the international
community.   The message from the president’s arguments was clear: civilized people
help and defend innocent people, while savages (i.e., Cedras) subjugate them through the
use of force
Second, note how Clinton referenced the Haitian intervention.  According to the
president, the mission in Haiti would be “limited,” “specific,” and similar to “Panama”
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and Grenada.”  His emphasis on the intervention being “limited” and “specific,” which
was similar to the intervention in Bosnia, was a result of the “Vietnam syndrome.” By
assuring the audience the mission was clear, Clinton implied the intervention would be
short-lived.  Haiti was not to be the quagmire that Vietnam turned out to be.
Furthermore, Clinton’s use of “Panama” and “Grenada” were orientational metaphors for
the use of force in Haiti, as these metaphors organize political reality for a particular
situation (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; see also Stuckey, 1992).  For small interventions such
as Haiti, in Clinton’s discourse “Panama” and “Grenada” became shorthand for
successful, limited, and small-scale American interventions.   In the post-Cold War era,
these small interventions were more commonplace than during the Cold War.  In order to
manage the chaos arising in particular nation-states, the United States needed to intervene
to create or restore stability.  In the chaotic threat environment of the post-Cold War
world, “Panama,” “Grenada,” and “Haiti” stood small-scare interventions for mitigating
and managing the damage that chaos could wreak.
 Third, Clinton’s reasons for the Haitian intervention also emphasized the
reestablishment of democracy within Haiti, although democracy was not a reason for the
Somalia and Bosnia interventions.   In Somalia and Bosnia, part of the motive to
intervene was merely to give those two states the opportunity to create stability, while
Clinton made little to no mention about creating or restoring democracy in those two
nation-states.  I discern from this information that the creation of a democratic state was
not a motive to intervene in Somalia or Bosnia.
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However, for Haiti restoring democracy became part of the motive to intervene.
This was understandable considering democracy is a god-term in American political
culture (Doyle, 2000; Ivie, 1974; Nye, 1993). Democracy “civilizes” nation-states
because they become stable and prosperous.  Clinton declared the enlargement of
democracy one of the primary tasks of American foreign policy (Brinkley, 1997; Olson,
2004).  The president upheld that mission through restoring democracy in Haiti, which
brought greater stability to the Western Hemisphere and put Haiti back on the path to
joining “civilized” nations of the world.
 Finally, take into account the multiple reasons Clinton provided for intervention.
Kathryn Olson (2004) noted that each reason for intervention was presented as equal to
the others with the equality of each argument creating an overall case of accumulation.
In other words, the president provided such an overwhelming case for intervention that it
would make it more difficult for his opponents to oppose his decision to intervene. The
accumulation argument is understandable if we consider Clinton did not have the luxury
of putting the logic for this intervention in the larger Cold War conflict, as Reagan did in
his discourse on Grenada.  Rather, as Clinton faced a threat environment defined by
chaos, he needed more rhetorical flexibility than his Cold War predecessors.
 For the Haiti intervention, Clinton crafted an image of a modern savage, Raoul
Cedras.  The president’s discourse emphasized the atrocities the agent committed.  The
president’s language in the present tense emphasized that Cedras was fully culpable for
the brutal actions committed against his compatriots.  This depiction of Cedras provided
the public with a focal point to rally public support, while in Congress Cedras was
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literalized as a true savage and stripped of any civilization qualities.  The president’s
employment of modern savagery was indicative of the shape-shifting quality of a chaotic
threat environment with specific enemy and how that enemy was depicted differing
depending on the situation.
By contrast the commander-in-chief shaped America’s civilized image through
vehicles that depicted the United States as a deliberate, rational, peace-loving agent that
did all it could to avert a violent confrontation.   At the same time, Clinton’s discourse
cobbled together a variety of reasons for the Haitian intervention which allowed the
president some rhetorical flexibility to manage the orchestrated chaos Cedras and the
junta created.  The rhetorical flexibility evident in the Haiti intervention also appeared in
Clinton’s discourse on Kosovo.
Kosovo
  Kosovo is a southern province of Serbia.  It is made up primarily of Kosovars
who are of Albanian descent, although there are Serbian Kosovars as well.  The vast
majority of the population is Islamic whereas Serbian Kosovars tend to be Orthodox
Christians.  The region has long been important to Serbian national identity; however, in
1389 at the battle of Kosovo, Serbia lost the province to the Ottoman Empire.  This loss
had a tremendous impact on the collective psyche of Serbians as the battle became
mythologized over a five-hundred year period.28 Eventually, Kosovo and Serbia were
reunited under the banner of Yugoslavia.
28 The Battle of Kosovo became the greatest national myth in the creation of Serbian national identity.  This
mythological tale, which has been put into epic poetry, is one of both suffering and redemption.  According
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When Josef Tito created the Yugoslav nation after World War II, he purposefully
balanced ethnic and religious groups against one another so that no one group would gain
prominence (Cohen, 2001).  In 1974 Kosovo was granted autonomy under the
Yugoslavian constitution.  Although largely symbolic, this autonomy allowed Kosovars
to decide who would fill its local positions of leadership.  However, it also created a
sentiment among many Serbians that Kosovo was again attempting to break away
(Cohen, 2001).
 This belief continued after Tito’s death in 1980, especially when within a year of
Tito’s death, Albanian Kosovars started rioting in Kosovo, demanding greater autonomy
from the Yugoslavian central government.  The rioting ended, but the anxiety about
Kosovo’s separation from Serbia continued among many Serbian political leaders.
During the 1980s, ethnic tensions within the Kosovo region continued to mount along
with the rise of Slobodan Milosevic as a communist party leader in Serbia.  Milosevic
gained prominence in 1987 for his public declaration that he would never allow Kosovo
to separate again from Serbia.  This declaration made him an instant hero to Serbians
(Vujacic, 1995), and within two years, Milosevic had consolidated his power within
Serbia by eliminating most of his political enemies.  He subsequently became the
President of Serbia and revoked Kosovo’s autonomous status.  Milosevic’s actions
to legend, Prince Knez Lazar, leader of the Serbian army, was visited by the prophet Elijah the night before
the battle.  Elijah gave Lazar a choice: he could win the battle, ensuring him an earthly kingdom, or he
could lose the battle, giving the Kosovo region to the Turks, but ensuring Serbians their rightful place in
heaven.  As Lazar chose the heavenly kingdom, he subsequently lost Kosovo.  However, his sacrifice
ensured the Serbs would eventually receive a heavenly redemption.  The province became the central pillar
of a seamless, united Serbian identity (Doder & Branson, 1999; Kaplan, 1996; Ott, 1999).
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created a good deal of discord between Serbs and Albanian Kosovars, but their conflict
would be put on the back burner as Yugoslavia disintegrated into a civil war.
The conflict within Kosovo did not truly erupt again until the summer of 1998
when Milosevic launched an offensive in Kosovo against the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA).29  The KLA had taken thirty percent of the Kosovo region, but the Serbian
military regained much of the region, displacing tens of thousands of ordinary Albanian
Kosovars.  There were also rumors of ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanian refugees
(McCrisken, 2003; Paris, 2002).
Throughout 1998 the Clinton administration continued to monitor the
deteriorating situation in Kosovo. The president froze all Yugoslavian assets and
prohibited American businesses from conducting commerce in the region (Paris, 2002).
The success of the Serbian offensive in driving the KLA and Albanian Kosovar civilians
from their homes prompted Clinton to speak at length about the crisis in the fall of 1998.
Specifically, in October Clinton publicly threatened Milosevic with NATO air strikes if
he did not stop the Serbian offensive.  The threat appeared to work because Milosevic
halted the campaign.
Meanwhile, U.S. officials attempted to gather KLA and Serbian representatives
together to work out a ceasefire.  February 1999 brought international peace talks that
opened in Rambouillet, France.  Although the KLA signed the ceasefire agreement, the
29 In the mid-1990s, the KLA launched sporadic terrorist attacks against Serbian targets.  In February 1998,
it launched an all-out offensive against Serbian military positions to “liberate” Kosovo from Serbia.
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Serbians refused and subsequently re-opened their military offensive in Kosovo on
March 20, 1999.  Four days later, President Clinton ordered American fighter planes
along with other NATO allies to begin a bombing campaign against the Serbian military.
Serbia re-opened its offensive, which along with the subsequent American action
prompted Clinton to rally the American public to support the Kosovo intervention.
Crafting the Modern Savage: Milosevic as Hitler
 In shaping the image of the Kosovo intervention, Clinton provided the American
public with a single culprit: Slobodan Milosevic.  The president contrasted the Albanian
Kosovars’ desire for peace with Slobodan Milosevic’s refusal to pursue a peaceful
solution.  According to Clinton, Kosovo “is a small province” where its people “struggled
peacefully to get their rights back” after Milosevic stripped them of those rights in 1989
(1999j, p. 868; 1999f, p. 451).  Even then, Kosovar leaders were willing to say “yes to
peace” to stop the violence within the Serbian province (1999f, p. 451).  However,
Milosevic and the Serbian leadership “refused to even discuss key elements of the peace
agreement” (1999f, p. 451).  As per Clinton, Milosevic’s decision not to discuss the
subject was a sign he was turning his back on the civilized ideal of peace.  Thus unlike
other civilized nations and peoples such as the Albanian Kosovars, Milosevic was not
dedicated to a peaceful solution.  As an irrational agent, Milosevic was a threat to the
security of Albanian Kosovars, European stability, and American security; therefore, he
must be purified from America’s symbolic universe.
Clinton further defined Milosevic’s image by concentrating on the savage actions
the Serbian leader utilized to suppress his opponents in both the past and present.  First,
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the president associated Milosevic with responsibility for the crimes during the Bosnia
crisis.  He stated Milosevic was “the same leader who started the wars in Bosnia and
Croatia” who had launched a systematic campaign of oppression against Albanian
Kosovars “since the late 1980s” (1999f, p. 451; 1999i, p. 757).  Earlier in this chapter, I
discussed how the president did not blame a specific agent for the Bosnia crisis.  Not only
did Clinton not want to single out Milosevic as the culprit for starting the war on Bosnia
because it might jeopardize the Dayton peace accords, but for the Bosnia intervention,
there was no need to construct Milosevic as a modern savage.  However, for the Kosovo
intervention, Clinton connected the atrocities committed within the Bosnian civil war to
Milosevic.  In doing so, Clinton demonstrated a pattern of action the Serbian leader had
pursued since the early 1990s which involved the systematic killing of innocent civilians
because of Milosevic’s ethnic and religious hatreds.
 Clinton also discussed the specific campaign Milosevic had launched against
Albanian Kosovars since the late 1980s in which the Serbian leader’s crimes included
“denying them [Albanian Kosovars] their right to speak their language, run their schools
and shape their lives” (1999f, p. 451).  That campaign abated for a short time in the
1990s, but Milosevic re-started it in late 1998 by ordering attacks of “tanks and artillery
on a largely defenseless people” (1999f, p. 451).  The campaign resulted in “shelling
civilians,” and “torching their houses” (1999f, p. 451).   People who were “innocent”
were “forced to kneel in the dirt” where they were “sprayed with bullets” (1999f, p. 451).
Men were “dragged from their families” and “lined up and shot in cold blood” (1999f, p.
451), women were “rounded up and repeatedly raped” (1999i, p. 758), and children were
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told to “go into the woods and die of hunger” (1999i, p. 758).  This campaign against the
Albanian Kosovars was similar to the one Milosevic launched against Bosnia where
“innocent people” were herded into “concentration camps” (1999f, p. 452), children were
“gunned down by snipers” (1999f, p. 452), and soccer fields and parks became
“cemeteries” (1999f, p. 452).  Overall, a “quarter of a million” Bosnians were killed with
“two million” becoming refugees” (1999f, p. 452).
Here, Clinton’s construction of Milosevic as a modern savage was similar to his
discourse concerning Cedras.   The president portrayed both leaders as irrational, modern
savage agents bent on subjugating innocent people by force.  The president’s discourse
concerning the actions taken against innocent civilians decivilized both Milosevic and
Cedras because no “civilized” agent would engage in such action. Moreover, images of
modern savagery of America’s adversary provided the audience with a clear focal point.
Scapegoating a specific agent laid the groundwork for Clinton to rally public support
because it is easier to obtain public support for a known, specific enemy than an
amorphous one.
However, there was something qualitatively different about Milosevic’s savagery
when compared to that of Cedras.  The difference was that Milosevic was an agent bent
on genocide, not mere subjugation of his own people (McHale & Cutbirth, 2005).  For
example, Clinton stated that Milosevic’s campaign was not “war in the traditional sense”
(1999f, p. 451); rather this campaign was to “drive Kosovars from their land and to,
indeed, erase their very identity” (1999i, p. 757).  Milosevic’s actions were “ethnic
cleansing” and “genocide” the likes of which had not been seen since the “ethnic
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extermination of the Holocaust” (1999f, p. 452; 1999i, p. 758).  Although Clinton did
point out that Kosovo was not the same as the Holocaust, the two situations were
“related” because both the Holocaust and Kosovo involved a “vicious, premeditated,
systematic oppression fueled by religious and ethnic hatred” (1999i, p. 757). While as
many in the press and Congress pointed out (Paris, 2002; Stables, 2003), the Kosovo
intervention could not be equated with the Nazi Holocaust, the president saw similarities
between the two and proceeded to circulate that image.  Essentially the Albanian
Kosovars became like the Jews of World War II with Milosevic as the new Hitler, or
genocidal enemy.  Milosevic’s campaign against the Albanian Kosovars was another
head of the multi-headed hydra of chaos which only the United States and its allies could
stop.
Civilization
 In contrast to the uncivilized actions of Milosevic, Clinton justified America’s
intervention on the grounds the United States needed to defend innocent Albanian
Kosovars and bring an end to the atrocities perpetrated by the Serbian leader. Forcible
intervention managed Milosevic’s orchestrated chaos so as to restore stability to Kosovo.
Specifically, the president offered three arguments to defend American intervention, the
first being that the United States acted to save “innocent lives” (1999f, p. 453). He
assured his audience that America had done “everything we possibly could to solve this
problem peacefully” (1999f, p. 452).  The president related the Albanian Kosovars had
chosen peace and the United States “pledged” to “stick by them” (1999f, p. 452).
Milosevic, however, had chosen to pursue a campaign of ethnic cleansing, which caused
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immense hardship for thousands of Kosovars.  The death and destruction caused by
Milosevic made intervening a “moral imperative” because America was the “only hope
the people of Kosovo” had to live in their country “without fear” (1999f, p. 451; 1999f, p.
452).
Note Clinton’s use of civilizing vehicles because he gave the impression that
America’s use of force was a last resort and that the U.S. intervention saved Albanian
Kosovars from widespread ethnic cleansing.  For example, the president stated the United
States had attempted to solve the Kosovo situation “peacefully,” but the “only hope” for
Albanian Kosovars was American and NATO intervention.  The United States attacked
Milosevic’s military to save “innocent” people.  Intervention was the only way for the
United States to combat the chaos Milosevic had wrought while at the same time
upholding its image as the “defender of civilization.”  Clinton sustained America’s
leadership role by extending its ability to manage chaos.
Clinton’s second reason for American intervention was to prevent a “crueler and
costlier war” (1999f, p. 453).  The president implored his audience to think of what
would happen if the United States did not intervene, as a non-intervention would give
Milosevic a “license to kill” resulting in more “massacres,” “refugees,” and “victims
crying out for revenge” (1999f, p. 452).  More chaos would ensue along with more death
and destruction, which could spread to other parts of the Balkans and then perhaps engulf
all of Central Europe.   In contrast, the use of force by the United States and its allies
would contain the chaos to a specific area that could be better controlled, thus allowing
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NATO to stabilize the area and putting out a fire that could have spread across the entire
Balkan region.
Finally, a military intervention was justified “because our children need and
deserve a peaceful, free Europe” (1999f, p. 453; see also 1999k, pp. 913-916).  Clinton
assured his audience that intervening in Kosovo was part of American “national interests”
because if America was to be “prosperous and secure, we need a Europe that is
prosperous, secure, undivided and free” (1999f, p. 453).  The United States cannot allow
Europe to be “falling apart” because it “shares our values and shares the burdens of our
leadership” (1999f, p. 453). Intervening in Kosovo helped to achieve stability within
Europe, which was a “foundation on which the security of our children will depend”
(1999f, p. 453).  Again, Clinton connected the intervention in Kosovo to managing a
larger problem that might arise from Milosevic’s actions.  The United States intervened
because American children need a “peaceful, free Europe.”  American security and
prosperity depended on a Europe that was united and peaceful.  If Europe became
divided, it would impede its ability to continue to “share our values” and “share the
burdens of leadership.” In the long run, getting rid of Milosevic made both Europe and
America more secure and gave America a partner in controlling the various threats that
came with a changing international landscape.  In an interdependent world, the United
States needed partners to control its shape-shifting adversary.  Dealing with chaos
allowed the enemy to be confined to disrupting small pockets of populations instead of
the large ones which might eventually affect the direct security of the United States.
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Management of Milosevic’s chaos underwrote Clinton’s justification for action,
but if we take the reasons for intervention all together, the president’s Kosovo discourse
provided insight into what eventually became known as the “Clinton Doctrine.”  For the
United States to maintain stability in strategic areas, it must combat instability before it
spreads, which means the United States must combat genocide and ethnic cleansing
where it can (Klare, 1999).  According to Clinton, the U.S. intervention into Kosovo was
a “moral imperative” because of Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing campaign.  If the United
States did not stop the Serbian leader, a “deadlier and costlier war” would ensue.  As a
unified and stable Europe was better for American security in both the short- and long-
term and vital to future American interests, Europe could not be allowed to be “falling
apart.”  The Clinton doctrine was also a statement on managing the larger threat
environment.  The president’s stopping the chaos of “ethnic cleansing” and genocide in
one particular area prevented it from spilling over into other parts of the region.  In
essence, the Clinton Doctrine was one of managing chaos, keeping the problem in one
area before it became a larger one.  This management stabilized the larger area and kept
chaos in check, which in turn prevented the security of the United States and its partners
from being further threatened.
Although the Clinton doctrine was laudable, it was also seriously flawed and
unrealistic.  Up until the Kosovo intervention, the United States did not consistently
follow the principles the president put forth. The United States withdrew from Somalia,
stayed out of Rwanda, and went in late to Bosnia.  Through his own discourse, Clinton
limited America’s ability to enforce the Clinton Doctrine.  For example, in Bosnia and
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Haiti the president argued America would succeed in the intervention because the
mission was clear and limited.  This kind of rhetoric would hardly support the ability of
the United States to intervene to stop genocide. The president may have declared the
Clinton Doctrine, but his actions and discourse limited his ability to actually implement
it.
Conclusion
In this chapter I argued the Clinton administration faced a more diffuse, complex,
and diverse threat environment than his Cold War predecessors.  This threat environment
was characterized by chaos, which for Clinton was the enemy that replaced the Soviet
Union.  However, this adversary was a shape-shifting, multi-headed hydra which required
different responses depending on the situation.  Thus to define and manage this threat, the
president needed and employed a good deal of rhetorical flexibility.
I further maintain the best way to view how chaos underwrote this threat
environment was through examination of Clinton’s discourse concerning America’s use
of force.  The interventions analyzed—Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo—were all
battlegrounds in the fight against chaos.  Each intervention involved a different type of
enemy and different reasons for American action.  For example, the president depicted
the enemy in Somalia through the prism of a primitive savage, whereas in Haiti
America’s enemy was the more conventional modern savage.  The use of different
images of savagery to define various enemies was indicative of a chaotic threat
environment where each situation provided a different enemy and reason(s) for
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intervention.  However, even among these different situations, similarities ran through
Clinton’s rhetoric, which I will discuss over the next few pages.
The first similarity among all the interventions was that the president employed
civilizing vehicles in each situation.  These vehicles cultivated an image of the United
States as the epitome of civilization.  As depicted by Clinton, the United States was a
peaceful, rational agent who intervened in large part to save innocent lives and bring or
restore a semblance of stability to a part of the world.  Creating and/or restoring stability
to a particular nation-state and region checked the advancement of chaos.
In addition, the president emphasized the limited ability of American power to
solve all existing problems.  In Chapter Two, we saw that Clinton limited America’s
exceptionalist mission of intervention by arguing the United States could not “be the
world’s policeman.”  This depiction of American power in the post-Cold War world
stood in stark contrast to the Cold War where the United States would “bear any burden”
to defeat the foe.  The limited ability of American power carried over into discourse on
military interventions because the U.S. missions were limited in scope.  By
demonstrating the limitations on America’s power, the president implicitly provided
reasons for extending America’s partnerships with others such as NATO.  Partnering
with NATO, as well as other organizations and nation-states, demonstrated the need
America had for these entities who worked in concert with the United States to manage
the chaos in most interventions.  Keeping chaos confined to a particular area in turn
created a semblance of security for other areas.
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However, differences also existed.  First, there was one in the topoi utilized to
craft images of imperial and modern savagery.  Clinton’s discourse in Somalia and
Bosnia emphasized the quality of the chaotic scene over that of the agents involved.  Both
interventions were akin to those made in premodern societies bereft of any civilized
quality.  For the Haiti and Kosovo interventions, Clinton utilized the traditional
decivilizing vehicles of military intervention discourse to craft a savage agent.  The
discourse centered on the quality of the agent, not that of the scene, making both Cedras
and Milosevic epitomes of the modern savage.  However, the emphasis on scene
illustrated the flexibility Clinton needed in a post-Cold War threat environment that was
more complex, diffuse, and diverse than that faced by his predecessors.  Increased
rhetorical flexibility provided the president more rhetorical options to best assess and
justify how to manage the enemy of chaos.
Second, there were differences in the U.S. justifications for intervention.  In both
Somalia and Bosnia, Clinton emphasized that the United States must intervene to create
the opportunity for stability.  If the United States did not do so, these societies could
further devolve into chaos and American leadership would be questioned.  In Haiti and
Kosovo, the president outlined several justifications for American action.  In Haiti, the
multiple justifications included the primary one of the restoration of Haitian democracy.
For Kosovo, the president also presented several justifications for American action,
which when combined crystallized into the Clinton Doctrine—the president’s ultimate
statement on managing global chaos.   Ethnic cleansing or genocide was one head of the
multi-headed hydra of the enemy of global chaos.  By confining and stopping genocide in
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one particular area, the United States could keep it from spreading to another as well as
creating and/or restoring a semblance of stability within an area.  In turn, stabilizing an
area checked the power of chaos, keeping the United States, its allies, and the world in
general more secure.
Clinton’s employment of various rhetorical strategies to justify the use of force
was indicative of the complicated threat environment he faced.  In Somalia, Bosnia,
Haiti, and Kosovo, the United States confronted various enemies.  The broad range of
threats with which the United States had to deal was reflected in Clinton’s other discourse
on foreign policy.  For example, the president told a U.N. audience that the enemies of
America and the world were “terrorists and their outlaw nations sponsors,” “international
criminals and drug traffickers,” “forces of natural destruction,” “encroaching deserts,”
“famines,” and “deadly new diseases” (1995f, p. 948; see also 1995c, p. 253; 1996f, p.
1647; 2000b, p. 1758).  Here Clinton broadened the threat environment.  No longer did
the United States face the monolithic threat of the Soviet Union; now America’s enemies
were all transnational, stealthy, diffuse, and complex.  This enlarging of the threat
environment was one of the president’s foreign policy legacies.  According to James
McCormick (2002), Clinton’s foreign policy broadened the different forms of threat for
the United States to face and adapt, yet McCormick does not specifically outline how the
United States broadened this threat environment.  Through an analysis of Clinton’s
discourse, this project demonstrates the way Clinton constituted the threat environment
by employing different types of savagery to characterize America’s enemies and justify
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American intervention, thus broadening the way the United States understood the concept
of threat, and by extension, the threat environment.
Moreover, it was apparent from the president’s discourse justifying military
intervention that America’s adversaries could cause a good deal of chaos and havoc in
various ways.  These enemies were emblematic of America’s true enemy for the post-
Cold War world: chaos.  Olson (2004) pointed out the Clinton administration took
“global chaos in all its various forms, as the central foil” to American foreign policy (p.
309).  Chaos could occur anywhere and at any time.  As it could take a variety of forms,
it needed to be combated in a variety of ways, just as each military intervention brought
with it a different enemy and different justification as to why American intervention was
needed.  Clinton’s discourse broadened the rhetorical options available to presidents for
justifying the military intervention which were needed in a chaotic threat environment.
Analyses of Clinton’s discourse on Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo have
expanded how we theorize the rhetoric of military intervention.   The president’s
discourse on this subject was emblematic of the overall threat environment the United
States faced, broadened the rhetorical options future president had available to justify the
use of force, an demonstrated a change in logic over intervention.  In the next chapter, I
examine how Clinton crafted America’s grand strategy for the post-Cold War world and
the means the United States would employ to obtain it.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
THE CLINTONIAN GRAND STRATEGY FOR A POST-COLD WAR WORLD:
RENEWING THE LIBERAL ORDER NETWORK
In the last two chapters I analyzed Clinton’s discourse concerning two features of
America’s foreign policy vocabulary: America’s role in the world and the threat
environment faced by the United States.  The final feature of this vocabulary is
presidential articulation of a grand strategy, which is an overarching goal that secures
American interests abroad.  As I noted in Chapter One, a grand strategy is an integration
of a variety of components—diplomatic negotiations, economic policies, military force,
and institutional arrangements—to sustain American primacy (Wallop, 1993). A
president’s foreign policy discourse on grand strategy positions describes a number of
these elements the United States uses to sustain its interests.  Moreover, this rhetoric sets
the agenda for and instructs the public about what components are needed to ensure both
U.S. security and that of its partners.
During the Cold War, America’s grand strategy was containment.  Presidents
during this era differed on the specific instruments they privileged, but the underlying
goal was the same: to stop the Soviet Union and its allies from making territorial and
ideological inroads across the globe.  However, when the Cold War ended, America’s
foreign policy grand strategy was no longer containment.
Almost immediately, various figures in the foreign policy community advocated
different ideas as to what should replace containment.  For example, former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger (2001) argued the United States should use a balance of power
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strategy to best secure American interests.  William Kristol and Robert Kagan (1996)
lobbied for a strategy they called benevolent American hegemony.  For these two
authors, the primary threat the United States faced was that it would not use its power to
sustain its own interests.  For conservatives such as Kristol and Kagan, America’s grand
strategy should be to further expand its power by involving itself in various parts of the
world and actively working to transform those places for the benefit of American security
as well as for the people of that particular area.   These two divergent views were part of
the overall debate regarding the nature of American grand strategy.
 The discussion over grand strategy continued while Clinton was in office.
According to his critics, it was an arena of policy in which Clinton never provided a clear
position.30  For example, Richard Haass (1995, 1997) accused the president of being
unable to discern America’s vital interests or create a strategy around those specific ideas,
as the president vacillated between various preferences—Wilsonianism, economism,
realism, humanitarianism, and minimalism.  In other words, according to Haass, the
Clinton administration did not offer any specific, coherent ideas that could be considered
a replacement for containment and the administration possessed no vision for American
grand strategy in the post-Cold War world.
 However, others have argued the Clinton administration did offer a clear grand
strategy, with Douglas Brinkley (1997) suggesting that the strategy of democratic
enlargement replaced containment.  The goal of this strategy was to widen the
30 To examine the views of other critics of Clinton’s foreign policy, look to Dumbrell (2002), Huntington
(1996), Kaplan (1996), and Mandelbaum (1996).
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community of free-market democracies, with the primary component being the expansion
of free trade.  Because democracies are relatively stable governments which have
peaceful external relations with other nations, enlarging free-market democracies would
stabilize the international environment.  Kathryn Olson (2004) extended this argument by
maintaining enlargement was a highly flexible but coherent strategy the administration
used throughout its eight years in office.  This frame privileged presidential flexibility
and domestic prosperity.
My reading of Clinton’s foreign policy rhetoric is similar to Brinkley’s and
Olson’s in that I agree the president offered a grand strategy for American foreign policy;
however, my reading of the president’s discourse is that his grand strategy was to renew
the liberal international order through a network of policies, institutions, and
arrangements, rather than the strategy of enlargement.31  The liberal international order
contains four components: 1) commitment to open trade; 2) establishment of international
institutions to manage the economic environment; 3) domestic social safety nets; and 4)
partnerships, particularly security ones (i.e., NATO) generating commitments to mutual
security (Deudney & Ikenberry, 1999; Ikenberry, 2005, 2001).  Taken together, these
components create a network of policies, institutions, and arrangements that reinforce one
another and stabilize the international order.
31 I make this distinction because enlargement entailed only one component: enlarging and consolidating
the community of free-market democracies.  Renewal of a liberal international order entailed multiple
components that are interconnected to create and maintain order within the international landscape.
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This order was established in the postwar period of World War II, a period that
was a rare but important historical juncture.32  Prior to the World War II juncture, other
moments occurred when leading states or a set of states grappled with the question of
how to structure the global environment to serve their interests (Ikenberry, 2001).  In the
postwar era, the United States became one of the world’s leading powers, but the
Roosevelt and Truman administrations understood the international environment to still
be developing as the Cold War had not immediately set in after World War II. Thus, the
two administrations promoted a blueprint of a liberal international order to structure this
environment.  Both presidents advanced the virtues of open trade, widening of social
safety nets at home,33 and establishing of organizations such as the United Nations (UN),
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT)34 and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  This network of
instruments functioned to manage, shape, and strengthen an international setting serving
not only American interests, but also those of its allies (Ikenberry, 2005, 2001).  This
liberal order provided stability to the Cold War world.
When Clinton became president, he perceived the international setting as
undergoing a good deal of transformation such as the  accelerated interdependence of the
global economy, the rapid expansion of information technology, and the prominence of
32Historical junctures occur after wars or international agreements where leading nation-states must grapple
with opportunities to shape world politics and maintain order.  According to Ikenberry (2001), certain years
stand out as turning points: 1648, 1713, 1815, 1919, 1945, and 1989.
33 The widening of social saftety nets at home provided more domestic stability and allowed the United
States to spend more time on international concerns.
34 During the Clinton administration, GATT was transformed into the World Trade Organization (WTO).
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transnational threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, ethnic and religious
violence, and environmental destruction.  Secretary of State Madeline Albright best
summed up the challenge of American foreign policy: “we live in an era without power
blocs in which old assumptions must be re-examined, institutions modernized, and
relationships transformed” (Brinkley, 1997, p. 121; Ikenberry, 2001, p. 246).  In other
words, globalization changed the international environment which necessitated rethinking
and retooling the mechanisms of the postwar order of the Roosevelt and Truman
administrations.  This in turn provided the motive for the president to argue for
modifying and strengthening the work of the World War II generation.  I argue Clinton’s
discourse concerning grand strategy was to renew the network of components within the
liberal order as the president understood a strong liberal international order to be needed
to manage the problems of an era of globalism.
Clinton put forth three categories of arguments: “economic,” “institutional,” and
“regional relationships” that recast this feature of America’s foreign policy vocabulary by
privileging different instruments than his foreign policy predecessors. Taken together,
these arguments set the tone for the United States to advance reforms which in Clinton’s
logic helped to manage the opportunities and challenges of an age of accelerated
globalization.  Each set of arguments was part of a larger, layered, network of
connections where the United States could advance its own interests, but also share the
burden with other states and entities to deal with the challenges of globalization.
Moreover, this discourse guided an understanding of what the U.S. needed to do to renew
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its economy and extend its leadership.  Finally, this rhetoric provided lessons as to what
was possible and might occur by renewing the liberal order.
In this chapter I undertake the argument in three parts with concluding remarks.
Initially I analyze Clinton’s two primary economic arguments.  First, expanding free
trade became a central tenet of American foreign policy under the Clinton
administration.35  According to Clinton’s logic, increased exports fueled the renewal and
growth of the American economy as well as the global one, which the president
maintained lessened the anxiety of Americans because it provided more jobs and more
income for Americans and others around the world.  Simply put, the president argued the
more economic growth that occurs, the more internal and external stability exists.
Second, Clinton argued wealthy nations and international institutions must put a
human face on the global economy.  For the president, this meant they should create
arrangements and policies to harness it so everyone might have the opportunity to tap into
it.   This management involved providing debt relief for developing nations so those
nations could provide domestic programs—understood as social safety nets—to lift their
citizens out of poverty.  By providing such programs, these developing nations would
have a greater opportunity to reap the benefits of the global economy.  In turn, the United
States could eventually trade more with these nations, thereby expanding American
growth.
35 The expansion of free trade was certainly promoted by Clinton’s predecessors; however, it was never the
central tenet of foreign policy it was for the Clinton administration.  For a history of presidential discourse
on free trade, see D.B. Conti (1998). Reconciling free trade, fair trade, and interdependence: The rhetoric
of presidential economic leadership.  Westport, CT: Praeger.
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Clinton articulated these arguments through the employment of historical
metaphors, specifically the social contract metaphor and the myth of the American
dream.  These metaphors and myth served as guides as to what the United States could
accomplish if it expanded trade, but the president also believed these programs helped to
harness the benefits of the global economy.  The president renewed the liberal order
because he concretized the components of free trade and social safety nets.
The second part of this chapter explores Clinton’s discourse concerning
international institutions.  The president argued international institutions—primarily
NATO, the IMF, World Bank, and WTO—needed to reform to meet the demands of the
post-Cold War world.  He stated these reforms would offer more stability and legitimacy
within the global system. For this argument the president used historical as well as
natural metaphors to define what should be done to stabilize and secure the international
environment.
Finally, Clinton argued the United States must readjust its regional relationships,
primarily with Asia, Africa, and Latin America.  To realign these relationships, the
president employed two different forms of discourse.  First, he used what I call
confessional foreign policy in which he admitted the U.S. foreign policy sins of the past.
These confessions symbolically signified a symbolic new day in America’s relationships
with a particular region.  Second, Clinton employed the metaphor of “new partnership” to
emphasize how he viewed America’s alliances with Asia, Africa, and Latin America.  As
“partnership” is a family metaphor (Beer & De Landtsheer, 2004), constructing new
partnerships with these regions symbolically enlarged the U.S. “family” of alliances that
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allowed America to work in concert with others concerning the opportunities and
challenges of an era of interdependence and integration.
These three categories of arguments constitute the means the president articulated
to deal with what he considered to be a changing post-Cold War world.  The president’s
rhetoric functioned to position the United States to institute a variety of changes in policy
and arrangements with allies such as the signing of more free trade agreements and the
expansion of NATO.  In addition, his discourse set the agenda for and educated his
audience as to what he understood the United States needed to do to continue its position
as the world’s dominant power.  Taken together, Clinton’s discourse laid the groundwork
to readjust the liberal order for the new realities of an age of interdependence and
integration.  By recasting this order, he renewed this feature of America’s foreign policy
vocabulary.  In the next section, I examine the economic arguments Clinton made to
improve the liberal order.
Economic Instruments: Expanding Free Trade and Putting a Human Face on the Global
Economy
The first set of arguments Clinton made to maintain, modify, and strengthen the
liberal order were economic ones.  The president made two primary arguments.  First, he
maintained the United States must renew its economy through an expansion of free trade.
He articulated this argument through historical metaphor and the myth of the American
dream.  Second, Clinton argued the global economy must work for everyone, which
meant it must have a “human face”— that is it should be managed in such a way for all to
have the opportunity to tap into and reap that economy’s benefits.  For this argument, the
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president employed historical and social contract metaphors.  I begin this section by
analyzing Clinton’s discourse on expanding free trade.
Expanding Free Trade
 When Clinton arrived in office, he viewed his primary duty as renewing the
American economy (Clinton, 1994l, p. 2097; Clinton, 2004; McEvoy-Levy, 2001).  To
do so, the president pursued a strategy of aggressive economic growth through an
expansion of free trade. The passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the WTO round of trade talks in Seattle along with the three hundred
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements the administration negotiated were evidence of
the president’s constant promotion of free trade.  For this president, as free trade was the
primary means of renewing and strengthening the American and global economies, it
became the central precept of his foreign policy (Berman & Goldman, 1996; Conti, 1998;
McCormick, 2002).  Clinton reasoned expanding trade renewed the American economy
and expanded the American middle class.
 America’s economy needed renewal because for Clinton, accelerated
globalization rapidly changed the international environment.  The president viewed the
world as fragmented, but at the same time more integrated and interconnected than ever
before.  Commerce was global.  Services were global.  Information was global.
Globalization changed the way people worked, lived, and understood the world.
Speaking specifically about the changes in the global economy, Clinton used the
historical metaphor of the industrial revolution—particularly the rapid changes of that
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era—as a reference point for the rapid changes of the 1990s.  As he put it, the post-Cold
War world was a time of:
intense economic transformation.  It is the most intensive period of economic
change since the industrial revolution.  The revolutions in communication
technology, the development of nonstop global markets, the vast currency flows
that are now the tides of international business, all these have brought enormous
advantages for those who can embrace and succeed in the global economy (1995i,
p. 1567; see also 1993f, p. 1486; 1993g, p. 1613; 1997b, p. 560).
The industrial revolution symbolically stood for the post-Cold War era.  During the
industrial revolution, the manual labor economies of the United States and Europe were
replaced by ones dominated by industry and manufacturing (Landes, 2003).
Technological changes in manufacturing and transportation drove that revolution, which
in turn created economic, sociological, and cultural changes throughout Europe and the
United States.  These changes caused pain for some and profit for others as nation-states
were forced to adjust both economically and politically so they could survive and prosper
within the confines of the industrial revolution.
For Clinton, the changes brought by globalization were similar to the industrial
revolution, but instead of being driven by heavy industry and manufacturing, the global
economy—the new “industrial revolution”—was driven by information technology and
the mobility of capital and money combined with a system of 24-hour markets.  By using
this historical metaphor, Clinton brought all of the implications posed by that era into the
present. Like the industrial revolution, the new global economy caused a good deal of
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economic change.  It brought pain as well as creating profit.  Clinton argued that to
prosper, nation-states had to adjust to and embrace the changes of this new era, just as
they had done during the industrial revolution.  These implications provided the impetus
for Clinton to promote ways (primarily through free trade) to deal with change.
 However, according to Clinton America had not prepared itself for the new global
economy.  Recall from Chapter Two that Clinton claimed the economic changes
occurring within the post-Cold War world caused a good deal of anxiety for the
American people, especially the middle class.  He explained, “the challenge of the global
economy and our inadequate response to it for years is shaking the moorings of middle
class security” (1993i, p. 2014).  Here the president’s message was that the “inadequate
response” by the United States to the “challenge of the global economy” was creating
“middle class” insecurity.  Clinton’s use of the phrase “middle class” was important
because the “middle class” is an essential part of American political discourse that taps
into the overarching myth of the American dream (Hardt, 1998). The myth is a primarily
a materialistic story about obtaining success and prosperity for oneself, one’s children,
and one’s future generations (Fisher, 1973; Moore & Ragsdale, 1997).  By becoming part
of the middle class and furthering its growth, Americans essentially obtained this
American myth (Hardt, 1998).  But as indicated by Clinton, this dream was in jeopardy
for some Americans because the United States had not responded to the changes within
the global economy, with the inability to tap into the American dream causing middle
class insecurity.  By implication, Clinton’s presidency provided the leadership to assuage
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the insecurity of the middle class and offered the opportunity to obtain an adequate
response to the global economy.
 This adequate response came through Clinton’s promotion of expanding free
trade.  As he explained, the primary way to harness global change and renew the
economy was to “focus our efforts on expanding trade” (1995i, p. 1568; 1993a, p. 114).
For this president, expanding trade throughout the world was his way to achieve more
domestic security for Americans.  Thus his discourse put free trade at the center of his
foreign policy agenda.
 Promoting free trade led to three things.  First, it expanded how the United States
defined its national security.  Second, it led to an opportunity for the American dream to
be spread both domestically and internationally.  Finally, its promotion of free trade
could increase the spread of democracy and peace.  These three items interlinked and
reinforced one another, which further supported the liberal international order.
For Clinton, making free trade a central principle for American foreign policy
meant the United States had to readjust its definition of national security.  Traditionally,
national security concerns military matters, so American presidents often discuss national
security in these terms (Yergin, 1977).  However, in an international environment where
nation-states were interconnected and integrated economically, Clinton argued the United
States must regard the opening of free markets as a national security priority. As he told
an American University audience, “we must update our definition of national security”
for “it is time to make trade a priority element of American security” (1993b, p. 207;
1993b, p. 209; see also 1993i, p. 2015; 1996d, p. 791).  Because this president saw the
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expansion of trade by the United States as furthering domestic prosperity, economics
took center stage when conceptualizing American national security.  The president’s
emphasis on free trade broadened American foreign policy for a globalized world.
 Second, the president perceived expanding exports brought with it the opportunity
to expand the American dream both domestically and internationally.  Throughout his
presidency, Clinton touted the benefits the American people received from expanding
free trade.  For example, in an address to the Pacific Basin Economic Council in 1996,
the president stated, “in the past three years, our own exports have boomed.  They’re up
over 35 percent to an all time high, creating a million new jobs that consistently pay more
than jobs that are not related to exports” (1996c, p. 777; see also 1995h, p. 1548; 1998a,
p. 115; 1999a, p. 67).  Free trade was “good for high-wage jobs,” “rising standards of
living,” expanding the “middle class,” and essentially giving Americans a “fair shot at the
American dream” (1994k, p. 2056; 1994n, p. 2166; 1995a, p. 82; 1994n, p. 2167).
Clinton further stated that expanding free trade supplied American jobs that “pay more,”
raised “standards of living,” and expanded the “middle class,” which gave the
opportunity for the American dream to be realized by all Americans. As Mark Moore and
J. Gaut Ragsdale (1997) put it, “an increase in job opportunities and world trade will,
furthermore, increase America’s wealth, and the increase in America’s wealth will restore
(and symbolize) strengthen of the American Dream” (p. 8).  For Clinton, free trade led to
economic growth, which then expanded the middle class.   By expanding the middle
class, Clinton demonstrated economic leadership because he also expanded the American
dream for Americans.  Thus, his constant promotion of free trade rhetorically positioned
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the United States for an expansion of the middle class and the American dream.  For
Clinton, the larger the middle class the greater the economic prosperity and stability
America would enjoy.
 Clinton’s discourse also provided a lesson on how to achieve the American
dream.  Although the myth is primarily a materialistic one, there are no specifics as to
how to achieve it.  For this president, expanding trade constituted how the American
dream could be fulfilled for more Americans because by Clinton’s logic, expanded trade
led to economic prosperity.  This prosperity in turn expanded the middle class, which
then increased the prospects of achieving the American dream.  For Clinton, the linchpin
of achieving the American dream was for the United States to pursue an aggressive
policy of free trade.  The constant promotion of free trade by the Clinton administration
set the tone for the American dream to be expanded to more Americans than ever before.
  The president then proceeded to universalize the myth.  Free trade renewed
American domestic prosperity, but also assisted with an expansion in global growth.  As
the president stated:
It is simply not true that trade has, on balance, been a negative for the United
States and for other countries.  Millions and millions, hundreds of millions of
people have moved to middle class existences around the world because of more
open borders and more open trade (1999l, p. 933).36
In this instance, Clinton declared the “American” dream (understood as individual
material prosperity) was and could be shared by all.  For Clinton, trade not only helped to
36See also 1998j, p. 808.
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achieve the American dream, but for other nation-states, trade moved millions of people
outside of the United States to “middle class existences” where they reaped the same
benefits as Americans.  Further expanding trade allowed millions, even billions, to share
in this ideal.   By his reasoning, expanding the American dream created more global
economic prosperity and security, with security creating more stability within a society.
Thus as Clinton understood it, expanding trade supplied the building blocks for more
global prosperity within nation-states.  The more prosperous the nation-state, the more
stable it becomes, with an increase in stability among global nation-states increasing the
stability of the international environment.  The president’s promotion of global trade
served to facilitate the opportunity to stabilize the international environment, thereby
extending the liberal international order to secure American interests.
Finally, Clinton understood expanding free trade to be a way of increasing
international peace.  For example, Clinton told a United Nations audience “broadly based
prosperity is clearly the strongest form of preventive diplomacy.  And the habits of
democracy are the habits of peace” (1993g, p. 1613).37  Here, the president argued that
international peace was best achieved through global prosperity, but there was also a
larger argument within the above statements, as Clinton was implicitly relying on the
democratic peace thesis.38  For the president, the implied logic of this argument worked
like this:  The expansion of free trade advanced and solidified democratic gains across the
37See also 1993b, p. 210; 1994k, p. 2056; 1994l, p. 2100.
38 The idea that democracies are peaceful toward one another is known as the democratic peace thesis.  This
thesis was first put forth in the writings of Immanuel Kant and was revived by political scientist Michael
Doyle (2000, 1983).
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globe.  The more democracy was put into place, the more peaceful the world could be.
Finally; the increased levels of peace would facilitate an increase in the stability of the
international environment.  As indicated by Clinton, the expansion of free trade advanced
and strengthened democratic gains across the globe and led to greater international
stability.  Thus Clinton reasoned the promotion of free trade set the tone for an increase
in the level of security at both the domestic and international level.
In sum, Clinton promoted the expansion of free trade as a means for the United
States to harness the prospects of the global economy.  He did so by using a historical
metaphor and the myth of the American dream.  The president’s promotion of free trade
set the tone for advancing this tenet of his foreign policy.
The second economic argument the president made was to increase economic
prosperity for all.  An increase in economic prosperity for the entire world would give the
United States the opportunity to increase its overall prosperity because it could expand its
market base.
Putting a Human Face on the Global Economy
 Although expanding free trade remained the central economic argument
throughout the Clinton presidency, especially in his second term the president argued the
global economy had not benefited a good portion of the world’s population.  Spurred on
by economic crises in both Mexico and Asia, Clinton made a case for reforming the
global economic system so as to allow all people to tap into the opportunities brought by
globalism.  As Clinton speechwriter Michael Waldman (2000) stated:
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Since the global economy was exhibiting the same boom and bust qualities that
the national economy had suffered before strong national regulation was created
to stabilize markets, Clinton wanted to make a broader case.  The world economy
needed the kind of order and structure that had protected the domestic economies
of the United States and other countries (p. 231).
This idea of “order and structure” manifested itself through what Clinton called putting a
“human face on the global economy” (1998q, p. 1743) or creating policies that would
benefit the lives of all people, not simply one sector of society or a particular set of
nation-states.  For Clinton, enacting policies with this human face started with meeting
the challenge of creating a “world trading and financial system that will lift the lives of
ordinary people on every continent around the world or, as it has been stated in other
places, to put a human face on the global economy” (1999b, p. 277; see also 1998o, pp.
1572-1578; 1998q, p. 1743; 1999l, p. 933; 1999q, p. 2129; 2000c, p. 2658). Clinton’s
first and second clauses were connected by the conjunction or indicating the president
believed the way to “put a human face on the global economy” was to “create a world
trading and financial system” that lifted the lives of “ordinary people.”  Wealthy nations
and international institutions had a responsibility to make decisions and policies in the
best interests of all.  These policies benefited not only nation-states or specific economic
structures, but could provide direct benefits to everyday citizens.  “Ordinary people” were
more likely to be vulnerable to the changes in the global economy because unlike the
well to-do, they did not have the economic means to make large adjustments in their
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economic lives.  By making decisions with a “human face,” the prosperity brought to
some in the global economy could be extended to all.
 Clinton articulated two specific ideas to this end.  First, institutions and laws must
be set up to temper the cycles of boom and bust that led to the Mexican and Asian
economic crises.  Second, developed nations and international institutions must create a
“global social contract.”  To illustrate the need for the first idea, he discussed how the
United States had dealt with a similar situation within its own history.  In a
commencement address at the University of Chicago, Clinton asked:
How can we create a global economy with a human face, one that rewards
everyone, everywhere, one that gives all people a chance to improve their lot and
still raise their families in dignity and support their communities that are coming
together not being torn apart?...Through the Progressive Era, all the way through
the New Deal, for more than 20 years, the American people through their
government to try and develop a national economy with a human face.  What did
they do? They created a federal reserve law.  They then created the regulatory
agencies that preserved the integrity of our markets, the securities and exchange
laws, the commodities laws that govern the Chicago commodities market.  They
created economic policies that moderate the cycle of boom and bust…Our task is
to advance these same values in the international economy (1999l, pp. 932-933).
There are two important items from this passage.  First, Clinton’s use of U.S. history
illustrated what could be done on the international level.  The domestic economic
circumstances of the Progressive and New Deal Eras stood for the current international
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economic circumstances.  We have seen that the president stated there was no line
between domestic and foreign policy as both arenas impact one another.  Thus his use of
history was logical because what worked at the domestic level could be brought to bear
on the international economy.
 Moreover, Clinton co-opted the Progressive Era and the New Deal for his own
purposes.  Although the Progressive and New Deal eras were very different from each
other and from that of the 1990s, Clinton drew a parallel between those times and what
he faced; demonstrating the domestic economic decisions made during the Progressive
and New Deal eras should be emulated.  According to these domestic models, nation-
states and international institutions in the new global economy must do a better job of
creating laws, policies, and agencies to manage the international economy to guarantee its
success.  As indicated by the president, if global practitioners emulated what the U.S. did
domestically in the early 20th century, the global economy could flourish.  This new
economic model allowed “ordinary people” to tap into the opportunities of the
international economy, just as “ordinary” Americans had been able to do so.  For Clinton,
the historical model of the Progressive and New Deal eras became an exemplar for
managing globalization so its benefits could be felt by all.
Furthermore, note Clinton’s use of the phrase “20 years,” which is the equivalent
of a full generation.  According to the president, it took “20 years” for the United States
to develop policies and agencies to better manage the domestic economy.  At the
international level, the same principle applied, as Clinton recognized that putting a human
face on the global economy was not something that could occur overnight.  Instead it
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would take the creation of a number of policies and agencies over a generation so that all
citizens could reap the benefits of a more interdependent economic world.  The
president’s discourse positioned the United States to be an active participant and leader in
promoting these developing policies and agencies.  By making a case for economic
reform, Clinton argued that he put the United States at the forefront of global economic
leadership.  As the United States—and by extension Clinton—became the voice of those
who had not benefited from the global economy, this put the U.S. at the forefront of
economic leadership for ordinary citizens.
The president’s second way of putting a human face on the global economy was
through a reconsideration of the social contract.  According to Clinton, in a global
economy the world must reconsider “the nature of the social contract now” (1999h, p.
737). In classical social theory, the social contract is a metaphor that illustrates a two-
tiered agreement ensuring protection of citizen rights by the government in exchange for
limited political, social, and economic power (Tucker, 2001).   However, as Clinton
comprehended it, the global economy created a reconsideration of how the social contract
must be conceptualized, as the global economy created more interaction, more citizen
mobility, more integration, but also more economic dislocation for the ordinary citizen.
This process also changed the way politics must be conducted because problems that
exist in Asia were no longer just Asian problems: they became problems for the world.
The implication was that nation-states now have to care not only for their citizens, but
also work to care for people across the globe.  These new responsibilities meant a new
social contract needed to be created—a global one.  In this contract, there would be three
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rather than just two layers: international economic organizations and developed nations,
nation-states, and citizens.  Nation-states would still have a duty to offer their citizens a
basic social safety net such as health care, education, and economic opportunities, but if
they could not meet those basic ideals, economic organizations and developed nations
would have a duty to assist those struggling in the global economy.  As Clinton put it:
I think we have to acknowledge a responsibility, particularly those of us in the
wealthier countries, to make sure that we are working harder to make sure that the
benefits of the global economy are more widely shared among and within
countries, that it truly works for ordinary people (1999s, p. 2191).
Here Clinton argued that wealthy nations had a responsibility to make certain the
opportunity for economic prosperity was more widely shared.
For the president, America fulfilled this responsibility by embracing debt relief;
therefore in the latter part of the president’s second term, he started his global debt relief
initiative.  For his part, Clinton pledged to forgive the debt the world’s poorest countries
owed to the United States and he implored other developed nations and international
institutions to follow suit.  According to the president, “unsustainable debt is keeping too
many poor countries and poor people in poverty (1999n, p. 1631; see also 1999r, p.
2134).  According to his logic, poor nations could not provide their citizens with basic
services if they were burdened by a mountain of debt:
We have embraced the global, social contract: Debt relief for reform.  We pledged
enhanced debt relief to countries that put forward plans to use their savings where
they ought to be spent, on reducing poverty, developing health systems,
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improving educational access and quality.  This can make a dramatic difference
(2000d, p. 2700).
For Clinton, debt relief gave poor countries the opportunity to provide specific programs
that would directly benefit them: items such as “reducing poverty,” creating better
“health systems,” and improving “educational access and quality” that directly benefit
ordinary citizens.  As perceived by the president, these programs were the social safety
nets nation-states needed to provide their citizens in order to manage the negatives of
globalization.  The creation of these social safety nets is an important part of the liberal
international order.  By promoting and achieving debt relief, Clinton offered a specific
idea to better manage the global economy so all could benefit: rich and poor, developed
and developing, well-to-do and ordinary citizens.  Clinton’s case for debt relief
positioned the United States to continue to be a world leader by helping citizens deal with
the problems of globalism.  Moreover, the president understood this debt relief allowed
nation-states to spend their money on safety net programs.  The more domestic safety
nets, the more connections within the liberal order network there would be.  Therefore,
his discourse also set the tone to renew another aspect of the liberal international order.
 Clinton’s economic arguments for expanding free trade and putting a human face
on the global economy were his ideas for managing the opportunities and challenges of
globalization while at the same time positioning the United States to continue to expand
its leadership role.  This role expansion allowed the U.S. to manage the direction of the
global economy, which would surely benefit American interests.  Moreover, these
economic policies linked the United States with other nation-states.  In creating policies
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and arrangements through trade and a global social contract, the president reified one
layer of the liberal order network.  Clinton’s discourse on modifying international
institutions supplied the second layer to this network.
Modifying International Security and Economic Institutions
Construction and maintenance of international institutions is another essential
component of a liberal international order.  Institutions such as NATO, IMF, World
Bank, and the U.N. were created within a five-year period after World War II.  As
described by Clinton, these organizations were part of the architecture leading to
America’s Cold War victory.  For the post-Cold War world, the president held the United
States and the world must also “adapt and construct global institutions that will help to
provide security and increase economic growth throughout the world” (1994i, p. 1629;
see also 1993b, p. 210; 1993g, p. 1613; 1995b, p. 94).  Here, NATO, IMF, World Bank,
and WTO were the “global institutions” to which Clinton referred. According to the
president, these organizations must “adapt” to the realities of the post-Cold War world to
help stabilize the global setting.  By adapting to these new realities, international
institutions managed the massive changes wrought by globalization.
To make this argument, Clinton couched his specific modifications for these
institutions in both historical and natural metaphors that revealed what would occur if
these modifications took place.  They were useful guides in determining the need to adapt
international institutions for the 21st century.  In this section, I first analyze the
president’s reform program for NATO, then explore his specific reforms for the WTO,
IMF, and World Bank.
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NATO
 The president’s quest to modify global institutions started with adapting NATO
for the 21st century.  His program of reform called the “Partnership for Peace” contained
two ideas.  First, NATO should open its doors to new members, primarily the new
democracies of Eastern Europe.  Second, NATO countries should work in concert with
other nation-states, such as Russia, to develop trust among former adversaries as well as
coordinate military operations for similar missions.
Two motives drove Clinton to promote adapting NATO.  The first was the
common threats faced by all nation-states which made this adaptation necessary so the
United States and its allies could meet “the security challenges of the 21st century,
addressing conflict that threatens the common peace of all” (1997d, p. 689).  According
to Clinton, the “security challenges” of the new century threatened everyone.  The threats
of the post-Cold War world could appear in various forms in a variety of places, creating
havoc for the whole world and threatening the “common peace of all.”  As Clinton
understood it, expanding the number of NATO members and the missions undertaken
assisted in managing this new threat environment.  America and its allies could deal with
threats in concert, thereby spreading the burden among all states.  Clinton’s discourse
allowed the United States to persuade other NATO allies to embrace these modifications.
 The president’s second motive for enlarging NATO was to consolidate democracy
within Europe, resulting in a unified, stable, and democratic continent.  Clinton
explained:
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When President Truman signed the North Atlantic Treaty 49 years ago next
month, he expressed the goal of its founders in typically simple and
straightforward language: to preserve their peaceful situation and to protect it into
the future.  The dream of the generation that founded NATO was of a Europe
whole and free . . .Forging a new NATO in the 21st century will help to fulfill the
commitment and the struggle that many of you in this room engaged in over the
last 50 years.  NATO can do for Europe’s East what it did for Europe’s West:
protect new democracies against aggression, prevent a return to local rivalries,
create the conditions in which prosperity can flourish (1998c, p. 410; 1994a, pp.
11-12; 1996g, p. 1894-1896; 1997d, p. 689; 1999b, p. 273; 2000c, p. 2656).
In this passage, Clinton drew upon Harry Truman and the “founders” of NATO to create
a historical metaphor.  Recall the president previously had invoked Truman as a model of
presidential leadership in a time of international change.  For Clinton, Truman stood for
visionary leadership because he committed the United States to continuing its role as
world leader, with Clinton’s continuance of this commitment making him the heir to
Truman’s legacy of leadership. By continuing to commit to NATO, the president might
one day be thought of as a visionary leader in a time of transition just like his
predecessors.
 Similarly, Clinton invoked Truman’s vision for NATO, but also the “founders”
of NATO as well.  As indicated by the president, Truman and the NATO founders
viewed the organization as a bulwark to preserve and secure the peace within Western
Europe.  Their leadership was a lesson for contemporary leaders, including Clinton.  The
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president recognized this lesson and wanted to extend their example of leadership by
modifying NATO; therefore adapting NATO for the “21st century” continued both
Truman’s and NATO’s  visionary leadership.  Because he was the primary advocate for
modifications to NATO, the president again made himself the heir to Truman’s legacy of
leadership.  As Truman’s leadership in creating NATO helped to establish the liberal
order, Clinton continued this model in recalibrating the liberal order for the post-Cold
War world which provided the United States with a greater ability to deal with the
opportunities and challenges of globalization.
Additionally, note Clinton’s use of the phrase “NATO can do for Europe’s East
what it did for Europe’s West.”  NATO consolidated the growth of Western European
democracies after World War II.  Its earlier work—and earlier success—could be
duplicated.  For Clinton, adapting NATO secured the democratic gains made by Eastern
European countries.  A new NATO for the 21st century provided these nations with a
security mechanism by which Eastern European states could further entrench the
democratic process within each nation.  This deepening of the democratic process within
Eastern Europe would then fulfill the vision of the founders of NATO of a Europe that
was “whole and free.”  According to the president’s logic, because democracies do not
fight one another, Europe would thus become more stable.  By adapting NATO, he thus
fulfilled the founders’ mission of sustaining democracy and stability within Europe.
Clinton’s use of history provided both a lesson and a guide for future action: a stable
Europe that would give America a partner with whom to share the burdens of common
problems.
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In conclusion, President Clinton asserted that adapting security institutions for the
21st century was a primary means of securing greater stability within the international
environment.  Primarily he focused on NATO as a modified NATO could provide a
specific means to manage current and future problems while at the same time securing
the conditions for greater European stability.  The president made this overall argument
by demonstrating two motives for expanding NATO: to deal with common challenges
and to continue the leadership demonstrated by NATO’s founders, including Truman.
The renewal of NATO was the linchpin in Clinton’s ability to renew the liberal
international order.
In the next section, I explore the president’s attempts at reform in the international
economic institutions of the WTO, IMF, and World Bank.
International Economic Organizations
 Clinton argued that to fully realign the liberal order, international economic
organizations (IEOs) such as the IMF, WTO, and World Bank must be reformed.    The
president saw a problem in how economic policies were being formulated by IEOs.
Decisions were made by these organizations at the behest of powerful interests such as
trade ministers and CEOs in developed nations.  As Clinton noted, “for 50 years trade
decisions were largely the province of trade ministers, heads of governments and
business interests” (1999s, p. 2190). For Clinton, the fact the decision-making process
concerning the global economy was concentrated in the hands of a few individuals where
its secrecy and unaccountability was a detriment to the overall structure of the global
190
economy (Payne & Nayat, 2004).  By most standards, these organizations’ policy
formulations were undemocratic.
 To rectify this situation, Clinton argued IEOs must become more accountable and
transparent.  Speaking before the WTO meeting in 1998, the president declared we:
(M)ust recognize that in this new economy, the way we make trade rules and
conduct trade affects the daily lives and the livelihoods and the health and safety
of ordinary families all over the globe…The WTO was created to lift the lives of
ordinary citizens.  It should listen to them (1998i, p. 809).
 The important phrase here is “ordinary citizen.”  I have already demonstrated how
Clinton advocated “putting a human face” on the global economy would benefit the
“ordinary citizen.” Making the process of trade more open and accountable also benefited
everyday people.  Because decisions made by the WTO affect everyone, they should
include all voices that represent the “ordinary citizen.”  However, considering the
decision-making process of IEOs had been confined to a few individuals, these
organizations (particularly the WTO) had abrogated their mission to make trade decisions
to help everyone.  To be truly democratic and representative, the WTO must have outside
input on all decision making. By expanding the number of voices within the decision-
making process, WTO leaders would better serve their constituencies.  If representatives
of the “ordinary citizen” become part of the economic policy process, there is also likely
to be an increase in trust in these organizations, thereby strengthening the global
economy as a whole along with the liberal order that structures that economy.
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 Moreover, the president’s argument for a more transparent WTO made him the
champion of the “ordinary citizen.”  The role of the president is world leader, not leader
of specific economic ministers and CEOs.  By emphasizing the need to open the WTO
process to benefit the “ordinary citizen,” Clinton claimed to represent the views of
millions of voiceless citizens who had not benefited from WTO trade policies.  His
discourse gave him the appearance of a world leader for all citizens, which made the
United States the leader in attempting to reform the IEOs for the betterment of “ordinary
citizens” everywhere.  This argument allowed the United States to advocate policies that
would benefit its interests.
 Not only did the president make his pitch for more accountability and
transparency at the WTO, he also appealed to all IEOs to make their decision-making
process open to the public. He called upon organizations such as the IMF and World
Bank to bring their operations “into the sunlight of pubic scrutiny, to give all sectors of
society a voice in building trade policies that will work for all people in the new century”
(1998p, p. 1746).  Here Clinton used a natural metaphor of “sunlight” to illustrate what
IEO reform would bring, as sunlight works in two ways: the light of the sun allows us to
see objects more clearly while also warming the Earth for our survival.   In turn, opening
up the process of IEOs allows all people to view it while greater transparency “warms”
the IEOs, ensuring their survival and also that of the liberal order and global economy.
When the process is opened, more people are apt to support it, invest in it, and operate
within its overall structure.  The more citizens who operate within the structure, the
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stronger it becomes.  The stronger it becomes, the greater chance of survival for the
structure of the global economy.
As Clinton stated in a speech to the WTO in 1999, international organizations that
have “sought support and not shied from public participation; when that has happened
support has grown” (1999s, p. 2191).  As indicated by the president, opening the
decision-making process encourages support for these organizations and makes them
more democratic.  Earlier we saw Clinton’s commitment to securing the gains of
democracy in Eastern Europe through adapting NATO.  As indicated by Clinton, an
increase in democracy creates more stability with the expansion of NATO facilitating that
stability.  Likewise by reforming the IEOs to make them become more transparent, more
accountable, and more democratic, more stability is created within the global economic
system.  This greater stability then creates the opportunity to assure the survival of the
IEOs and the global economy in general.
 Reforming the IEOs was pivotal for two reasons.  First, IEOs must be adapted to
live up to the leadership of the World War II generation, a claim Clinton also made in
justifying the continuation of America’s leadership role.  Speaking before the World
Economic Forum, the president remarked:
Constructing a new international economic architecture through our trade
agreements and the revitalization of our institutions, is for our generation, as
pressing and important as building the postwar system was to the generation of
the Marshall Plan and Bretton Woods (1995b, p. 95).
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First, note how Clinton connected trade and renewing IEOs. As we saw earlier in
the chapter, expanding trade was a central tenet for his foreign policy in renewing a
liberal order.  Within this passage, Clinton intertwined both expanded trade and renewing
IEOs as the building blocks to a “new international economic architecture.”  For the
president, these two items served as building blocks for managing the international
environment.  They were part of the architecture that structured the liberal international
order for the post-Cold War World just as it had done for the Cold War.
 In addition, notice how he used the historical metaphors of the “Marshall Plan”
and “Bretton Woods.”  Both of these items stood for stability, as the “Marshall Plan” and
“Bretton Woods” were part of the “postwar system” that brought stability to the
international environment after World War II and contributed to the U.S. victory in the
Cold War.  The past was a lesson for the present in how to reform itself; therefore for
Clinton, revitalizing these international institutions was “pressing and important” for the
stability of the post-Cold War world.  In revitalizing the institutions of the Bretton Woods
system, the U.S. extended global stability within the international economy and offered
the means to further American interests.
 Clinton’s second reason for advocating reform of the WTO, IMF, and World
Bank was he believed the legitimacy of the global economy was at stake.  The president
argued “if we want the global trading system to have legitimacy, we have got to allow
every legitimate group with any kind of beef, whether they’re right or wrong, to have
some access to the deliberative process” (1999q, p. 1726).  The key term here was
“legitimacy.”  For an organization to be trusted and supported, it needed to have
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legitimacy (Hurd, 2002).  If IEOs were deemed illegitimate, the entire system they
represented may also be deemed illegitimate, which was a danger for American security
because the United States was so dependent upon the global economy for its continued
prosperity and security.  As Clinton understood it, making these organizations more
transparent and democratic would increase the legitimacy of the global economic system.
In turn, this legitimacy would strengthen the liberal order he was attempting to extend
into the 21st century.
 President Clinton advocated the modification of international institutions to deal
with current and future dilemmas by making them more accountable and transparent.
Reforming these institutions continued the work of the World War II generation as well
as increased the legitimacy of the global economic system.  Meanwhile, this reform
strengthened a component of the liberal order that provided more security for American
foreign policy and the international environment in general.
In this final section, I elucidate the third rhetorical component of Clinton’s liberal
order: recasting America’s regional alliances.
Reconfiguring America’s Regional Relationships: New Partnerships for a New Age
 The final pillar of the realignment of the liberal order was Clinton’s reformulation
of U.S. regional relationships, specifically with Asia, Africa, and Latin America.  To
recast these relationships, Clinton made two rhetorical maneuvers.  First, he employed
what I call “confessional foreign policy” in which the president acknowledges past sins
of U.S. foreign policy to establish a new relationship between the United States and a
particular region.  Second, the president used the metaphor of “new partnership” to
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characterize America’s relationships with Asia, Africa, and Latin America.  As
partnership is a family metaphor (Beer & De Landtsheer, 2004), his use of it signified a
new “family” of relationships for the post-Cold War world.  However, as not all these
partnerships were the same, Clinton characterized them in different terms depending on
the region.
 These two forms of discourse are related in that they both function to modify U.S.
relations with varying nation-states and regions.  Clinton’s recasting of U.S. regional
relationships created a communal sense of identification through common interests,
which then harnessed the opportunities of the post-Cold War world while at the same
time sharing its burdens.  In this section, I first explore Clinton’s confessional foreign
policy.  Then I analyze how he perceived the definition of partnership and its pertinence
to America’s relationships with Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
 Confessional Foreign Policy39
Confessional foreign policy entails the admission of past wrongs committed in the
international relations between various nation-states.  This form of discourse functions
similarly to community-focused apologia (Edwards, 2005a; Edwards, in press).  Rhetors
who use this form of discourse apologize for past injustices committed by one
community against another.  Most of these mea culpas have been for past injustices
perpetrated years, sometimes decades, earlier.  This form of apologia serves as a
39 I borrow this phrase from Robert A. Seiple (2005).  Confessional foreign policy.
http://www.globalengagement.org/issues/2005/03/confessional.htm (Accessed July 24, 2005).
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rhetorical first step in building, maintaining, and strengthening communal relations and
creating a communal sense of identification.
Confessional foreign policy is similar to community-focused apologia in that
rhetors,40 in this particular case Clinton, use it to acknowledge the transgressions of
American foreign policy to rebuild and strengthen relationships with a particular nation-
state or entire regions.41  In the context of renewing the liberal international order, this
type of discourse functioned in three ways.  First, it offered a historical reinterpretation of
the relations the United States had had with a particular state or region.  Second,
Clinton’s confessions distanced his presidency from the transgressions of his
predecessors.  Third, the confessions symbolically positioned the United States to achieve
better relations with a particular region or nation-state.  These confessions tore down
symbolic barriers which had served as an impediment to the improvement of U.S. foreign
relations with a particular community.  While together these confessions provided a way
to help to rehabilitate America’s interstate relationships, certainly these confessions did
not make amends for all of injustices caused by U.S. foreign policy, as many of the
relationships still need a good deal of strengthening.  However, Clinton’s confessional
foreign policy did help turn a page toward strengthened state and regional associations.
40 Confessional foreign policy is not necessarily unique to American presidents as a number of political
leaders within the world have admitted culpability for historical injustices committed by their particular
nation-states.
41 Clinton was able to make these confessions because the end of the Cold War gave him options his
predecessors had lacked.  If the Cold War had not ended, it is likely the president would not have
acknowledged America’s foreign policy transgressions.
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Africa
The president’s primary confessions were the acknowledged injustices the United
States committed against Africa as a whole.  Specifically, Clinton confessed to three
transgressions the United States committed against the African continent.42  First, he
briefly recounted American foreign policy toward African nations during the Cold War,
stating:
It is as well not to dwell too much on the past, but I think it is worth pointing out
that the United States has not always done the right thing by Africa.  In our own
time, during the Cold War when we were so concerned about being in
competition with the Soviet Union, very often we dealt with countries in Africa
and in other parts of the world based more on how they stood in the struggle
between the United States and the Soviet Union than how they stood in the
struggle for their own people’s aspirations to live up to the fullest of their God-
given abilities (1998e, p. 426; 1994e, p. 1150).
 Clinton thus observed the United States had not always “done the right thing by Africa.”
According to this formulation of history, during the Cold War American foreign policy in
Africa concerned the calculus of power with the Soviets.  The United States was “in
competition with the Soviet Union”—a competition based on who could obtain control
over the continent.  To contain the Soviets, the United States supported regimes in Africa
that were anti-communist, but not necessarily dedicated to helping their people “live up
42  I analyze Clinton’s confessions in the order he presented them to his audience rather than
chronologically.
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to the fullest of their God-given abilities.”  Clinton regarded the support of these regimes
as a mistake of U.S.-African relations.  Admitting the United States had made a mistake
during the Cold War allowed the president to reinterpret the history of U.S.-African
relations to suit his purposes, which was to demonstrate that U.S.-Africa relations during
the Cold War were an aberration. He viewed this past as a negative stain affecting the
progress of current U.S.-African relations.  Clinton’s confession was a means to atone for
America’s mistreatment of Africa and to write a new history of relations with the African
continent which would position the United States to strengthen its relationship with the
continent to manage the common challenges of the post-Cold War world.
 Furthermore, Clinton’s confession distanced him from his Cold War predecessors
who had dealt with African nations based on those nations’ support of the United States
or the Soviet Union (Laidi, 1990; Smyth, 1998).  Highlighting the misdeeds of the Cold
War implied the U.S.-Africa association had evolved during the Clinton presidency as he
would not make the same mistakes as his predecessors.  Considering the president
allowed the Rwandan genocide to occur,43 his rhetorical move was certainly audacious,
but by admitting America’s transgression against Africa, Clinton moved U.S.-African
relations forward because the confession was at least a first step forward in rebuilding a
U.S.-African partnership: a small step perhaps, but nevertheless one.
Finally, his confession symbolically started to tear down the walls between the
United States and Africa through his use of mortification, a strategy used when there is
43 During his Africa trip, Clinton did issue an apology to Rwandans for the genocide.  For an account of this
apology, see J.A. Edwards (2002). A superpower apologizes: Clinton?s 1998 address in Rwanda.
Unpublished master’s thesis.  Mankato: Minnesota State University.
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symbolic guilt.  Kenneth Burke (1961) argued societies find order through hierarchy.  To
maintain that hierarchy, a rhetor must meet the demands of society by acting within its
norms.  If that rhetor fails, the result is guilt, which must be expunged in some way.
Mortification is one way to expunge the guilt from the hierarchy.  For U.S-African
relations, the guilt was America’s treatment of the continent during the Cold War.  By
confessing the United States had not “done the right thing by Africa” during that time,
Clinton partially removed the stain from U.S.-African relations.  I say “partially” because
for the expunging of guilt to be fully complete, the mortification must be a full
accounting of particular crimes (Edwards, 2005; Negash, 2002; Tavuchis, 1991).  Thus
while a rhetor must “remember” the specific transgressions one community executed
against another, the president did not offer a full account of America’s crimes during the
Cold War toward the continent of Africa, much less a full accounting of America’s
mistreatment of Africa in general.  Nevertheless his confession did start to break down
the impediments to a better U.S.-African relationship left by the Cold War as it laid the
groundwork for putting the two communities on the path to create a better association in
the future.   For Clinton, a stronger association would allow the United States to share in
the opportunities and challenges of the post-Cold War world while adding another layer
to the network of associations the president used to realign the liberal order.
Clinton confessed a second historical injustice when he told an African audience,
“of course going back before we were even a nation, European Americans received the
fruits of the slave trade. And we were wrong in that” (1998e, p. 426).  However, the
president’s admission of guilt contained little in the way of specifics when detailing the
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U.S. involvement in the slave trade; instead, the president laid the blame for the slave
trade upon “European-Americans” who conducted it “before we were even a nation.”
Certainly, Clinton would have known the United States continued its own version of the
slave trade until 1808, twenty years after the adoption of the Constitution, yet the
president “forgot” to mention this information. Hence, his confession seemed
disingenuous because it seemingly relieved America of any direct responsibility for
slavery or the slave trade.
That said, the mere fact an American president admitted to an audience in a
foreign land that the slave trade was wrong was a positive step because it signaled an
evolution on the part of the United States.  Prior to Clinton’s confession, I am unaware of
any presidential admission of guilt regarding the slave trade, especially to an audience in
another nation-state.  As remembering transgressions of the past is the first step toward
getting past those transgressions and rebuilding associations between communities, by
merely acknowledging the crime of the slave trade, the president put the U.S.-African
alliance on more solid footing.44
Clinton argued the greatest wrong committed by the United States against Africa
was “the sin of neglect and ignorance.  We have never been as involved with you, in
working together for our mutual benefit, for your children and ours, as we should have
been” (1998e, p. 426; 1994d, p. 1150).  In confessing the United States had neglected and
ignored Africa, he implied the U.S. attitude toward Africa was wrong-headed.  American
44 After Clinton made his brief confession about the slave trade in Africa, there were calls from many
circles for him to issue a general apology on slavery.  However, the president never did issue a domestic
apology on the subject.
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presidents, unless it was the fight against communism, largely ignored African states,
especially sub-Saharan Africa.  Simply put, Africa has always been on the margins of
U.S. foreign policy.
For Clinton, in an interdependent world America’s relationship with Africa must
change.  The United States had to take a more active role in its relations with the
continent and work together with its nation-states to reach common ground for the mutual
benefit of U.S.-African relations.  By confessing America had neglected and ignored
Africa along with his other declarations of guilt, Clinton’s discourse served to partially
remove the guilt that served as an impediment to U.S.-African relations.  Although there
are still symbolic barriers remaining because the president’s confession constituted only a
partial removal, the rebuilding of U.S.-African relations was well served by the
president’s admission of historical injustice against the African continent.
Additionally, Clinton’s confessions extended the influence of American foreign
policy to every habitable continent.  They were a signal in the evolution of U.S-African
relations, which meant more U.S. participation with the African continent laying the
groundwork for a more constructive relationship, which in turn strengthened Clinton’s
ability to influence and involve himself in African affairs.  This association created
another connection in the network of arrangements the president sought in order to
strengthen the liberal order.  Clinton’s discourse attempted to position the United States
to rehabilitate its association with the African continent and thus provide another
connection in renewing the liberal order.
Central America-Guatemala
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Not only did Clinton confess to transgressions the United States had committed in
Africa, he also admitted the past wrongs of American foreign policy in Guatemala.
Speaking at a roundtable on peace efforts in Guatemala, the president noted, “for the
United States it is important that I state clearly that support for military forces and
intelligence units which engaged in violence and widespread repression was wrong, and
the United States must not repeat that mistake” (1999c, p. 340).  Here Clinton admitted
the United States was wrong to support the military junta in Guatemala during the Cold
War.  This admission of wrongdoing by the president was a reinterpretation of the history
of American foreign policy similar to what he had done in Africa, as because of the
military junta’s strong anti-communist stance, his predecessors most likely would not
have admitted that supporting it was wrong as this support served American interests in
winning the Cold War.  By apologizing for this American policy, Clinton rejected this
version of U.S. foreign policy history and sought to write a new history with Guatemala
during his presidency to improve U.S.-Guatemalan relations.
In addition, as with Africa, the president’s admission of guilt distanced his
administration from that of his predecessors.  Clinton sent the message that U.S.-
Guatemalan relations had evolved under his administration.  Moreover, his confession
implied the United States would not allow what happened during the Cold War with
Guatemala to reoccur under his administration.  Rather, Clinton’s presidency was a new
day in relations with the Central American nation, as in the post-Cold War world, U.S.-
Guatemalan relations were based on “partnership” (1999e, p. 347).  His admission of
guilt signaled the evolution of the interstate relationship which provided the opportunity
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for a communal sense of identification.  By building upon this common ground, Clinton
could then recast America’s association with Guatemala.
Finally, admitting guilt helped to partially remove it as a symbolic barrier to better
U.S-Guatemalan relations.  For Clinton, America’s guilt stemmed from its support of a
regime that committed “violence and widespread repression.”  By confessing America’s
guilt for its Cold War transgression in Guatemala as he had done in Africa, the president
symbolically eased an impediment to better U.S.-Guatemalan relations, thus allowing the
United States to build an association with Guatemala built on common interest, not anti-
communist fervor.  In doing so, Clinton’s discourse provided the prospect of a stronger
bond with the nation, which in turn was another link in the network of policies,
associations, and arrangements to realign the liberal order.
However, as the president did not offer a full account of America’s support for
this repressive regime, again his purification was only partial.  As I noted earlier, for an
association to find common ground, a rhetor must provide a complete account of the
transgression to fully expunge the symbolic stain from that relationship.  Clinton’s
Guatemala confession did not expunge America’s guilt from U.S-Guatemalan relations as
he merely made an ambiguous statement about having regret for the U.S. support of
Guatemala’s oppressive military junta.  While his admission of guilt may have been a
useful step forward to improving the alliance between the United States and Guatemala, it
was far from the full account needed to fully remove the symbolic barrier of America’s
past transgression.
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However, the president’s confession regarding America’s transgressions in
Guatemala continued later on during the same Central American summit.  Here Clinton
explained:
What I apologized for has nothing to do with the fact that there was a difference
between the policy of the administration and the Congress in previous years,
going back for decades, and including administrations of both parties. It is that the
policy of the executive branch was wrong. And what we're doing here is in the
open; it's not a secret (1999e, p. 347; 1999d, p. 344).
Note two things from this passage.  First, the policy referred to was America’s
support for anti-Soviet regimes and movements in Central America (i.e., Guatemala and
the Contras.)  While all Cold War presidents supported these regimes and movements,
arguably one of the greatest controversies over this policy arose during the Reagan years
when the administration illegally funded anti-communist movements in Nicaragua and El
Salvador (Bass, 1992).  Clinton contended America’s policy towards Guatemala and
Central America was wrong and needed to be acknowledged and rejected.  As such, his
position was also an implied rebuke of his predecessors, specifically Reagan, for
supporting such oppressive regimes and movements.  That rebuke demonstrated that
Clinton wanted the United States to have a different relationship with Guatemala and all
Central American nations.  It put U.S. relations with the region on a different footing, one
that opened up the opportunity to improve the overall relationship between the United
States and Central America.
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Second, notice how the president used the word open to characterize the U.S.-
Central American association under his presidency. Open when juxtaposed with the word
secret represented a present/past dichotomy.  During the Cold War, U.S. relations with
the region were “secret.”  However, the Clinton administration transformed these
relationships and brought them out in the “open.” An “open” relationship with Central
America realigned America’s relationship with the region.  In the context of a liberal
order, the president’s confessions positioned the United States to tear down old barriers
and start building and strengthening new relationships with these regions.  Stronger
regional relations intertwined the futures of all parties, thus laying the groundwork for
stronger future associations.  Better regional relationships also created more stability and
further entrenched the liberal international order.  Therefore, one rhetorical maneuver to
build stronger regional relationships was through confessional foreign policy.  A second
rhetorical maneuver can be found in Clinton’s employment of “new parternships” to
characterize U.S. associations with Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
New Partnerships in Asia, Africa, and Latin America
To further secure American interests (which the president also claimed were
global ones) Clinton argued the United States must establish a variety of new
partnerships. To be a true partner, “We should share one another’s burdens rather than
only talking of triumphs.  And we should speak honestly about what we feel about where
we are and where we should go” (1994a, p. 9). As I noted earlier, “partnership” is a
family metaphor (Beer & De Landscheer, 2004). For Clinton, partnerships were based on
common interests and sharing “one another’s burdens,”  with common interests
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furthering more cooperation to deal with persistent troubles.  Therefore, “new
partnerships” with regions expanded the “family” of alliances.  According to Clinton’s
logic, this expanded “family” worked for each other’s mutual benefit, but also helped to
temper mutual challenges.  Because they worked for similar goals and against similar
problems, those in these “new partnerships” would work in accord with each other to
provide solutions to situations.
 Although the United States shared its burdens with other nation-states, it was still
the dominant member of any partnership.  As Clinton put it, “while we seek to do
everything we possibly can in the world in cooperation with other nations, they find it
difficult to proceed in cooperation if we are not there as a partner and very often as a
leader” (1995j, p. 1596).  Note the president’s ideal of a new partnership involved a
power differential within these relationships.  Simply put, America was the leader while
other states and regions were junior partners.  As understood by the president, taking the
mantle of senior partner stabilized the international order, because as the United States
was the “indispensable nation,” American leadership in the partnerships was essential to
the partnership’s continuing evolution and strength.  By being the senior partner, the
United States stabilized the regional relationships and created conditions favoring
American interests.  These interests extended and strengthened the liberal order built after
the postwar period.
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Aside from Europe, the partnerships highlighted most frequently were with Asia,
Africa, and Latin America.45  These partnerships were the ones needing realignment
during his presidency.  For example, speaking in San Francisco on American foreign
policy, Clinton asserted:
We also create a more peaceful world by building new partnerships in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America.  Ten years ago, we were shouting at each other across
a North-South chasm defined by our differences.  Today, we are engaged in a new
dialogue that speaks the language of common interests, of trade and investment,
of education and health, of democracies that deliver not corruption and despair,
but progress and hope, of a common desire that strengthen in all our countries will
be free of the scourge of drugs . . .But the true measure of our interests lies not in
how small or distant these places are in or in whether we have trouble
pronouncing their names.  The question we must ask is what are the consequences
to our security of letting conflicts fester and spread? (1999b, p. 272)
Three items should be highlighted from this passage.  First, observe how the first three
sentences presented the president’s view on how America’s regional relationships had
evolved.  During the first Bush administration, “ten years ago,” America and the regions
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America had been shouting at each other, defining themselves
by their differences.  In essence, the first Bush administration oversaw a good deal of
45 I did not include Europe within my discussion here because U.S.-European relations were always a
bedrock of American foreign policy whether during the Cold War or the Clinton administration.  Thus,
Clinton did not need to establish a “new” partnership with this region of the world.
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family infighting.  In contrast, during his administration Clinton rebuilt these familial
relationships that now spoke a “language of common interests.”  In this sense, the
president appeared as the progenitor creating new regional relationships which added
another strand to the web of arrangements the president used to realign the liberal
international order to manage the challenges and opportunities of the post-Cold War
world.
Second, Clinton broadened how American foreign policy defined its “interests,”
as interests typically is a foreign policy term that indicates benefits solely to a particular
state with those of other states or peoples not being considered  (Lindley-French, 2003).
Recall the president argued domestic and foreign policy arenas were now inextricably
linked.   Similarly, when the president spoke in the language of “common interests,” he
indicated the United States must now consider the interests of other regions when
formulating policy.  Thus although the United States was the senior partner, for the
partnership to continue and thrive it still must give consideration to the needs and wants
of other regions.  In positioning American partnerships with Asia, Africa, and Latin
America on more solid foundations than his predecessors, Clinton renewed the liberal
order because he created another connection in the network of policies, institutions, and
arrangements that make up its overall matrix.
Finally, Clinton used the word security in association with the disease metaphor,
which has been a common metaphor in American political discourse since the founding
(Ivie, 2004).  As national leader, the president is the doctor who diagnoses the disease
and provides the cure for the body politic.  Clinton extended the disease metaphor to the
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global body politic.  As world leader, the president is also the doctor who diagnoses the
disease and provides the cure for the disease, in this case, the spread of ethnic and
religious conflict.  The cure was building “new partnerships,” which did not let the
“consequences” of these conflicts spread to other nations. Building “new partnerships”
meant the United States had more partners to manage international affairs and share the
burden of leadership.  Burden sharing based on “common interests” strengthened
America’s relationships while these relationships deepened the liberal order created by
the World War II generation.
Asia Partnership
In depicting the specific associations with Asia, Africa, and Latin America,
Clinton employed the metaphor of “new partnership” to define these alliances, but the
president considered each partnership to be slightly different.  For example, Clinton
indicated Asia was the most important new partnership.  He succinctly described his view
on Asia: “We need not choose between Europe and Asia.  In a global economy with
global security challenges, America must look to the East no less than to the West.  Our
security demands it” (1996h, p. 2136).  The phrase “we need not choose between Europe
and Asia” gave an implicit message that previous American foreign policymakers had
chosen between the two.  It was no secret that during the Cold War, America looked
primarily to Europe, not Asia, for the bulwark of its security.  But for a post-Cold War
world involving a global economy, common interests and challenges, instant
communication and accelerated interdependence at all levels, America needed a different
Asian partnership than the one it had during the Cold War.
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Constructing a new partnership with Asia was not particularly difficult because
the U.S.-Asian relationship was being built upon:
(S)hared efforts, shared benefits, and shared destiny, a genuine partnership for
greater security, freedom, and prosperity.  Given all the currents of change in the
region, I knew then and know now the road will not always be even and smooth.
But the strategy is sound and we have moved forward steadily and surely toward
our goal (1996c, p. 775; 1996b, pp. 595-598; 1998k, pp. 1149-1152; 1998l, pp.
1169-1174).
Here the president declared that Asia and the United States shared a “genuine
partnership,”46 which meant their relationship was based on true mutuality. The U.S-
Asian relationship was on par on a number of levels including economic, political
freedom, and technological advances.  Clinton understood only Asia to merit the title of
“genuine” partner because it shared so many similarities with the United States.
In this sense, his cognitive frame for U.S.-Asian relations became the
associational equivalent of Europe.  In a post-Cold War era, the president elevated Asia’s
place in America’s foreign policy universe because of all of the common roots of its
relationship.  Clinton’s elevation of Asia to a “genuine” partner demonstrated marked
differences among his new partnerships.  All of the alliances were rooted in similar
ideals, but the president privileged Asia, along with Europe, among U.S. regional allies.
46 In Clinton’s discourse regarding Asia, Africa, and Latin America, only U.S.-Asian relations were deemed
a “genuine partnership.” The president did use the term full partnership in some instances, but that title was
for specific countries and not regions.  Based on my examination, I concluded Clinton’s discourse did
reveal differences in the regional relationships he fashioned for the post-Cold War era.
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The president’s discourse thus positioned the U.S.-Asian association to be key to
managing the difficulties of the post-Cold War world which gave the United States the
ability to share with Asia the burdens of leadership in an ever-changing world.
Africa Partnership
The partnership discussed between the United States and Africa was truly “new.”
In Africa, the Clinton administration believed it essentially had to rebuild an alliance with
the continent as a whole.  This was partly evidenced in the previous section on
confessional foreign policy in which Clinton’s confessions functioned in part to repair
and rebuild U.S.-African relations because of the transgressions committed by the United
States.  Further evidence stems from Clinton’s discourse on U.S.-African relations.  For
example, speaking at a White House Summit of Africa Leaders, the president observed,
“when I become President, it seemed to me that our country didn’t have a policy toward
Africa, that we had policies toward specific countries, and very often we tried to do the
right thing” (1994d, p. 1150).  According to Clinton, no American president ever really
paid attention to the needs of Africans.  Prior to the Cold War, most African states were
European colonial possessions, with America for the most part staying out of colonial
politics.  During the Cold War as former colonies became nation-states, the U.S. and the
Soviet Union fought proxy wars over whose influence would dominate the continent.
Save for the fight for anti-communism, prior to the Clinton presidency Africa was not a
priority for U.S. foreign policy (Smyth, 1998).
This is not to say Clinton suddenly made Africa his number one priority in
regional relationships.  In fact, the president’s early debacles in Somalia and Rwanda
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signaled that the president originally had little interest in developing a different
relationship with Africa than his predecessors (Rothchild & Sisk, 1997).  Yet by his
second term, Clinton projected the image that Africa mattered to the United States, as a
new partnership with Africa shaped another connection in the means Clinton used to
secure American and global interests.
Clinton reasoned changing America’s relationship with Africa began with
viewing Africa through a new lens.  This was evidenced in greatest detail during his trip
there in March 1998.47  He recognized the 1990s as a period of rebirth for sub-Saharan
Africa as dozens of African nations worked to build free markets, democracy, human
rights, better systems of health care and education, as well as actively combating poverty
and disease (Diamond, 1998).  These accomplishments led him to assert, “It is time for
Americans to put a new Africa on the map” (1998d, pp. 419-420).  The phrase “new
Africa” signified what Clinton saw happening all across the African continent.  As he put
it, “Africans are being stirred by the new hopes for democracy and peace and prosperity”
(1998d, p. 419).  For Clinton, the United States walked the path of “democracy and peace
and prosperity” alone, but the 1990s became the first time when Africa and the United
States began walking a similar path to the future.  Thus a new partnership between the
two marked the first step in a direction towards similar goals and the furthering of
47 For a full account of Clinton’s use of the metaphor of partnership in his 1998 Africa trip see J.A.
Edwards & K.L. Daas (2005).  Bill Clinton and the rhetoric of partnership in his African tour, 1998:
Toward a post-Cold War foreign policy rhetoric? A paper presented at the 2005 Central States
Communication Association.
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America’s universal vision, part of which involved readjusting the liberal order to
strengthen U.S. foreign policy.
Thus in an interdependent world, the United States needed as many allies as it
could get to spread the burden of meeting global problems. A new partnership with
Africa extended the network of associations to all continents.  Crafting a partnership with
Africa served American interests because the United States could open up new economic
markets, engage in common security practices, and meet common challenges.
To make this point, Clinton stressed:
We need partners to deepen the meaning of democracy in America, in Africa, and
throughout the world.  We need partners to build prosperity.  We need partners to
live in peace.  We will not build this new partnership overnight, but perseverance
creates its won reward (1998d, p. 420; 1998e, pp. 494-496).
Again, the president’s use of the term partner suggested a relationship built on a shared
vision.  This association was reciprocal because a U.S-Africa partnership would “deepen
the meaning of democracy in America” and “in Africa.”  As Clinton indicated, the U.S-
Africa partnership was a new one, with the newness of the relationship meaning it would
take “perseverance” to grow and develop.  Clinton’s discourse suggested that for the
United States, this relationship had not progressed as far with Africa as it had with Asia
and Europe.  Consequently, America’s relations with Africa when measured against
partnerships in Asia, Europe, and Latin America were still at the bottom of the foreign
policy ladder.   Therefore although Clinton’s discourse on Africa was more substantive
than his predecessors when it came to establishing a U.S.-Africa relationship, it was
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qualitatively different from his discourse on other regional associations because the U.S.-
Africa partnership was not as developed as America’s other alliances, thus putting Africa
on the bottom of America’s hierarchy of relationships.
Latin America Partnership
Finally, in discussing a new partnership with Latin America, the president
attempted to recalibrate a relationship that ever since James Monroe issued his doctrine in
1823 had historically been considered America’s “backyard” (Cottam, 1994; Judis, 2004;
Skonieczny, 2001; Smith, 1995).  This “backyard” mentality provided the justification for
a number of American presidents to interfere in the internal affairs of Latin American
states (LaFeber, 1993). American foreign policy treated Latin America as if it were an
extension of its own territory, even though until 1898 the United States had no colonial
possessions in the region.
Moreover, American presidents built their relationship with Latin America on
paternalism.  According to Martha Cottam (1994), America’s image of Latin America
during the Cold War was one of a dependent that needed the assistance of the United
States to survive and prosper.  Because of America’s “backyard” mentality and
paternalistic attitude toward Latin America, U.S.-Latin American relations were never
built on a solid foundation of mutual benefit.  At least in theory, a new partnership with
Latin America had the potential to break down this dependent image and build better
relations within the Western Hemisphere.
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 In explaining his vision for a different partnership with Latin America, the
president relied upon two predecessors who had also attempted to build better relations
with the region.  Speaking before the first Summit of the Americas, Clinton stated:
In our own country, President Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy . . .sought to
unite the hemisphere by urging mutual respect among all and recognizing even
then, long ago, the importance for our interdependence.  Three decades later,
President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress inspired the peoples of Americas with
its vision of social justice and economic growth (1994n, p. 2168).
Here the president linked himself with the two most revered Democratic presidents of the
20th century: Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy.  Both Roosevelt and Kennedy had
attempted to recast U.S.-Latin American relations, with Roosevelt arguing for a Good
Neighbor Policy while Kennedy emphasized an Alliance for Progress.  These two men
represent concerted efforts by 20th century American presidents to recast U.S. Latin-
American relations (Smith, 1994).  According to this logic, Clinton’s efforts to build a
new partnership with Latin America made him the heir to these efforts.
As maintained by Clinton, a new partnership with Latin America was a
“partnership in prosperity” that was “embodied in our call for a free trade area of the
Americas by 2005” (1994n, p. 2168; 1998h, p. 585; 1998g, p. 582-584; 1998i, pp. 589-
590).  Although the president argued that all nations (expect for Cuba) shared similar
values, he privileged economic matters above all other considerations.  In his discourse,
Latin America moved from being the U.S. “backyard” to the U.S. “marketplace.”  The
paternalism associated with previous U.S. foreign policy was partially removed because
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the links between the United States and Latin American were now built on creating
mutual prosperity, not militaristic intervention.  I say “partially” because crafting a
relationship primarily for economic benefit did not allow for the advancement of a
partnership beyond a certain level, thereby continuing U.S.-Latin American relations in a
quasi-dependent status.  In making the relationship primarily economic, Clinton gave the
impression that Latin America perpetually needed America’s markets to succeed.  The
implication of his discourse was that without American prosperity, Latin America would
suffer.  Because of its emphasis on mutual gain, the president’s discourse rhetorically
impeded the creation of a “genuine partnership.”  However, the president’s discourse did
move the association forward, thus shaping another connection that renewed the liberal
order.
Therefore during his presidency, Clinton rhetorically realigned and strengthened
America’s regional relationships with Asia, Africa, and Latin America by employing
confessional foreign policy and a partnership metaphor.  Strengthening U.S. alliances put
the United States at the center of a network of associations.  These associations worked in
concert for mutual interests as part of a liberal international order, with these interests and
order favoring America.   Ultimately strengthening America’s regional relationships
furthered the entrenchment of a liberal international order which secured and stabilized
the values and interests of the United States as well as tempering the international
environment.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined the means Clinton privileged in his foreign policy to
advance American interests: economics, international institutions, and regional alliances.
In economics, Clinton constantly promoted the expansion of trade to create both
American and global growth.  Additionally, to help those who received benefits from the
global economy, Clinton proposed putting a human face on the global economy.  This
human face entailed having wealthy nations and international institutions create reforms
and policies to give developed nations and their citizens the ability to tap into the global
economy.  Structurally, the president argued international institutions—principally
NATO, WTO, World Bank, and IMF—must be reformed.  According to Clinton, these
reforms would lead to more stability, transparency, and legitimacy within the
international environment.  Regionally, the president strengthened America’s associations
with Asia, Africa, and Latin America by using confessional foreign policy and a
metaphor of new partnership to signify a new day in America’s regional alliances.  This
discourse served America’s interests of positioning the United States to extend its
interests into these regions.
These policies, institutions, and arrangements serve as the building blocks for
realigning the liberal international order created at the beginning of the Cold War.  For
Clinton, these were the means to create a network to harness the changes within the
global setting.  As Clinton put it, “we have to be at the center of every vital global
network, as a good neighbor and a good partner.  We have to recognize that we cannot
build our future without helping others to build theirs” (2000a, p. 135; 1997f, p. 1206;
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1998b, p. 138).  The United States was the “center” of the global universe, but for it to
specifically harness all of the changes the post-Cold War brought, it needed to promote
policies that lifted the economic boats of everyone and allowed them to achieve both
security and prosperity.  The United States needed both to reform institutions so they
created more stability, transparency, and legitimacy for the global system and to create
stronger regional relationships to “build our future” and to “build theirs.”  Using the
means described above, Clinton created this “network” which strengthened the liberal
international order that favors American interests and values, thus allowing U.S. foreign
policy to become secure and stable.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
IMPLICATIONS, THE PROBLEM OF ORDER, AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH
Over the last three chapters, I have analyzed Clinton’s foreign policy discourse.  I
have argued that a change/order binary underwrote the president’s rhetoric as Clinton
represented change as the guiding principle to define the post-Cold War setting.  For
American foreign policy to succeed in this changing global environment, the president
argued the United States must shape and manage this new environment.  Clinton
presented this idea of order through his use of (and modifications to) America’s foreign
policy vocabulary.  His employment of this vocabulary helped to define and educate
audiences as to the opportunities and challenges the United States faced in the post-Cold
War world, offered guidance as to what Clinton understood to be the most pressing issues
to American foreign policy, and gave direction to U.S. international relations.
Chapter One of this project outlined the basic functions of presidential foreign
policy discourse: to help define reality and instruct audiences concerning its nature.   I
then explored the three attributes of America’s foreign policy vocabulary: the role of
America in the world, the enemies it faces, and the means it uses to obtain its goals.
Finally, I discussed the specific procedures for this study, including the justifications for
studying Clinton’s foreign policy rhetoric, the different speeches I examined, and the
methods used to conduct this project (metaphors and myths.)
 In Chapter Two I analyzed how Clinton articulated America’s role in the world.  I
argued that amid what the president identified as a still-forming international landscape,
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he constantly advocated the United States must maintain its leadership role, but he also
identified the limits of American power.  Furthermore, the president’s continued
advocacy of American leadership positioned the United States to manage the change
brought by an age of accelerated globalization and to offer stability within international
setting.  For Clinton, continuing the U.S. role as world leader offered a semblance of
order in a sea of accelerated change.  An analysis of his discourse also revealed how he
tailored American exceptionalism by removing an inherent tension between the
exceptionalist narratives and modifying a basic claim of exceptionalism itself.
 In Chapter Three, I outlined how the president constituted the threat environment
faced by the United States.  Here I argued chaos underwrote this environment with chaos
for Clinton being a virulent form of change.  It involved the proliferation of threats such
as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, AIDS, and ethnic and religious violence,
which offered the appearance of an adversary that was a multi-headed, shape-shifting
hydra that could appear at anytime. As the idea of chaos constituted a threat environment
that was transnational, complex, and diffuse, it was thus qualitatively different from that
of the Cold War.  To manage this environment, I further maintained that Clinton
employed a good deal of rhetorical flexibility, meaning there was no specific construct or
justification for intervention or for policies to combat a particular threat to America and
its allies.  The flexibility in the president’s discourse created the opportunity for the
United States to manage chaos.
 In Chapter Four, I explored Clinton’s grand strategy for a post-Cold War world.
Here I argued Clinton advocated a grand strategy of realigning the liberal order that
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would further concretize and extend American interests while at the same time dealing
with the challenges of an age of global change.  The president’s discourse on realigning
the liberal order contained three categories of arguments: economic, institutional, and
regional.  Taken together, these categories created a layered network of connections
involving policies, institutions, and arrangements that could manage the international
environment.  I further argued this discourse rhetoric positioned the United States to
achieve its policy objectives and to offer audiences guidance as to what the United States
needed to accomplish in the post-Cold War world.
 The evidence of these chapters provides the basis to advocate that Clinton left a
rhetorical legacy in foreign policy.  As Olson (2004) astutely observed, the greatest
legacies a president can leave are the symbolic contributions he makes.  This analysis
reveals this legacy to be consisted of both unique contributions to American foreign
policy discourse and the modifications he made to America’s foreign policy vocabulary.
Over the next few pages, I discuss Clinton’s symbolic legacy by first discussing two
unique contributions the president made to foreign policy discourse.  Then, I explain the
modifications Clinton made concerning the role of America in the world, the threat
environment (particularly regarding the savage/civilization binary), and the means to
achieve American objectives, including individual aspects of each feature.  Furthermore,
I discuss the problem of order that runs throughout Clinton’s foreign policy rhetoric.
Finally, I posit directions for further research.
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Unique Contributions to American Foreign Policy Rhetoric
This project reveals that Clinton made two unique advances with regards to
American foreign policy discourse. The first advance concerned the logic of intervention
for the post-Cold War world and the second advance was his use of confessional foreign
policy.
 First, my analysis suggests that a different logic for the use of force started to
develop in the post-Cold War world.  I noted in Chapter Three that Cold War presidents
justified the use of force to defend the “free world” from the destructive scourge of
communism. These leaders language was defensive, which implies that America’s
interventions were designed to protect the American people and its allies. Analyzing
Clinton’s discourse suggests that the logic of intervention has evolved somewhat in the
post-Cold War.  Karen Feste (2003) noted that the post-Cold War logic for intervention
reflected a “positive, offensive, strategic thinking designed to shape the new
environment” (p. 3).  Recall that Clinton’s rationale for intervention, especially in
Somalia and Bosnia, was to certainly manage chaos, but there was also an underlying
subtext that America’s intervention allowed these two nation-states to build a “civilized”
political and social order.  Essentially, Clinton’s interventions in Somalia and Bosnia
were nation-building projects because America and its allies supplied security for these
states so they could concentrate on building institutions.  In this sense, the president’s
intervention logic was offensive rather than defensive because Clinton was not
necessarily defending American interests, but actively intervening in other nations to
change their societies.  This logic did not always necessarily work, as evidenced by the
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eventual American withdrawal in Somalia, but with the Clinton administration,
intervention became an instrument to shape and direct the global order in such as way
that coalesced more or less along the lines of America’s interests.
The second unique advance this analysis put forth was Clinton’s use of
confessional foreign policy.  The president’s confessions of America’s foreign policy sins
signified a different way to build relationships with nation-states and regions.  In the
1990s, a number of political leaders made historic apologies and confessions for
historical transgressions their state had committed against other communities (Barkan,
2000; Edwards, 2005a; Gibney & Roxstram, 2001; Lind, 2004; Negash, 2002; Nobles,
2005; Yamazki, 2005, 2004).  There were so many of these confessions that some called
the 1990s the age of apology (Brooks, 1999; Nytagodien & Neal, 2004).  Clinton
confessed to a number of historical wrongdoings committed by the United States in its
dealings with nation-states.  These transgressions served as symbolic impediments to
creating, rebuilding, and strengthening its relationships with nation-states and regions.
With his confessions, the president began to symbolically tear down these impediments
to improving relations among various nation-states. His admissions of historical foreign
policy misconduct by the United States were a first for an American president.48 Through
his confessions, Clinton positioned the United States on common ground with the states it
48 American presidents have previously admitted transgressions, but typically these admissions of
wrongdoing have to do with mistakes made by their own administration, while Clinton’s confessions dealt
with wrongdoings by previous presidential administrations.  Clinton was the first president to apologize and
admit the United States’s foreign policy misbehaviors to a foreign audience (Smyth, 1999).  It is important
because these transgressions create a symbolic barrier to advancing a relationship between nation-states.
For a comprehensive listing of apologies throughout history, see www.penn.edu/politicalapologies.html.
224
had wronged.  Achieving consubstantiality (see Burke, 1950) the opportunity for
America to create greater collegiality and cooperation among various states and regions.
This form of discourse may mark an evolution in America’s foreign policy rhetoric where
future presidents will be called upon to confess the sins of America’s foreign policy past.
If they decide to do so they very well may follow the symbolic precedent left by the
Clinton presidency.
Modifications to the Themes of America’s Foreign Policy Vocabulary
The second aspect of Clinton’s symbolic legacy can be found in the modifications
he made to America’s foreign policy vocabulary.  As I have argued throughout this
project the three themes of this lexicon have been the most salient throughout American
history.  They are the building blocks for a president’s overarching vision of U.S. foreign
relations.  The subtle modifications that have become apparent through this analysis
provide a deeper understanding of how presidents navigate and offer direction for our
international affairs.   For each theme I offer specific contributions this analysis has made
to our understanding of America’s role in the world, constructing a threat environment,
and grand strategy discourse.
America?s Role in the World
 The first attribute of America’s foreign policy vocabulary is America’s role
within the world.   This analysis of Clinton’s discourse contributes four ideas to our
understanding of this role and American exceptionalism.  The first contribution was
Clinton’s continued commitment to American leadership which allowed the United States
to maintain its position as global leader.  A second contribution from this analysis is the
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way Clinton expanded the use of the World War II metaphor.  By associating his
generation with the World War II one, the president helped to carve a legacy of foreign
policy leadership for himself while broadening how presidents use the World War II
metaphor.  Third, the president removed the rhetorical tension between exceptionalist
narratives so these two missions can now work in concert with each other to offer
understanding of U.S. foreign policy.  Finally, Clinton argued that American power was
finite, a recognition that modified one key tenet of American exceptionalism.
 The first contribution was Clinton’s commitment to American leadership.
Throughout his eight years in office, the president never wavered in his commitment to
continuing the U.S. role as global leader.  Voices on both sides of the aisle, such as Pat
Buchanan and Tom Harkin, called for various forms of isolationism or unilateralism, but
Clinton maintained a commitment to keeping the United States “the indispensable
nation,” reinforcing America’s role as global leader (McCormick, 2002).  Thus Clinton
maintained the continuity of his predecessors in ensuring U.S. primacy in international
affairs, thereby keeping the role of global leader securely with the United States.
 Second, the president modified the use of the historical metaphor of the World
War II generation to carve his own legacy of leadership.  The World War II metaphor
was invoked constantly by Cold War presidents to legitimize the fight against the Soviet
Union during the era.  Most of the current scholarship discusses the resonance of the
World War II generation for current American political culture because of the sacrifices
and victory its members won during the war itself (Adams, 1994; Biesecker, 2002; Noon,
2004; Stuckey, 1992).  In contrast the president employed the historical metaphor of the
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World War II generation for the transitionary leadership its members and Truman showed
in the postwar period.  Clinton linked the international circumstances he faced with those
confronted by Truman and the World War II generation.  According to Clinton, his
generation chose to extend the mission of intervention.   This commitment to American
global leadership in the post-Cold War era continued the rhetorical legacy of the World
War II generation in which its members demonstrated leadership capabilities not only
during the war, but after it.   In so doing, the president carved his own rhetorical legacy of
transitional leadership.  Clinton, like Truman, was a model at the very least for
continuing the U.S. leadership role as world leader.  Future presidents may thus use
Clinton as an exemplar of leadership in a time of foreign policy transition because he
continued the tradition of leadership.
Third, this analysis revealed how Clinton tailored the exceptionalist missions of
exemplar and intervention for the post-Cold War world.  Typically these two worldviews
are in rhetorical tension, as they were in the League of Nations debate earlier this century
(Baritz, 1985; Edwards, 2005b; McCrisken, 2003; McDougall, 1997; McEvoy-Levy,
2001; Stephenson, 1995).  However, according to Clinton’s logic, there was no division
between foreign and domestic policy as each dimension of policy influenced the other.
Renewing the American economy and community provided the grounds the United States
needed to continue its exemplar mission, as being strong at home allowed the United
States to be strong abroad.  Other presidents intertwined the two missions, but argued in
the reverse that being strong abroad allows the United States to be strong at home.
According to the president’s logic, fulfilling both the missions of exemplar and
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intervention were needed to sustain American peace and prosperity, but basing America’s
mission of intervention on the mission of exemplar marks a theoretical advance in how
presidents employ these missions.  Considering that the United States continues to
operate in a world that is more integrated and interconnected than ever before, it is
plausible future presidents will use the mission of exemplar as rhetorical grounds for the
U.S. role as a global leader.  Thus by using that narrative as grounds for leadership they
will continue Clinton’s symbolic legacy.
 Finally, Clinton’s exceptionalism discourse limited the horizon of American
power and modified one of the key claims upon which American exceptionalism is built:
that the United States can escape the devolution of power that eventually comes to all
states.  According to this logic, because the United States is the dominant superpower, it
will continue to be so as long as it stays committed to its exceptionalist values.  While
Clinton certainly promoted the United States as being exceptional, he also argued that
U.S. power was finite, not unlimited.  This argument helps explain why Clinton viewed
shaping globalization to be such an urgent matter, as in order to secure American
interests into the future, the United States should take action in the short-term to shape
the world for the benefit of both the United States and its allies.  By arguing American
power was not unlimited, Clinton modified one of American exceptionalism’s key tenets,
which rhetorically is a more “realistic” vision of the future of American power than
simply stating as some of his predecessors have done (Coles, 2002) that U.S. primacy
will be infinite.  This is particularly true as in the near-term, American primacy may be
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rivaled by other nation-states, so continued presidential advocacy of this argument will
continue Clinton’s rhetorical legacy.
As this brief discussion indicates, my analysis of Clinton’s discourse reveals he
left several legacies for America’s role in the world and for public understanding of
American exceptionalism itself.  The president modified this feature of America’s foreign
policy vocabulary in a way that reflected the challenges and opportunities of an era of
globalization.  This project also supplied insight into how Clinton fashioned the post-
Cold War threat environment.
Crafting the Threat Environment
 The second feature of America’s foreign policy vocabulary is presidential
construction of the threat environment.  An analysis of Clinton’s discourse on this subject
reveals four contributions to constructing the threat environment that appear in Clinton’s
foreign policy legacy.  First, the president’s use of both images of savagery increased the
rhetorical options available for future presidents in defining an American adversary.
Considering the United States continues to face transnational threats, future presidents
may continue this trend.  Second, scene was an important line of argument in crafting the
image of an adversary, as the emphasis on scene expands how scholars theorize images
of savagery.  Third, this study offered a fuller explanation of civilizing vehicles as
explaining what civilization vehicles are and how they contribute to constructing an
image of civilization provides important theoretical advances.  Finally, an analysis of
Clinton’s discourse expands how we talk about crafting a threat environment as looking
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at Clinton’s discourse on the threats he faced offers an expanded view of how presidents
constitute a threat environment.
 First, the president’s use of both images of savagery increased the rhetorical
options presidents have in defining an enemy.  President Clinton drew upon the imperial
antecedent introduced by McKinley into the foreign policy lexicon. For McKinley, the
modern savage was Spain in the 1898 war with the imperial savages being the Filipinos
who fought against American occupation of their land (Butler, 2002).  Clinton
reintroduced this image of savagery into post-Cold War foreign policy discourse.
Considering the United States still faces a pluralistic threat environment, future presidents
may continue to use both images of savagery to justify American intervention and to also
indicate the overall threat environment the United States faces.
 Second, the president’s discourse revealed that scene provided an important line
of argument in shaping the image of an imperial savage.  In constructing the image of a
primitive savage for Somalia and Bosnia, Clinton relied upon the qualities of the chaotic
scene rather than the actions of the agents involved.  In his original conceptualization of
the imperial savage image, Butler never outlined specifically how the primitive savage
was crafted by rhetors.  But based on Clinton’s emphasis on scenic elements, scene
should be added to the topoi on how presidents craft the image of an imperial savage.
 Moreover, these scenic qualities became part of the motive for America’s
intervention.  Typically in war and crisis rhetoric, the modern savage agent is the motive
for intervention (Ivie, 1980; Butler, 2002).  The qualities of the modern savage
necessitate American intervention lest more violence and destruction be imposed upon
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innocent populations; thus America intervenes to stop the savage agent.  However, in
justifying intervention in both Somalia and Bosnia, Clinton emphasized the chaotic
scene, whether it was in the present or the past, as a motive for getting involved.
America’s intervention brought the opportunity for creating stability within both
countries.  This idea of curbing the chaotic scene to create stability should also be added
to the analysis of why the United States intervenes within a particular nation-state and
why the United States continues its intervention.
 Fourth, analyzing how Clinton employed civilizing vehicles was rhetorical work
in need of further explanation.  Bates (2004) rightly pointed out the image of civilization
was little studied by those conducting analyses of presidential rhetoric concerning
military intervention.   Bates introduced the idea of civilizing vehicles to the way
presidents construct America’s image of civilization.  This project builds upon Bates’s
work because through this analysis I have demonstrated how Clinton used civilizing
vehicles in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.  Whether the image offered the
opportunity for stability (Somalia and Bosnia), brought democracy and freedom back to a
particular people (Haiti), or discussed America as freedom’s greatest champion (Kosovo),
Clinton crafted that image of the United States as a bastion of civilization to nation-states
who needed the assistance of American intervention.  These various justifications
supplied the groundwork to fully develop a theory as to how civilizing vehicles are
employed by presidents in the construction of America’s image.
 Finally, Clinton’s perception of the post-Cold War world expanded the overall
threat environment faced by the United States (McCormick, 2002).  During the Cold
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War, the threat environment was understood in well-defined bipolar terms.  In contrast,
the Clinton administration had to contend with a threat environment that was understood
as more diffuse, transnational, and diverse and in which the primary threat was chaos,
understood as a virulent form of change.  As new powers arise, weapons technologies
continue to grow, the world grows more integrated, and the United States continues to
fight a war on terror, America will continue to face a chaotic threat environment.
Clinton’s discourse expanded how we talk about the threat environment in which future
presidents will operate.  By using both images of savagery and discussing transnational
threats, American presidents can build upon the symbolic legacy of the Clinton
presidency.
Grand Strategy (Means) Rhetoric
 The final feature of America’s foreign policy vocabulary is the presidential
construction of a grand strategy.  My analysis yield three ideas as to how Clinton
articulated this strategy post-Cold War. First, this study marks one of the first rhetorical
explorations of grand strategy.  Second, Clinton put free trade discourse at the center of
his foreign policy agenda.  His understanding of the importance of trade was an advance
on how his predecessors had discussed it.  Third, Clinton articulated a grand strategy for
the post-Cold War world which continued the work of his Cold War predecessors.
Overall Clinton’s rhetoric signified a new way to rebuild and strengthen relationships
with nation-states and regions.
  First, grand strategy with an emphasis on specific instruments of that strategy is
something not usually examined in rhetorical studies of American foreign policy.  Rather,
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rhetorical scholars tend to focus their analyses either on a general orientation of
presidential foreign policy or on specific issues such as war and international crises
(Bass, 1985; Bates, 2004; Bostdorff, 1994, 1992; Bostdorff & Goldzwig, 1991; Butler,
2002; Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986; Dow, 1989; German,
1995; Ivie, 2005a, 2005b, 1984, 1980, 1978, 1974, 1972; Klope, 1986; Kuypers, 1997;
Pratt, 1973; Reid, 1976; Stuckey, 1992; Young & Launer, 1987).  I offered an expanded
view of Clinton’s foreign policy rhetoric by exploring the way he discussed economic,
institutional, and diplomatic instruments.  Taken together, these instruments created a
network of policies, reforms, and arrangements that reinforced the liberal international
order.  Clinton’s discourse set the agenda as to what he understood the United States
should accomplish in the post-Cold War world.  It served as a guide to what he believed
were the most pressing issues of the day as well as setting the tone for the United States
to achieve these various instruments.  By discussing the specific arguments Clinton made
for these various instruments and how they worked together to reinforce the liberal order,
this project expanded the way rhetorical scholars can explain American foreign policy.
 Second, this analysis revealed the centrality of promoting free trade for American
foreign policy during the Clinton administration.  Free trade has long been a part of
American foreign policy with presidents often promoting its virtues (Conti, 1998).
However, Clinton put free trade at the center of his foreign policy agenda both
rhetorically and politically more than any previous modern president (McCormick, 2002).
For Clinton, as free trade was the primary means of renewing the American economy
while at the same time extending American global leadership, he went to great lengths to
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manage the domestic and global economy through its promotion.  Considering the United
States continues to operate within an era of accelerated economic globalization, future
American presidents are more likely to put economics at the center of American foreign
policy and continue to promote the virtues of free trade.
 Third, Clinton had a grand strategy for post-Cold War foreign policy.  The
president’s emphasis on free trade, management of the global economy, renewal of
institutions, and recasting of regional alliances created a network of policies,
arrangements, and associations—with America at its center—to share the burdens of the
challenges of an era of interdependence and integration.  Clinton’s discourse set the tone
for enacting a variety of policies, reforms, and arrangements he understood would benefit
the United States and the globe and position America to create a network with the United
States at its center.  In turn, this network reinforced the liberal international order built
after World War II.  Thus through Clinton’s rhetoric, he created the opportunity for the
United States to expand and strengthen this order.
 In short, Clinton’s rhetoric positioned the United States to renew the liberal order
it established at the end of World War II.  By making free trade a priority, renewing
international institutions such as NATO and international economic ones, and
strengthening America’s regional alliances, Clinton created a network of policies,
institutions, and arrangements that served to continue American interests while at the
same time bringing the United States more assistance to manage the difficulties of an age
of global change.
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Metaphors and Myth
In Chapter One, I argued the authority to do criticism was not found in a
particular method, but in the argument a critic makes in a particular project.  Over the
course of this study, I found Clinton relied heavily on historical and natural metaphors to
make many of his arguments for a particular policy or continuance of America’s role as
global leader.  Clinton’s use of historical metaphors was especially prominent with the
president’s understanding of the past shaping our understanding of these metaphors.  His
use of historical metaphors served as a guide to present and future action.  For example,
in Chapter Two, the president’s understanding of America’s foreign policy in the
immediate aftermath of World War I was that it was a failure.  For Clinton, this failure
stood for isolationism.   The particular lesson from this historical metaphor was that the
United States should not return to an isolationist foreign policy.
 The World War II metaphor figured the most prominently in Clinton’s discourse.
As I noted earlier, the president’s invocation of the World War II generation argued that
generation provided a “civics lesson” for all American foreign policymakers.  The
foreign policy decisions of the World War II generation stood for exemplary transitional
leadership.  Here Clinton espoused the lesson that the United States should use that
particular generation as a model for the decision to continue as the world’s leader.
Moreover, Clinton’s use of Truman helped define himself as the model of transitional
leadership.  By continuing to lead, the president sustained the leadership tradition started
by the World War II generation.
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 Natural metaphors also figured highly in Clinton’s discourse.  For Clinton, these
metaphors stood both for the overall change within the international environment and for
what could happen if particular policies were enacted.  For example, the president used a
number of water metaphors such as “new river” and “rising tide” to describe the
development of the international environment after the Cold War.  These metaphors
depicted the post-Cold War world as a landscape still being formed. He also used the
metaphor of “sunlight” to illustrate what would occur if organizations such as the WTO,
IMF, and World Bank became more transparent, as by becoming more open (i.e., letting
more “sunlight” in), these institutions as well as the global economic system itself would
become more legitimate.
 In addition the president relied on the myth of the American dream which has two
strands—one moralistic and one materialistic (Fisher, 1973).  Clinton highlighted the
materialistic aspect of the myth.  In employing the myth, the president emphasized the
importance of free trade which for him brought with it better paying jobs and wages, thus
providing the building blocks to expand the middle class in both the United States and
abroad.  In turn, the expansion of the middle class tapped into the American dream.
Clinton used the myth in a very specific way to give a specific prescription about how the
American dream could be created.  Thus, the president modified the way the myth of the
American dream is used in that he offered a specific prescription of how to obtain that
dream when typically the American dream is not offered in specifics.  By offering a
particular vision of the myth, Clinton modified it for his purposes, thus potentially
providing a model for future presidents to use a similar argument.
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The Problem of Order
I have analyzed how Clinton used America’s foreign policy vocabulary.  In my
study of the president’s foreign policy rhetoric, an underlying theme emerged: a
change/order binary.  Clinton understood change to be the principle that underwrote the
post-Cold War international environment.  He claimed the changes of the post-Cold War
world, both positive (the increase in technology and accelerated economic
interdependence of nation-states) and negative (ethnic and religious nationalism,
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, rogue states, and drug trafficking, to name a few)
caused a good deal of debate among American foreign policymakers as to what U.S.
foreign policy should be, allowed anxiety to rise among American citizens who had not
adjusted to the realities of the global economy, and created a threat environment—chaos
being an extreme negative form of change—that spawned different problems for
American foreign policy.
 The idea of change as an underlying theme in the president’s discourse is not
surprising when you consider:
The 1990s were a time of considerable political angst in the United States—a time
when politics, both nationally and internationally was in a constant state of flux
and transformation.  Old paradigms disappeared and new ones emerged.
Economies shifted, alliances broke down and media proliferated (Parry-Giles &
Parry-Giles, 2002, p. 1).
In essence, Parry Giles and Parry-Giles described the 1990s as a time of constant change
as the United States emerged from the Cold War era to a post-Cold War world of
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accelerated globalization.  American foreign policymakers had to adjust to this new
reality to further American power.  Clinton’s foreign policy rhetoric was a way to create
order within this sea of change.
 Moreover, the president’s depiction of change was understandable when we
consider the end of the Cold War marked an important historical juncture in international
relations.  Ikenberry (2001) explained there are important (but rare) historical moments in
the conducting of international politics.  Typically, these junctures appear after major
wars as the aftermath of these conflicts involves great transformation in the international
system which leaves  the dominant power(s) with the puzzle of how to create and
maintain order in international politics (Gilpin, 1981).  The end of the Cold War was
considered the most recent historical occasion with the task falling to the United States as
the dominant power to create and maintain order within this new era of transformation.
 Clinton’s uses of and modifications to America’s foreign policy vocabulary
offered a sense of order.  His employment of this lexicon provided public understanding
as to how the United States could manage the overarching change and temper the anxiety
that came with it.   For example, in Chapter Two, we saw the president realize the
international environment to be much different than that of the Cold War.  For Clinton,
there was a good deal of anxiety felt by the American people concerning globalization as
well as America’s role in the world.  The president’s emphasis on renewing the American
economy and community while at the same time maintaining our role as global leader
was one way to manage both the change itself and the anxiety it caused.   Clinton’s
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commitment to America’s economic recovery and continued leadership offered an anchor
for U.S. foreign policy in a constantly shifting global environment.
In Chapter Three, this change/order binary was also apparent.  Chaos was an
extreme form of change that could appear anywhere, at any time, and affect any number
of countries with problems.  The president’s interventions into Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia,
and Kosovo were battlegrounds in the fight against chaos with his discourse offering
justifications as to why intervention was necessary: the use of force would manage these
chaotic conflicts so they would not spread to other environments.
 Finally, in Chapter Four, the binary was also evident within his discourse on
redefining the liberal international order.  Clinton advocated a variety of different
policies, institutional reforms, and arrangements—including increased free trade,
management of the global economy, recalibrating international institutions and regional
associations—he understood would create a network of connections, that when taken
together would work to manage and harness the challenges of the post-Cold War world.
The president reasoned this network would allow the United States to share the burden of
leadership.  Moreover, this network reinforced the liberal international order that had
been created at the end of World War II.  Clinton’s discourse positioned the United States
to maintain, modify, and extend this liberal order, which the president understood could
be used to create and maintain order in another time of global transformation.
 Further evidence of this rhetorical binary is evident when one considers the
number of historical metaphors Clinton used in his foreign policy discourse.  Primarily
the president relied upon the historical metaphor of the World War II generation.
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According to Clinton, the World War II generation endured a similar period of
transformation, but persevered and made American foreign policy and its international
leadership stronger.  As the World War II generation had managed their time of
transformation successfully, the president invoked this metaphor as a guide for what the
United States should do in its post-Cold War time of change.  The metaphor of the World
War II generation stood for visionary leadership in a time of transition in which  Clinton
hoped his generation would follow the World War II foreign policy leadership model.
By so doing, the United States could successfully manage the international environment
to the advantage of itself and its allies.
Directions for Further Research
This project presents a foundation for further research.  It introduced America’s
foreign policy vocabulary as a comprehensive way to understand American foreign
policy discourse.  It demonstrated how Clinton recast this features for his presidency.
Furthermore, it showed how the president used this rhetoric as a way to manage the
challenges of American foreign affairs in the post-Cold War.  Finally, it represented
another step in understanding Clinton foreign policy.
 Based on these ideas, scholars should consider examining how this lexicon was
used in America’s foreign policy past, particularly at key historical junctures when the
United States faced similar debates regarding its foreign policy as Clinton did during his
tenure.  For example, as similar historical junctures occurred after World War I and
World War II, a specific line of research should be to gain insight as to how presidents
(particularly Wilson, Harding, and Truman) employed this vocabulary to discuss
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America’s role in the world, the threat environment the United States faced, and the
means the United States would use to achieve American objectives.  Conducting this kind
of research demonstrates the utility of America’s foreign policy vocabulary as a
framework for examining presidential foreign policy discourse at times of historical
junctures and in general.
Along those same lines, future scholarship should first be dedicated as to how
America’s foreign policy vocabulary is used by future administrations.  Currently, the
War on Terror dominates the George W. Bush administration’s foreign policy discourse.
But how do Bush’s rhetorical constructions of this War on Terror work within the
confines of this vocabulary? Are there similarities between Clinton’s use of the
vocabulary and the current administration? Future research should be dedicated to
examining the similarities and differences between the two administrations as this kind of
research will help to further explicate Clinton’s rhetorical legacy.
 Third, more research is needed into examining each feature of America’s foreign
policy vocabulary because these features are a central part of a president’s symbolic
legacy.  When considering each feature, scholars should look at a number of questions.
As to America’s role in the world, some of these questions may include: how will future
presidents employ and modify American exceptionalism? Will they continue to tear
down the tension between the mission of exemplar and intervention? To what extent are
these missions being used in American foreign policy discourse, and what dangers, if
any, arise from the use of this discourse?
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 When exploring the topic of how presidents rhetorically construct America’s
threat environment, scholars should examine three issues concerning presidential
discourse: 1) the overall threat environment; 2) the specific justifications for military
intervention; and 3) the differences, if any, in the presidential discourse on military
intervention.  First, concerning the overall threat environment, scholars should explore
what specific enemy or enemies make up this environment and how they define this
particular enemy.  This kind of research will provide a better understanding of the threat
environment the United States faces along with the rhetorical options available to
presidents in various situations.
Furthermore, the United States will continue to intervene or threaten to intervene
militarily in various nation-states and the president will use public rhetoric to justify these
interventions.  Scholars should continue to analyze and explain the “vocabulary of
motives” (Ivie, 1980) American presidents use to justify an intervention on two levels.
First, they should consider whether these presidents have continued Clinton’s legacy of
using both images of savagery and the topoi used to craft those images.  Second,
rhetorical scholars should flesh out the various civilization arguments presidents make to
justify American intervention.  As I noted earlier, this aspect of the savage/civilization
binary is woefully understudied and needs more attention from scholars focusing on the
rhetoric of military intervention, as a better understanding of this metaphorical image
would offer greater insight into the evolving motives as to why the United States employs
force.
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Finally, more theoretical work needs to be conducted on various nuances and
differences in presidential discourse when discussing various interventions.  While it was
not the focus of this project, the interventions in which Clinton involved the United States
differed depending on the situation.  For example, strictly speaking the Bosnia
intervention was not a “war” in the conventional sense, as American troops were put in
Bosnia to enforce a peace agreement.  Thus the Bosnia mission may be an example of a
distinct American intervention.  Procter (1987) has already identified a distinct American
intervention he called the “rescue mission.”  As there may a variety of distinguishable
interventions within presidential rhetoric, scholars should explore how the different
missions may lead the president to use various nuances to justify the use of force.  This
may assist in determining whether different vocabularies of motives exist for different
interventions, which will in turn lead to an expansion of how we theorize about
presidential discourse on the use of military intervention.
Future rhetorical scholarship should also consider the various means presidents
privilege to orientate their foreign policies.  For example, Clinton put economic security
through the expansion of free trade at the center of his foreign policy agenda.  This
project provided an overview of Clinton’s couching this free trade rhetoric through the
myth of the American dream.  More rhetorical analyses are needed of American trade
rhetoric.  Although Conti (1998) and Kiewe and Houck (1991) are the only book-length
volumes on presidential economic leadership, trade continues to be a vastly important
issue for both U.S. foreign policy and the presidency.  More studies are needed not only
to understand the arguments presidents make concerning trade, but how they couch those
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arguments as well.  Understanding presidential rhetoric on grand strategy will assist in
understanding the evolution of these arguments as well as the evolution of the presidency.
Additionally, rhetorical scholars should continue to analyze and explain American
grand strategy in rhetorical terms.  American grand strategy and its specific components
have received little to no attention by rhetorical scholars although thetorically, the
president’s discourse positions the United States to enact specific various instruments of
American foreign policy.  These instruments are the tools the United States uses to
further its interests, deal with other nation-states, and meet the overall challenges of the
global environment.  Rhetorical scholars should explain, analyze, and critique these
means as to how they help or harm American foreign policy, as well as how they impact
the world in general.  These kinds of studies would provide a greater understanding of the
range of topics a president must set an agenda for and educate the public on regarding
American foreign policy.
A final area of research concerns Clinton himself, particularly his foreign policy
rhetoric.  He was president during a time of domestic and international tumult with his
discourse leaving a symbolic legacy that is in need of more exploration, especially in
foreign policy.  More projects should be undertaken to explore further the conclusions
made here as well as to discuss the administration’s triumphs, failures, and draws.  These
assessments can be made through explorations of Clinton and specific situations such as
NAFTA, the expansion of NATO, the Middle East and Northern Ireland peace processes,
the Mexican and Asian Economic crises, the Rwandan genocide, the relations with China
and Russia, and the expansion of democracy in the post-Cold War world.
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Clinton presided during a crucial juncture in the history of American foreign
policy.  His discourse maintained the continuity of his predecessors while at the same
time carved his own rhetorical legacy through his unique contributions and symbolic
nuances to America’s foreign policy vocabulary.  In the future, presidents may continue
to use some of these rhetorical legacies.  Thus only time and further study will be able to
fully explicate Clinton’s ultimate legacy on presidential foreign policy rhetoric.
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